CORRESPONDENCE OF EARL RUSSELL AND MR. ADAMS.

Southland Times, Volume III, Issue 197, 3 January 1866, Page 3

CORRESPONDENCE OF EARL RUSSELL AND MR. ADAMS.

The letters wliich bave passed in the last few months between Lord Eussell and Mr. Adams, and wbicb have just been published, are very creditable to their writers. The arguments are good, the language is good, and the sentiments are very good. We in England may be especially glad that the conduct ofthe case on behalf of the United States has fallen into the hands of Mr. Adams, who argues witb moderation and courtesy, who knows bow to put his strong points without anything like blustering and arrogance, and who has the mind of a lawyer, and, while he makes the best of all on which he can really rely, does not run a weak argument to death. Tbe subject of tbe correspondence is the American claims against us for compensation on account of tbe injuries inflicted by ships in the Confederate service, but fitted out and armed from England. With this claim Mr. Adams mixes up the old grievance of our hasty recognition of tbe South as a belligerent Power. If we bad not recognised tbe South as a belligerent, it could not bave had a flag to sail its ships under, and the Alabama and her sister vessels would never have been sent to sea. It is a good thing that the question of the propriety of our recognition of tbe South so soon should have been once more raised, because the discussion of the point has now been so exhausted that we may hope to hear very little of it again. Mr. Seward urged that it was an unfriendly thing to recognise or encourage, so quickly and decisively, those who were rebelling against a friendly Power. It looked as if we were glad of the calamities of the United States, and anxious to make the most and the worst of thejn. So speedy and and instantaneous a recognition of rebels as belligerents was without any precedent to justify it, and this in itself ought to bave made England pause. Lord Eussell replied that the rebellion itself was unprecedented, and that never before in history had rebels to the number of five millions been able on the moment to form a civil government, establish a large army, and exercise undisputed sway over thousands of miles of territory. On other occasions foreign nations had waited to see whether the rebellion would become large, but here the rebellion was large from its outset. This is a very fair argument, and the Americans might perhaps be brought to think so, although they are at present profoundly convinced that we are much to blame because we did not see from the outset that the North must win. But very fortunately, the main argument bj which our conduct may be justified is one as to which there is much less room for contention. Erom the moment that the North instituted a blockade, and announced its intention to capture foreign vessels that broke, or threatened to break, the blockade we had no choice. Tbe North assumed towards us the position which a belligerent holds towards neutrals ; and thenceforth we could not say we were not neutrals because neither the Eederals nor the Confederates were belligerents. It was not a question of courtesy, nor a mere theoretical way of regarding men and things. British ships were captured because there was a state of war, and this was a fact which very much affected us, and of which we could not possibly avoid taking notice. Lord Eussell had the satisfaction of bringing to tbe notice of Mr. Adams an elaborate judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States, in which it was held that the Confederates had been belligerents from tbe outset, and that therefore Prize Courts had jurisdiction over vessels seized under the laws of war. Mr. Adams had nothing really to say in opposition to the arguments which convinced an American court of justice ; and the only adverse observation he can think of is to suggest that we were too hasty, even on our own showing, in treating the establishment of a blockade as involving the recognition of the belligerent rights of the Confederates. The facts appear to be these. The President, on the 19fch of April, 1861, proclaimed the blockade of seven States ; and Lord Lyons wrote a despatch, not giving the actual words of the Proclamation, but saying that the Government intended to establish a blockade. If Lord Lyons bad actually sent a copy of the Proclamation of the President, then tbe recognition of the South, which was announced in Parliament on the 6th of May, would have been quite proper ; but Lord Lyons only said that it wasintendedto establish a blockade, and Mr Adams thinks it was very unfriendly in the English Cabinet not to wait to see whether these intentions were I carried into effect. On the other side of i the Atlantic there was no delay, and an ! English ship was seized for breach of blockade on the very day when the Queen's Proclamation was issued. When the President, by proclaiming a blockade established a state of war, and exercised belligerent rights against English ships, it is very hypeeritical to say that the English Government were not very definitely informed of this by their own diplomatic agents, and had to act to the best of their judgmen. The facts of tbe case, not the wording of Lord Lyons's letters, determined whether they acted rightly or not. It might with much greater reason be said that tbe United States Government acted with precipitate harshness towards us when it seized, our ships as prizes before the fact of the blockade could have been brought to the knowledge of the English Government, and the Queen's Proclamation of have been made known to English shipowners. It must be remembered that tbe form which . the recognition ofthe South as a belligerent Power assumed was a warning to British subjects not to overstep the position of neutrals, and it is hard to say that the warning was issued too soon. This discussion on the premature recognition of the South ia, however, only ■picillary to the main arguments on which

