THE POLICY OF HUMILIATING FRANCE.

Southland Times, Issue 1344, 6 December 1870, Page 3

THE POLICY OF HUMILIATING FRANCE.

;-> (From the Spectator). "We do not pretend for a moment that we have got very far in the solution of the practical question, when we have laid it down that the object of humiliating France for the sake of humiliating her, is not one which it is legitimate to contemplate, even in a, treaty of peace. It may be very well replied that a precaution "which involves a greafflfufMliaiiuii ~isroirothing, and the deliberate wish to Humiliate quite another, and we heartily acknowledge the distinction. For instance, it may be and must be a humiliation .to France to pay a great pecuniary indemnification for the war, and yet it would be an act of grand __and__ perhaps almost indefensible generosity, if "the Prussians, who have lost so much in life and wealth and happiness by a war which they did not originate, were to decline to ask for any such indemnification— Still it is a point gained if it. be. admitted . that the object of the treaty of peace ought not to be the further humiliation of France— though no doubt a humiliation, and perhaps a very wholesome humiliation of aE kinds, must be involved in the mere fact of complete defeat and capitulation. A humiliation incidental- to the result of the war is one thing ; a further humiliation deliberately contemplated as the object of the terms of peace, quite i another. The humiliation that is inseparable from the part a nation has acted can never be resented in cold blood, like a humiliation inflicted for its own sake. We maintain that for the sake of Germany itself, for, the sake of France, and for the sake of Europe, it should be the wisdom of the conqueror to leave behind him no vestiges of a deliberate intention to lacerate the heart of the conquered pepple^even, though it be absolufely certain — as no doubt it is— that had the conquered people been conquerors instead of conquered, they would, have felt no scruple about the deliberate humiliation of Germany. ; For the sake of Germany, then, we think the needless humiliation of France in the highest degree undesirable, because Germany would defeat Franc© a second time— though it would be a. painless and an ennobling defeat— in adopting a policy so wholly unique, and so infinitely greater than that which animated the French invasion. Germany is surely strong enough to neglect military considerations so relatively important as the gain of a strongly fortified frontier on the Vosges. But if- she fee strong enough to neglect such considerations, how marvellously would it exalt her position, in Europe and the character of her people if she, can take up at once the part of the great pacific power which makes war not for glory, but. for duty ; and after defeating what was supposed to be the most military people in Europe by a military: spirit infinitely stronger, lecause more self-contained and modest, decline even to entertain those notions of; aggrandizement which were the ,great spur to the French invasion. This would indeed be entering on a new and original path of political influence, and one strictly akin to the genius of the_German people. To have" shown tnatfthat ?nation, Vhicl can make war as no other 1 ; nation in Europe can make war, puts the end ao far.-abov»e the means respects~the liberty even of its enemies more than it values petty precautions for its own safety-^to have shown that a nation of warriors

; dictates peace even more unhesitatingly » to itself than to the foe it has vanquished ; — to have shown that there is in Europe , a strength too . grand for ambition, too l self-reliant even for fear — would surely be to put Germans at the head of European civilisation in a sense 'in which no nation has ever yet laid claim to such a lead. Would it be a small triumph for" even the most thoughtful and cultivated . nation in "Europe to have set for the first time th& example to the strong of " overcoming evil with good ?" For the sake of France, we wish to see no unnecessary, no needless attempt to humiliate France beyond the humiliation involved in the absolute failure of a most shameless aggresion. What France needs, more then it needs even education and repose, is a release from the contsant self-con- j sciousness and vanity- which are always measuring France against the rest of the world. La grande nation will never forget herself while a bitter and unforgetable humiliation is' rankling in h~er~heart'~andcrying for vengeance. - Again, for the sake of Europe at large, we heartily deprecate the needless humiliation of France. Europe deeply needs the influence of a great pacfiic State such as Germany would be, if she had the grandeur of purpose to relinquish all the terrjtoxiaL&uits of conquest: Suelr H. Germany would be a bulwark alike against Russia and against France, such as we have • neveir yet dreamed of possessing. The greatest power would not dare, to attack her after her great feat of war. The smallest would respect her public opinion after her greater feat of peace. But if France bedismembered. by the will of Germany, when can Europe be in equilibrium again ? Germany would then! become the terror of the smaller powers, like Holland and Belgium, and remain what she has long; been-^the terror 1 of "Denmark .• - France would be always ready. -to conspire, .with, any power, ' small. or greai, which helil.outto her a hope of retrieving the past. , The hatred of races would grow fierce. : The. Celtic blood in Belgium would be pretty nearly sure to sympathise with the Celtic blood in France. Italy wouldbegin to tremble before the powerful ,. and ambitious rconqueror who had humbled her old ally. In a word, the result of the; war, instead "of being to give Europe arnew guarantee of stability, in the 'self-restraint ~ and 'moderation of the central power 6f Europe, would be the .natural result of the. rise of a power* so tremendous,, for whose moderation we had received no sort of guarantee. 1 In fact the rise of any hew power on suclra~scale as- this — apower able in a month to lay the greatest State in Europe low— is a matter for anxiety, which can pnly be allayed by extraordinary ' evidence of its pacific magnanimity. Foi* the sake alike of Germany itself, of France, and of the whole of Europe, the needless humiliation i of France by its territorial dismember- ! ment, even though it be only to the same extent to which it ia .pretty certain that -J!r^nfiejsmuldJi&s^m3LC_eMedjf_G.e had.been. ; vanquished, would be, in our belief, a great calamity, and, as regards the victor, the sacrifice of- an opportunity such as nations .do; not often obtain, of earning both a mighty political influence and the glory of a still more honorable -fame. . :";-•■. .-. 'y " ' ■ ■ ■ ■