The Southland Times. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1940. Invasion Problems for the Nazis

Southland Times, Issue 24236, 20 September 1940, Page 4

The Southland Times. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1940. Invasion Problems for the Nazis

ALTHOUGH there have been conflicting reports about the proposed invasion of England, two facts stand out. plainly and significantly beyond the flow of rumour. One is the continuance .of the struggle for air supremacy; the other is Germany’s continued preparation of invasion bases. When the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, pointed out that supremacy in the air is the crux of the problem’ it was echoing a truth that has been recognized in all the capitals of Europe, including Berlin. The Nazis probably assumed from the beginning that they would have little difficulty in smashing British aerodromes and in brushing aside the fighter squadrons. But although the easy conquest of France convinced them that Germany was irresistible in her march towards world dominion, they knew that nothing could be left to chance: to be thrown back from the shores of England would mean the destruction of the Hitler legend, a defeat that would resound across the world. If the Nazis had foreseen the difficulties of the air battles, and the stubbornness of British resistance, it is possible that the next move would have been in another direction. But it is obvious that, once an invasion was considered to be practicable, a vast amount of preliminary work had to be undertaken at high speed. Vessels, barges, munitions and supplies had to be assembled at the jumping-off places. Intricate staff work had to safeguard a transport system reaching in a network across Germany and the occupied territories. Large numbers of troops had to be brought to specified points and trained intensively in new tactics. Full allowance had to be made for losses in men and materials during the short blit dangerous crossing. And all the time the gaps made in a complex system by British bombs had to be hastily filled. Such work might not have been attempted unless’ the Nazis felt certain of ultimate success; but it would have been equally necessary if they were merely gambling on the chance that the air raids would give them the opportunity to attack.

A Change of Plan?

Now that the R.A.F. has upset their calculations, by bombing their bases and defeating the air squadrons, the question arises whether or not they will persevere in an enterprise which looks increasingly hazardous. The quieter tone of domestic propaganda suggests that they are preparing the German public for a change of plan. This may mean only that they are leaving themselves a way of escape from an embarrassing commitment should the further efforts of their air force prove unsuccessful, and there is no evidence that this stage has yet been reached. Ribbentrop’s latest diplomatic mission has brought a suggestion that the Rome talks ‘‘may have a good deal to do with a possible offensive in the Mediterranean if the Germans find that they cannot invade Britain with any prospect of success.” A Mediterranean offensive has always been regarded as an alternative strategy. Should it be undertaken in the near future, however, it would mean large and expensive readjustments to a waxmachine whose major strength has been concentrated near the Channel. Such changes are not beyond the organizing capacity of the German High Command, and the situation in the Mediterranean zone would at once become more serious. But a change of plan on so large a scale would mean a loss of valuable time, and the disappointment of Hitler’s hopes for an early decision. Above all, it would mean that, by preventing an invasion and forcing the Nazis to adopt a new policy, Britain would gain a success large enough to be called a major victory. It is too soon, of course, to do more than mention these possibilities. But every new day of Britain’s epic defence brings Hitler closer to an awkward decision. He must stake everything on a desperate enterprise, or withdraw with as good a face as possible to a new theatre of warfare.