THE NEW ZEALAND WAR.

Southland Times, Issue 602, 10 December 1866, Page 2

THE NEW ZEALAND WAR.

(From the Times.) It is to be hoped that the militaryhistory of our colony of New Zealand may be carefully studied, and not soon forgotten. That settlement has cost the British tax-payer many a million, but the outlay will pruduce a iSubstantial'return if the lessons of recent experience be honestly applied, not only to the system of colonial defences, but to our military system altogether. The native population of New Zealaud is, and has been for years, under 50,000. It barely exceeded that number in 1858, and it has been uninterruptedly on the decline. Of this population 30,000 at the outside were males, and, if we assume that one in three of these was able to bear arms, we shall get a force of 10,000 men as the aggregate fighting strength of all the savage tribes. But of these tribes some were always friendly, others neutral ; and it is believed that of late years, at any rate, no rebel army in the field against us has exceeded 2000 combatants. On the side of the Government was a population of Europeans comprising in 1861 no fewer than 64,000 males, and increasing rapidly. No further remark, we think, should be needed to show that New Zealand was perfectly able to defend itself, and that the colonists were fully competent by strength of numbers alone,

apart from all other resources, to deal with any insurrection or outbreak of the native tribes. But there is a good deal more to be added. These colonists could at any time have availed themselves of native allies against native enemies, and they were supported by a little squadron of corvettes and gunboats on the coast, to say nothing of Enfield rifles and Armstrong guns. Nevertheless, things had got somehow into such a groove that whenever the savages chose to take to fighting, as they did about every two years, the affair was actually rergarded in the light of an imperial war, and her Majesty's troops were despatched from this country to the antipodes, at an enormous cost, to conduct operations ajjainst a swarm of natives in the bush. ..lid proceedings, protracted for a year or two with exceedingly little success, and then settled by a transaction called a treaty, came under the description of " the war in New Zealand," and generally added a million or two to the estimates before the account was cleared. The statement will appear hardly credible, but it is nevertheless a fact that two years ago, when the relative numbers of settlers and savages were such as we have specified, a British army of 10,000 regular troops — infantry, artillery, and engineers — was maintained in the colony forthe prosecution of "the war," although at that moment the colonial forces actually in arms for the protection of the colony were at least three times as numerous as the whole body of natives in the field. The mischief, too, of the system was that, with all this prodigious waste of power, we never did any good No New Zealand war, even if reputed successful, ever left the natives with a conviction that they had better not go to war again. They rather enjoyed their campaign than not, and only made overtures for peace when fighting, had become tedious, or the harvest demanded their attention. Six months afterwards the news came that " war" had broken out again, and that a body of natives, perhaps 300 in number, had kept the Queen's troops at bay for a month, and then decamped without leaving wounded prisoners behind them. At last, however, and after humiliating experience, the secret of all this mischief was discovered, or, it would be better to say, recognised. "What kept up the New Zealand war was the army which we sent to put it down. Our regular troops regularly maneeuvred under regular commanders according to the theories of European campaigning, were not the troops for . this kind of service. Turned into volunteers, and relieved of stocks, pipeclay, knapsacks, drill, and science, they would have disposed of the enemy quickly enough, but their natural powers and courage were utterly destroyed by the application pf professional tactics to rough bush-fighting. At length the truth was seen. The war was handed over to colonial levies, with a few regulars, under a really active commander, and in six months Jthe delusion was dispelled for ever. Not only need we never again send an army to New Zealand, but we shall probably never again hear of a New Zealand war. The lesson, however, thus taught us is of wide and general application. The system which disabled our army in New Zealand cannot well be expected to improve it anywhere else. When fine, brave, and well-equipped troops are systematically put at a disadvantage by half-armed savages, it is clear there must be some impediment to success in the system adopted and the tactics employed. In fact, the colonial volunteers actually took the native redoubts, which our •ovular soldiers could not, or rather did not, take. The soldiers could bave done the work fast enough in volunteer fashion, butfounditimpracticable after the fashion prescribed to them. New Zealand wars are past and gone ; other colonial garrisons may be measured by the experience acquired in New Zealaud, and while we thank our countrymen at the antipodies for their service aud their example we should wish to see them liberally rewarded with the honors for which they are fanxious and which they have garautly earned.^