HE CRISIS IN EUROPE.
I. (From the Saturday Review.) ' ; death of tha King :pf 3|enma3?k ade a grea,t and sudden diiference f position of Eurqpe.' Previously, were many quesiioria which, in, $ 56( and, general required a merit," ruid ; tHe. .'old, o^tstaindmg , ,te about ScHleswig and Kolsteni aiß of thorn, Biit Europe migHt .slont on Sot jaiioi^e?" decade, it it lothing" morel t,o rouse it ithe ohan'ca of. i, r re4er>ai $)xecu- - It was rvory unlikely- that .the iutiqn would eve* take place; it very "uncertain whether, if It fevei;. .pkoQi it would , 4p W' one any •i'l-.'nnd no ono was called on $&■ y ;. and immediately to interfere ,' jit, Tito wast- that could be .^M' that it 'jhight some day» by some | chance, lead to a general war 1 , j ; tho <leat!i of.ithfi King of Den- 1 k has . ehangod, tho wholo face of i tgsi..-. : feeling whiolt & now ■fcencd in Germany m favor of tin ted intervention 'in .Schleswiglsteinis;,of a totally different land, ; t , yests on a totally different ' ndation from the halting, pedantic, -ctive: bustling \of tho Eederal Biet. has long been known that the G-er-u inhabitants of the Duchies depreed the exertions that were being ide in their favpr, and that the heads jhe national party in G-ermany kept jof from the fussy inanites of the ideral diplomatists. -; Those, who. were iefly concerned in the matter, and ose who led the opinion of G-ermany , »vays contended that the right time r active; demonstrations eonld never {me while the King lived. His title as. indisputable, and. any quarrel with im : could: only ;be a quarrel about institutional. -.details, which would •ppeal to popular sympathies, or pre3nt, vto Europe a. clear ground of disute. But when the King died the poitipn; of, Grercnany and of the Dnehies rould be . very different. It would then >c open tothemto say that the power of lie Sovereign . of Denmark over the Duchies was .altogether at an end. Denmark passed by one line of sue. 2ession, and the Duchies by another, and; as the personal union would je thus dissolved, the political union svould necessarily pass away for ever. It is true that the Ducnies are given to the present King of Denmark \>y the London Protocol of 1552. But the Grermans and the G-erman inhabi:tants_..of the Duchies consider this contention as wholly nugatory. It was made without the sanction of the Diets of the Duchies; without the assent of the more distant relatives of the royal family, who, hj the local law, ought to have assented; it never ■nrasa ccepted by the G-erman Diet, and although it was signed by Austria and Prussia, yet it is said that it was only signed conditionally, and that the conditions on which it was signed have not been fulfilled. By this Convention the Duke of Austenberg, no doubt, resigned his rights of succession. But the G-ermans contend that, in the first place, his renunciation ■was extorted by fear, and, in , the next place, that it was made on , ; the concurrent condition of certain promises to the Duchies being fulfilled wMch.liave been broken; and that . therefore, as the Duke renounced his rights on the understanding that the people over whom he might have reigned should have definite advantages,, he is quite at liberty to secure the advantages to them in the only "way in which experience has shown they are to be obtained, and may validly appoint, his son and heir to xeign over them in liis stead. At any ,:Tate, .whatever may be thought of the : validity of this reasoning, it is evident that, as a matter of fact, the dispute . has now entered on quite a new phase The JHolsteiners testify their claim to' independence by persisting in their right to have their Diet at Kiel, although the Danish G-overnment forbids s the meeting ; and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the head of the • Liberal and j^ational party in Germany, has been the first to recognise the claim of Prince Erederick of A^ugustenburg to the Duchies. His example has been followed by many of the minor Sovereigns of Grerrnany -rfinpre.' especially by the Grand-Duke of -Baden, who next to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, is the most popular, and influential of the minor princes, and, who las even gone the length of allowing his .representative at" Prankforito act also as the representative of Priiiee JVederick. • ; -Alt this is much more than a quarrel ■i of, Words. In the first place, Germany is now really in • earnest, and ■whatever steps are taken niust be taken soon. .The position. of Prince Frederick; and his supporters would rapidly become ludicrous unless- they followed up their brave ( words -with brave deeds. . The . Holsteiners, too, wiE -expose themselves to the vengeance ,of jthe Danish Government, and it is not likely that the ISTational party, [in G-ermany-— having a case which they^ think so good, and led by such men as the Dukes of Saxe- , Cpburg-G-otha" and Baden- — would allow the Holsteiners to be crushed without an effort to save them. In the next place, 'the .Great Powers are now called on to take ia ' part on one side or the other. Prussia ■is , very unlikely to enforce the London Protocol, and is almost certain to go as far as she dare in trying to upset it. Austria would forfeit in a moment all the. advantage she . has reaped from her "advocacy of Pederal Eefbrm if she'stqod in the way of Germany in this .quarrel ; and, therefore, the most that can be expected is that Prussia, and Austria will remain neutral, owning that Germany is right, but avowing that their hands - are tied by the Protocol of 1852. It is, however, not impossible that one of the two, striving to outstrip her rival,
