NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

Southland Times, Volume III, Issue 248, 30 April 1866, Page 3

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

(From the Times, loth. January.) Atlast'the New' Zealand question — that , is to say, the New Zealand war — seems i likely to be terminated ; but before that desirable consummation actually arrives, we hope the lessons of our experience in those islands will be thoroughly im- ; pressed upon the public. New Zealand contains probably at this moment a population of 200,00 colonists, in which the males 'are about twice as numerous as the females. The native tribes with which we have been so long at war comprise about 50,000 souls, including, perhaps, 15,000 males of fighting age. There would not appear, therefore, to be rodm for much difficulty between settlers and savages, since the former could over- ' power the latter with ease, and control or chastise ihsm at discretion. But this is is not the whole of the case. "We had never 15,000 Maoris in arms against us, or the half of them, or, as there is reason to believe, even the fifth part of them. Some tribes were always friendly, and ready to fight on our side while in, addition to these allies, we actually had if, indeed, we have not at this moment an army of 10,000 Imperial troops in the colony imported from the home establishments to take part in the war. If we now add that the only thing which stood in the way of speedy success was this very army, we , shall , seem to be making a paradoxical assertion highly uncomplimentary to British troops. We mean no offence to them, however, and yet thestatement is perfectly true. This Imperial army kept the war afoot, without being allowed to finish it. It was a force under distinct control, and, by some perversity of fortune, or policy, almost always controlled to bad- purpose. The colonists knew how the war ought to be conducted, but they could not command the troops, nor were they enabled to set about the work themselves. "What with the particular views of the Governor and the General in command, the restrictions placed upon subordinates, and the service assigned to the [ soldiers, the operations of the army cameto nothing. That the troops themselves were fully equal to the exigencies of a campaign in the bush, if well led and directed, is shown by the intelligence we published on Saturday ; but they never had a fair chance of learning the business, or going well about the work. So many impediments of authority, or interest, or jealousy were interposed, that the military force was paralysed, while .all this time the colonists were deprievd of the opportunity of finishing the war in their own way. At last the system became intolerable, both in the colony and at home. A policy of " self-reliance " was introduced in its place, and though the troops have not yet been sent home, the prosecution of the war has been taken up by local levies with marked success. The soldiers, too, when thus engaged and conducted, have done excellent service, and the savages appear to have suffered as much loss in the last six months as in all the preceding campaigns. These achievements, which really reflect much credit upon both officers and men, will probably bring the natives to reason at present, and then we are told that a new " native policy " will be adopted by .the colonial authorities and enforced by colonial levies. This policy is described as "letting the natives alone," a very simple system, no doubt. But, in itself, it is only what has been too often practised already, while there is another point for consideration — namely, that the natives may, perhaps, not choose to be equally forbearing towards us. However, there is this resource in reserve, that if the savages give any further trouble, they will be shortly and sharply dealt with. The colonists perfectly understand their business, . and, if left to themselves, can bring it to a very good end. . Already they have taken fortifications thought to be impregnable without artillery, and already i the troops when put fairly upon the work, have shown that they can do it well. In one action, most skilfully as well as 5 ■ bravely conducted by Lieutenant Bigg s i with thirty Volunteers and 100 friend [y i natives, 207 Maories with 300 women fc pcs , children surrendered themselves p oners — a capture am st without pre a ent, i we fancy, in a New Zealand war. c i That we, with all bur advantages of 1 science, material, and number, should ; hitherto have lain virtually at Jf c mercy • of a weak and divided enemy > and have t> allowed this handful of savages to cripple : the colony in its growth, and tax 2 heavily Englishmen at home, is ceri tainly & wonderful thing to look back s upon how absolutely the control of affairs i was in our hands, had. we but known how i to exercise it, may be iuferred from the 3 remark contained .n our correspondent's i letter yeppeeti&g the state of. the Mwrie^

These restless and, under our system oi aetiou, unconquerable . enemies are sc comparatively few in number, and are sc rayidly declining, that in a few years they will be of little more account than the Red. lndians in Canada. New Zealand war, even if not brought to an end otherwise, must have died out at last for want of Maories. The numbers of our enemies in the field have been incredibly small, and if we knew the exact strength of the force which has defied a British Colony and a British army for so long a time, and worn out the patience of Government and people at home, we should probably be lost in amazement, It shodld, however, he added, in explanation of the mystery, that these natives occupied a country singularly favorable to their method of warfare, and were themselves extraordinary proficients in the- art of n»iAi±ary fortifi. a';ion. If any reader thought lightly of a Maori "pa," his ideas might have been corrected by a description of one of these positions in our last intelligence. Imagine two large square redoubts connected at the angles by a rampart covering a subterranean passage, with parapets eight feet high, doubly palisaded, and rifle pits as thick as honeycombs all round . Stili formidable as such places were, the troops and Volunteers could give a very good account of them, when allowed to fight as they pleased. All these conflicts and difficulties "will appear more astonishing than ever, if we do but recollect that the country in which 200,000 Englishmen have been worried by 50,000 savages is about as large as .Great Britain and Ireland together. Civilization cannot as yet have been pressing upon barbarism. We are not treading upon the heels of the Maories, like the Americans upon those of the .Red men. There must be ample room for them to live as they please, without pretending, as they have actually . done, to limit the growth of a British, colony. There was at one time a curious conspiracy or insurrection in North America of the Eed men agxinit the Whittß. The Indians had become convinced that the continent was to be no longer theirs, and that their race would be overpowered by the new comers, unless they could, by one desperate effort, exterminate the invaders and recover their position. They did, therefore, make war upon the Whites, and gallantly, too, but that was a hundred years ago, when the disproportion between the races was not so very great. In New Zealand, however, we have witnessed the astonishing spectacle of arising and prosperous colony kept upon its defence and forced to struggle for its existence by a mere handful of savages, whose absolute submission ought to have been secured long ago. The pretensions of these tribes were utterly preposterous, but they were advanced and maintained without reserve. What the Maories really meant to say by the war was this — that New Zealand was to be theirs, not ours. We hope they have row been disabused of that ideaj but though they cannot reverse a natural law, or turn back the tide of civilization, there is, happily, not the slightest reason why they should not peaceably fulfil whatever destiny may be in store for them.