“A GALLIPOLI DIARY”

Southland Times, Issue 18823, 17 May 1920, Page 5

“A GALLIPOLI DIARY”

SIR lAN HAMILTON’S BOOK. A STARTLING INDICTMENT. (By Telegraph.—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (Australian and N.Z. Cable Association.) LONDON, May 14. (Received May 16, 5.5 p.m.) The Australian Press Association has secured the rights of early publication of Sir lan Hamilton’s “A Gallipoli Diary.” It contains remarkable revelations of the early days of the campaign. Sir lan Hamilton, in the preface to his diary, says: “I will not leave my diary to be flung to posterity behind the cover of my coffin. If any one wishes to challenge its contents I am above ground to give him satisfaction.” The book contains a remarkable record of official short-sightedness, but is even more noteworthy as a revelation of the personality of such a commander of a great fighting force as is rarely given to the world.

j Referring to the attitude of the Press | Bureau and the War Office’s desire for secrecy, Sir lan Hamilton has recorded: “Some newspaper correspondents have arrived. I told them to do whatever they damned well pleased.” The diary is published in two volumes. Sir lan Hamilton in the early chapters graphically describes his meeting with Lord Kitchener to discuss the operations at the Dardanelles. Referring to the sending of the 29th Division Lord Kitchener said: “You might just as well realise at once that G.H.Q. in France will not agree to this. They think they have only to drive the Germans back 50 miles to win the war. French and his staff believe firmly that they can pitch camp in a corner of Europe and fight the world war to a finish. The thing is absurd, but French plus France are a strong combination. They are fighting tooth and nail for the 29th Division. It must be clearly understood that all things ear-marked for the East are regarded by powerful interests at Home and in France as being stolen from the West.” Generals Wolfe Murray, Archie Murray and Braithwaito were then called in by Lord Kitchener. This was apparently the first either of the Murrays heard of the Dardanelles project, and both seemed taken aback. General Braithwaite said we should have better air services than the Turks, and ho begged that wo should be equipped with up-to-date aeroplanes, pilots and observers. Lord Kitchener exploded and said “Not one.” Lord Kitchener was perfectly sure that the fleet would get through the Dardanelles, and that a revolution would occur among the Turks at mere sight of the smoke of the wershipsP Lord Kitchener added: “The, moment the holding of Constantinople comes along the French and Russians will be very jealous and prickly. Therefore the more we efface ourselves at that stage the better.” He (Lord Kitchener) was pleased that we could let the French and Russians garrison at Constantinople and sing their hymns at St. Sophia whilst we held the railway and perhaps Adrianople. Sir lan Hamilton refers to Lord Kitchener’s desire in pre-war days to become Viceroy of India or Ambassador at Constantinople. He says that under Kitchener India could have beaten the Turk single handed, while as Ambassador at Constantinople he would have prevented Turkey from entering the war. . “The Intelligence Branch was hopeless,” he saj's. “It did not know anything about the enemy’s strength or guns. Mr Winstoa Churchill was in a fever to get us off. On the German system the plans for the landing would have been in my pocket worked out to a cartridge or a pail of water. By the British system I was obliged to concoct ir.y own plan in a brace of shakes, almost under fire. Our way may have merits strategically and tactically, but in the matter of supply and transport organisation and administration it is the way of Colney iic.i vh.’ “When I took farewell of Lord Kitchener he said, ‘lf the fleet gets through, Constantinople will fall itself. You will have won not a battle but the war.' ” Sir lun Hamilton throughout the campaign sent hundreds of cables appealing firstly for men, and then for more and more ammunition. Lord Kitchener told him that Sir William Maxwell would give him any support he wanted from Egypt, but Sir William Maxwell would not do anything because he had his own show to run. “Lord Kitchener gave fair warning that I must not embroil him with Lord French, France, or the British politicians by squeezing him for more troops. I took the job on these terms, hoping for help from Egypt, but I got the chilliest of refusals. The quidnuncs in London said with complacency that my 60,000 bayonets were enough to overturn the Turkish Empire. So they would, but I did not have that number for the battle line. Exactly half my bayonets spent the whole night carrying water, ammunition, and supplies, and the other half were up all night in the firing line, armed mostly with spades, digging desperately. Now and then there was a hell of a fight, but that was incidental and a relief. Civilians at Home think we were like those in France, with motor transport at our backs. My troops were becoming thoroughly worn out, and our regiments would not he their superb solve* until their terrible losses were made good.” Sir lan Hamilton refers to the visit of Mr , an Australian journalist, armed with letters from Mr Fisher and Senator Pearce. He confesses that in his anxiety to oblige he exceeded his powers in permitting the visit, but Mr signed a declaration solemnly undertaking to observe the censorship rules. “Mr admitted that his mind was a blank about soldiers and soldiering.” Sir lan Hamilton continues, “and he made mo uncomfortable by his elaborate explanation why his duty to Australia could be better done by pen than by rifle.” Sir lan Hamilton received from the Secretary of War a copy of Mr 's criticisms sent to Mr Fisher, and Mr Asquith, whereupon Sir lon says, "I careuflly read this Guy Fawkes epistle, but 1 should not have worried about the outpourings of my late guest but for Mr Asquith’s clothing them in a State paper. Here we see an irresponsible statement by an ignorant man, and I feel that it was Heine used as one more weapon to force Mr Asquith’s hand and ruin our last chance. Mr Asquith may have believed ’s statement that Maxwell had a poor brain for a big proposition, or that Birdwood hadn’t fighting quality. The big brain of the great General was also convinced that the Turk was a better man than those who opposed him. —— saw nothing of the Turks. These reckless scraps of hearsay would have been worthless, if they had not been endorsed with the stamp of the Ministerial holy of holies.” Sir lan Hamilton stated that the Turks got. wind of the first date of the landing from London, via Vienna, and he comments : "The least said to the Cabinet, the lenrt leakage.” While the new Territorial divisions were coming prior to Suvla, Sir lan Hamilton impressed on the War Office to send young, energetic officers and he adds: “I knew the hopes Lord Kitchener built on these magnificent divisions. I knew that he was also capable of understanding how he had cut his own throat, the men’s throats and mine by not sending young up-to-date generals.” “There was a division which landed victoriously, rested and watered, which its commanders said could not bestir itself, even feebly, for 12 hours. I told Hammersley that the brigade must advance at once and dig in on the crest line, but I did not learn until two years later that the brigade was not concentrated. If oven one company had been well entrenched on Tokke Tope height we should have had the whip hand for the next manoeuvre, but on August 9 the Turks rolled up our line. The misery of the scene well nigh broke my heart. Our occupation of key positions had come too late. Had Stopford taken up any point of the watershed one-eighth of the whole Turkish position on the peninsula would have become critical. Stopford said his Territorials could not secure the hills as the attacking spirit was absent owing to want of leadership by the officers, yet at Anzac these Territorials, under General Godley, fought like lions.