for tlie injuries done by the Alabama anc her sister vessels. The general result o: the facts stated appears to be that, or the whole, the British Government was vigilant, and successfully vigilant ; thai it exerted itself strenuously, that public opiuion aided it, and that very few Confederate ships got to sea which any amount of watchfulness could have prevented from getting to sea. But in the particular case of the Alabama there were not those early, prompt, and effectual measures taken which were taken in later cases. In the case of the Alabama the Grovernment waited for legal proof • in the case of the steam-rams, the Grovernment seized without legal proof, and merely on suspicion. That is, in the first case that arose the Grovernment acted legally, and in the latter cases illegally. That the conduct of the Government in the case of tlje Alabama was very irritating to _M_r. Act&fffs, may easily be imagined. A month before he could get the British Ministry to take any steps whatever, he had intelligence of the construction and destination of the Alabama, and immediately informed Lord Eussell. The authorities at Liverpool were immediately asked to report, but, as Mr. Adams very plainly says, they were bribed,' and consequently reported that all Mr. Adam's information was untrue. It was only when he got a strong opinion from the present SolicitorGeneral, hinting at the British Grovernment being responsible for the consequences if it continued inactive, that Mr. Adams could get the case even laid before the Crown lawyers. Days went by, Mr. 'Adams urging that the vessel would get off, and our Grovernment replying that it could not seize unless proofs were furnished which, in the opinion of the Law Officers, would ensure a conviction. The Alabama, as Mr. Adams prophesied, did get away, snd its escape and subsequent adventures furnished the subject of much discussion ia England. The general result was a great doubt as to the operation of the Enlistment Act, and a clear conviction that the sooner and more effectually we stopped the exit of armed vessels from neutral ports thebetter it would be not only for the Eederals, butfor ourselves. The Grovernment aeted on this conviction, took a certain amount of risk, and stopped the rams. Mr. Adams says that, when we fcund the Enlistment Act ineffectual, we ought to have altered it. That was a question entirely for the Grovernment and Parliament of this country to decide. So far as a foreign nation is concerned, it is exactly the same thing to it whether the action of our Grovernment in the case of the rams was or was not in conformity with our municipal laws, so long as it Avas satisfactory. Our reply to the American claim is, in short, that in the first case which arose our Grovernment honestly acted according to our existing law, and under the advice of our best lawyers, but that, finding the existing law practically insufficient, they, in compliance with the request of the Eederals, and to meet the justice and necessity ofthe case, made such a change as effectually prevented the evil complained of. Are we, then, to be responsible because our Grovernment in the first instance acted legally? No nation could admit this ; otherwise foreigners would be the judges of what om municipal law ought to be, before we, ourselves have an opportunity of seeing hov it works. But did the Government act legally *? This, as Lord Eussell j ustly rertarks, resolves itself into the two questiors — Did the Law Officers of the Crown forn a right construction of the Eoreign Enlistment Act ? and, secondly, did the Cabinet, as guided by the Crown Lawyers, act with reasonable promptitude? Who is to decide these questions ? Lord Eussell refuses to submit them to arbiiration. It is impossible, he says, for any foreign arbitrator to pretend that he em construe an English statute better than English lawyers can and the English Grovernment cannot allow a foreign arbitrator to criticize the steps which it thought proper to take from day to dsy in its honest intention to carry out the law. It so happens that there is an exactly para.lel case in American records, which shows how the Government of the United States acted under precisely similar circumstances, The case is that of the reclamations of Portugal for injuries inflicted, during its struggle with Brazil, on Portuguese subjects by vessels that issued from the harbours of the United States. The first complaints were made in ISI6, and the correspondence between the two Governments on the subject continued to so late a date as 1850. In 1817, at the urgent instance of the Portuguese Minister, the President recommended to Congress a change in the law as to fitting out cruisers in American ports ; and the Enlistment Act, on which our own was modelled, or supposed to be modelled, was the result. TMs measure, however, failed to effect the desired end, and complaints were made by the Portuguese for three years subsequently that the evil was increasing. Mr. Adams suggests that the injuries may have been inflicted by vessels that had got out before the Enlistment Act came into operation • and there is no evidence to show whether this was so or not, except that the statement that the evil was increasing would lead to the supposition that there were more agents engaged in causing it. The parallel, however, is exact, except that many more vessels are known to have issued from American ports to the injury of the Portuguese than have issued from English ports to the injury. of the Eederals ; and the American vessels were in many cases ( commanded by Americans, whereas in "c_o case has any English ship fitted o\if, for the Confederate service been commanded by an Englishman. However, ti_- main point is that the American Government for thirty years refused to allow the Portuguese claims, on the ground that it had honestly tried to do its duty, and would not hold itself answerable for the misdeeds of American citizens :vho, m spite of the, )mi&% vetoes P.f % Qq*

