The Southland Times. MONDAY, OCT. 31, 1864.

Southland Times, Volume I, Issue 66, 31 October 1864, Page 2

The Southland Times. MONDAY, OCT. 31, 1864.

The decision of the Imperial Government with. regard to the terms on which military aid will for the future be afforded to the Colony, naturally leads us to con-, sider whether the presence of British troops is at all desirable in New Zealand — 5 whether a purely Colonial force would j not more efficiently prosecute the war, ■ and render the continuance of peace when : once, obtained more certain. The sum, i which up to the present time the Colony ): has. paid for the service of the regular soldiers introduced for the purpose of ) subduing the Maori rebellion, has been £5 1 a year per head for every such soldier, but 3 after the Ist of January, g 1865, the 3 Colonial subsidy will be increased to £40 perhead. One regiment is, however, to be % maintained by the Imperial Government, *. on condition that the colony expends a sum 5 of £50,000 per annum -on native require-.. 5 merits, Whatithose'requirements may. ; be, is not exactly .pointed out by Mr. Caiidweli. ; I But the obvious intention is that the 3 money shall be spent,- as a great deal has 5 been ; spent before, in keeping the , natives \ m good humor : presents ; ia^other words, by the continuance of the " flour . and suga*" policy, of which 3w GfKp^a

Gbet has. been such a staunch advocate This latter portion of the offer of Greai Britain can be dismissed" in a very few words. The time has passed for bribing the natives to remain quiet, and any funds which may be from time to time required for their government, or which it may be advisable ibr the Colony io expend in improving their social condition, must be voted by the Assembly, and expended precisely in the manner it may dictate, and not as though in fulfilment of an agreement with the Colonial Offi.ce. - The presence of any body of soldiers, whethei great or small, must not be trammeled with any conditions bearing. uponJ the ■ method of dealing with .the native tribes. The Assembly will doubtless take that: view of the; matter ; but whether it would be better' that the system of securing ]_ the tranquillity of the Colony 'by Imperial troops should be abandoned, is another question, and one , not ; very , easily answered. ■■• - A great cause of complaint during* the present struggle has been the" "divided authority on matters of Colonial Government; but more especially there have been disagreements with regard to the control of the army. In the first place, there is the War Office and the Horse Guards, to which the General in the Colony of course holds, himself chiefly responsible ; secondly, there is the Governor, who lias also certain, or uncertain I powers- entrusted to him by the Crown, with reference to directing the operations of the troops; and thirdly, there is. the ! Colonial Ministry for the time being, which is responsible to the Assembly for the general conduct of the Avar (as being a part of its policy), although, in realit}', it has no power to control the movements of the General in the slightest degree. The Assembly authorised the war, and unavoidably plunged the Colony into debt, to ensure its vigorous prosecution ; but there its influence in a great measure ended. England provided , the troops, and, as far as the army is concerned, her chief representative in the Colony is Sir Duncan Cameron. It will be apparent to all that this more-than-doub'le Government was not likely to be very successful in its endeavors "to bring the Maori difficulty to a satisfactory termination. Sir Duncan Camekon is, we all know, a splendid soldier, and had the matter been Jeffc in his hands, unfettered by more than the most general instructions from the War Office, the King movement might and probably would by this time have been a thing -of the past. But unfortunately for the Colony in this instance, such a mode of delegating power was not to be thought of. Neither General Cameron nor the Colonial Ministry was to be entrusted with full authority, and the consequence has been that the objects for which the war was begun have not been carried out, and a really sure peace seems almost as distant a3 ever. It has been by no means unusual for hitches to occur between the different departments of the Imperial Government, in the management of troops during a war. The machinery is considered too complicated ; and it is reasonable to suppose that this divided authority has frequently had an effect not conducive to success ; but how much greater is the difficulty, how largely are the chances of failure increased, when to the disagreements of the Imperial authorities are added those of .the Colonial Ministry, the General commanding, aud His Excellency the Governor. The Maori war has sufficiently indicated the necessity of a change in this respect and the conditions imposed by the Imperial Government, on the troops being allowed to remain in the Colony, would seem to afford the opportunity for determining how this Ccin best be effected. In order that the operations of the troops may be thoroughly successful they must be under an undivided authority. The power must either lie entirely with the British Government, in which case it should pay the expense of the war; or it should lie with the Colonial Ministry ; and when we say the power, we mean the .whole supervision of the troops, and the appointing and removal of officers. 11l HO Other way am success be ensured. The General must know distinctly to whom he is look for directions, and what work he is called on to perform, and must not be liable to receive instructions and j recommendations from several quarters, i as has been the case in New Zealand, with what results is well known. Now whether England pays for her ti'oops in the Colony or not, she will certainly retain the right of controlling their movements, and will never entrust it m any considerable degree to a Colonial Legislature. But if the troops remain the colony must pay for their services, and, according to the number at present in New Zealand, the subsidy would be at least £300,000. The question is, whether that money might not be better expended on troops raised for Colonial service, and entirely under the control and in the pay of the Colony. The work of raising and maintaining an army of sufficient magnitude for the defence of the Colony is certainly no light matter, but it is by no means impossible, and the undivided authority to which such a force would be subject, and its superior knowledge of the country, and of the native mode of warfare, would ! enable a smaller number to do well : what^ .an army of 10,000 men have hitherto failed to accomplish. A Northern contemporary, in commenting on this subject, suggests that a force of Maoris might be employed, officered principally by Europeans, and alludes, to the numerous instances where a like course has been successfully pursued. • The idea is well worth consideration. Such a force could be easily enrolled, and, if selected carefully and ' well officered, would prove invaluable. Of the danger of the men deserting their colors, and joining -the enemy when called into active service, it can;, be shown that irregular . troops;, iv- similar ■ circumstances, ■ rarely 'jjroY«rfeais^ \ ■■: .:< : i\ So' far as we can disoover, public opinion is very strongly in, fa^pr of the

withdrawal of the Imperial troops, and the formation of a Colonial army /-as nearly as possible 1 on 'the same - footing, _ but entirely under the control of the- .Colonial Legislature. v -~ -