REPORT ON THE FEDERAL NAVY

Southland Times, 2 March 1864, Page 5

REPORT ON THE FEDERAL NAVY

(From the Times, Dec. 24.) The report just presented to the Federal Congress from the Secretary of the Navy is a document possessing great interest for us on this side of the Atlantic. While naval architecture and naval armaments are in a state of transition, and nobody can exactly forecast the character which may be assumed by naval warfare, it is exceedingly important to observe the conclusions of other nations, and especially when, as in the case of the Americans, they are actually at war. We must also do Mr Welles the justice to say that he makes his statement very plainly, and leaves us in no doubt about the position or views of the department over which he presides. How peculiar and, indeed, unique this position has become will very quickly appear. It will not have' been forgotten by the readers of this journal that we have repeatedly objected to the examples selected from the American system, and proposed for our imitation at home. We remarked that the cases of the two countries were not parallel. We showed that the Americans were directing all their efforts to one particular end, and were intent, not on the establishment of a powerful navy, but on the construction of vessels for special service in their own waters. They desired, not to acquire supremacy or security on the high seas, but to command the inland streams, to blockade the ports of the Confederacy, and to capture Charlesi ton. In conformity with these purposes they shaped their proceedings, but the results, whether successful or otherwise, could not be taken as examples of a comprehensive system. These were the views which we expressed, and they now receive an absolute confirmation from the Secretary's report. . Mr Welles distinctly represents the whole Federal navy as a navy constituted for home service exclusively, The Northern States do not, in his opinion, possess a single vessel fit for the duties of foreign war except i as regards coast defences. All their new new ironclads, built or building, are mere harbour ships or coasters, and nothing more. In fact, with the exception of a few " double enders," these vessels are simply Monitors, and all that Mr Welles can say of that class of ships is that "it has proved itself to be well adapted for harbor defence and coast service," adding that "in some emergencies these vessels from their great powers, of endurance have shown themselves to be efficient and serviceable in offensive operations." This, of course, is an allusion to the part played by the ironclads in the seige of

Charleston ; but it is not so' much as pretended tliat any one ship of that, fleet is fit to go to sda. A notable e/rent,' indeed,- occurred just too late for official cognizance. Sir Welles is at the pains of relating circumstantially the "'marked and extraordinary conflict" between the Weehawken and the Atlanta, as "in some respects .one of .the. most significent and instritctive naval battles of the war." The Weehawken, it will be recollected, smashed the sides of the Atlanta with Ti*r 4901 b. shot thrown from a 15-inch -gun weighing 20 tons. We have 'already observed upon this exploit that, as the Atlanta was nothing but a makeshift ironclad constructed under the greatest difficulties, the success of the Weekawken's gun proved' very ••little '.; but; there was another point of some' c'onsecfrtenpe in the case. What was the seaworthiness criUhe- vessel carrying these enormoiis cannon ? The last AtSexiem intelligence will give, us some reply to this inquiry. " The Monitor Weekawken," said the telegram, "lying at the entrance of Charleston harbour, sank suddenly at her anchorage during a gale. She went down very rapidly. Four engineers and 26 of her crew were 'drowned." It is obvious that if American ordnance can only be carried under such risks as these it is not suited to the British navy. . Mr Welles, however^ enters upon a further question of no ordinary interest. , While acknowledging that America has no ships fit for general service at preseut, he sees "that she must have some hv and by. All that he can say now is', that American harbours are protected against the possible attacks of foreign men-of-war ; but he argues that real fighting-ships must sooner or later be constructed for service at sea, and as he speculates a great deal on the. character which .should be given to such vesseis, we learn his opinion on this important subject. lie appears, then,, to think that the most necessary condition of a good modern.; man-of-war is enormous size. Such a vessel he says, slionld not only carry machinery powerful enough to insure great speed, and ordnance heavy enough for any assault, but should be able to stow away fuel sufficient for long cruises without the necessity of recoaling. This, however, it will perhaps be remembered, was the very condition which produced the plain of the Great Eastern, and from what Mr Welles adds it really seems as if he contemplated a model of nearly the same magnitude. He does not descend to particulars on the' point,- but he remarks that even in M present crisis of affairs, when the chief energies of lijts department have been devoted to the satisfaction' erf more pressing exigencies, he did issue proposals for the Construction of one of these monster vessels. The result is most surprising. " The cost," he tells us, "as shown by the propositions received for a ship of the necessary magnitude, was so groat that it was deemed advisable to enter into no contract involving so large an expenditure, except by the express sanction of Congress." Now, considering that the Americans are actually spending on their navy about double what' we spend, and that their prodigality m incurring all kinds of war charges has been literally boundless, we can only imagine with amazement, the amount of the outlay upon a single vessel which Mr Welles was afraid to sanction and does not venture to state. What could have been the proportions of this mysterious and formidable fabric? Was it :i Warrior on the scale of the CJ-reat Eastern V The Secretary is evidently of opinion that even Congress may be startled by the price of the article, for he apologizes beforehand for it; tniA argues that no charge can be too j heavy for the" peace' find security which a ' squadron of such vessels might be' expected to insure. If, then, we are to measure our own proceedings in these matters by the estimate of the ca*e formed in America, we mu«*t needs conclude that we arc on the right tack, and that, the only fault to be found with our Mmotaurs and Ntfrfchtimberlands is that, though they are larger than any men-of-war afloat, they are not large enough. Mr Welles thinks nothing of gunboats or smaller vessels. His model man-of-war is a ship with the biggest engines, biggest guns, and biggest coal bunkers ever seen. He thinks, too, that it must be built of iron, though it is instructive to observe that his mind is hardly made up on this question, and that he balances one material against another as if he scarcely knew how td decide; On the question of guns he says very little, being content to assume, what nobody would deny, that "heavy" ordnance is indispensable in modern warfare. But it is important to remark that, whatever may be the relative merits of the British and American systems, the latter must necessarily be subjected to the serious drawback of cumbrous and unmanageable pieces. vve, by throwing ligber projectiles with greater velocity, obtain corresponding lightness and portability in the guns themselves. The Americans, by relying not on velocity, but on weight, are compelled to increase in proportion the calibre and weight of their cannon, until they arrive at last at this result, that such pieces are only fit for land fortifications or floating batteries, and have not yet been mounted on any vessels competent to keep the sea. When, therefore, they speculate, as they have recently done, on the efficiency of a vessel like the Weehawken against a vessel like the Warrior they are comparing dissimilar things. The Weehawken was little more than a floating battery ; the Warrior is a good sea-going ship. What Mr Wellcs's new man-of-war may be we cannot conjecture, but our own experience has certainly suggested that the quality of bigness may easily be carried to far.