1 vernment, managed to commit an unlawfu f act to the prejudice of a foreign nation 1 So close is the parallel, so completely s does it show that the American Govern fc ment acted not suddenly, but on delibera 2 tion, and for a period of thirty years - exactly as we have acted, that Mr. Adams t is obliged to seek refuge in the astonish - ing plea that very possibly tbe American "i Government was wrong throughout, and j that England ought not to follow a bad precedent. "We will leave Mr Adams to l settle this question witb his own Gro- * vernment ; and we feel sure tbat tbe : American people, witb tbeir substantial • love of justice and respect for law, will be largely influenced, in spite of all tbeii prepossessions, by the statements, argui ments, and precedents put by tbe British Grovernment. Reason and good feeling will settle tbe past, but bow is tbe future to be settled ? What precautions can be taken against tbe issue of cruisers from neutral ports in wars to come ? No nation is so much interested as England in making tbe law against tbe issue of such vessels as rigid and as operative as possible. Will measures of prevention suffice ? Experience shows tbat if tbe belligerent wbo has cause to apprehend tbe issue of these vessels is as active and pays as heavily for its information as the Eederal Grovernment was, and if the neutral in as honestly anxious as tbe English Grovernment was to prevent tbe issue, it will be witb a difficulty almost unsurmountable that a regular vessel of war can be built, equipped, and got to sea. An amount of interference witb shipowners and of supervision over them which produces no really bad effects will suffice to prevent them taking tbe risk of building vessels of war for illegal purpeses. The real danger is not here • it is in a very different quarter ; and tbe case of tbe Shenandoah teaches us where to look for it. Tbe Shenandoah was not a vessel of war ; it was a common merchant ship of fche kind tbat trades to the East, and it was chartered to Bombay. On its voyage out, it was met by a vessel engaged in tbe perfectly legal trade of carrying guns. Tbe guns were put on board tbe Bombay trader, and at once there was created on tbe high seas an armed cruiser in the Confederate service. It is bard to see bow any preventive measures, any vigilance, or any good intentions could bave hindered tbe creation of tbe Shenandoah, which has nevertheless inflicted sucb desperate injury on the American whaling- trade. It is only by penal measures operating after the evil has been done tbat other intending offenders can be deterred. And these penal measures must operate either against the men engaged in the transaction or against tbe ship. We do not see why severe penalties should not be inflicted on tbe men, or why, if a proper penal law were passed, it should not be put in execution. The want of evidence might cause some prosecutions to fail, but it would not cause all to fail ; and English subjects wbo knew tbat, if they ever set their foot on English ground after fitting out a vessel in the Avay in which tbe Shenandoah was fitted out, tbey would certainly be arrested and tried, would hesitate in many instances to take tbe risk. That a neutral should act against tbe ship, and seize a vessel bearing the Sag of the belligerent, is a suggestion easily made, but full of tbe gravest difficulties, as it must almost inevitably involve tbe neutral in the war, and would cast upon tbe neutral tbe duty of performimg a task wbicb tbe other belligerent ought properly to discharge. The better course for tbc neutral to take would probably be to remonstrate witb tbe belligerent Government tbat bad authorised and profited by tbe transaction, and, if it were strong enough, it would remonstrate in a way which would make its remonstrances effectual.