may pronounce the rErotoeol -invalid, ; and may draw -her ebinpetitor after her. The non-G-erman Powers, ■;and. especially England, will then be in a, great dimoul^r. ; They' will be bpund ;by a splemiitki^ cause of the present King of Demnayk, but it ief a strange thing . that Englanid. should; consider herself authori«o4 v to; irappse 'a ! foreign Prince oft people, conti'ary : to :tl*e,. wishes ;of that people, It is tvm that we do. tltis m some parts of tekey,, but" , then" [we h'ftte the ©souse; that, if we did not, anayohy, vo^ldj: as, it ia conceived, "bo the consequence j and, still mov&, that tfye revolting pvo«. tinces .wild mllyMl into fee A\m*k of .&■ big ' Power! 1 w/ijtate tlisimrb iiKo; political balance of Buvopo. ...Xj? is ted to d&y that eiihsi 1 of these comaqttenqes would follow; if the Duchies weW severed from Benwiarkj and^ even in Turkey, it is Hot without prdu that we adopt a policy which •■keeps the Mon* tenegrins and tho Servians under a rule that is distasteful. It is perhaps rather from a well-grounded contempt for their savage virtues and vices, than from any larger considerations, that we deduce the claim to keep them in subjection to the Porte. But it would be a very different, thing to establish,! and keep up by force, a distasteful rule ; over a community of G-ermans within three days' voyage from our shores. "We have, therefore, a difficult duty to discharge, a great perplexity to unravel, and the necessity for immediately doing something. It is highly improbable that many weeks will elapse before war breaks out in Holstein, unless some measures are taken to stop it. But this cannot be done unless the Eive Great Powers meet to take the matter into their serious consideration, and patch up an arrangement if an arrangement is possible. Sweden, as a signatary of the London Protocol, might also, perhaps, claim to take a part. But the German Diet has also a theoretical right to assist at the solution of a question so deeply concerning its interests; and as it is the fashion not to receive representatives of the Diet, Sweden may perhaps be content to see herself excluded if the Diet is excluded also. As the Protocol was signed at London, it would be natural that the Conference of the Great Powers should be again held at London ; and it is by no means impossible that a Conference of the Great Powers at London may replace the Emperor's project of a Congress at Paris. It would suit all those Avho object to go to Pai'is as if it were the centre of European sovereignty, and- who cannot agree with the Emperor that the city which causes most disturbacee is thereby entitled to be the seat of all schemes for peace and quiet. The German Sovereigns who are jealous and distrustful of France would have nothing 16 fear ; and it so happens that every one of the Great Powers i has at once something that specially attracts us and something that specially repels us, and so all can count on our being moderately impartial. It would also afford a tangible and clear basis for the Conference if the dispute aboxit the succession to the Duchies were the ostensible object of the meeting. But the Conference would also serve t to some degree the purposes of the proposed Congress. It would not flatter the vanity of the French or of their Emperor qiyite so much as if it were held at Paris,andthe disciple of adversity exhibited to the people that elected him all the Kings and Princes of Europe coming to him to bring him frankincense and myrrh. But, as the Emperor himself said, the probable issue of the Congress, if it could ever have been got together, would have been not so much to decide questions as to establish alliances. And it is scarcely possible that the representatives of the Five Powers should assemble now, and forego the protracted discussionto which the settlement of the dispute about the Duchies must lead, without the I foundation being laid for new alliances, and for some adjustment being attempted of questions only remotely connected with G-ermany and the Duchies. At first, perhaps, the German Powers would be opposed to the other three greater Powers ; but their object would be not to be overwhelmed, and they might, therefore, be induced to make terms with one of their adversaries. They might possibly find it prudent to strike up a final friendship with their great copartner in the spoliation of Poland, and to abandon the Poles to their fate in return for support to G-ercnany or Holsteiu. Again, the opportunity might be seized by England and Erance to bring their influence to bear on Austria, and an alliance might be formed by which Italy would profit. As the Latin nations have already caught eagerly at the proposition of the Sovereign who affects to be their chief, and as even the Pope himself is said to be willing to send a representative to a Congress where the withdrawal of the JVench army from Home must be discussed, if anything is discussed that is worth hearing, the Emperor, by his proposal, has at least assured himself and satisfied the world as to the command he has over the feelings and destinies of the dwellers in the two Peninsulas. A Conference at London might enable him to ascertain abo who are the allies on whom he can most rely, and what they will pay for his alliance. If he is as prudent and sensible as he persuades the world lie is, he will be satisfied with this. The jealousies and fears of the Eive Powers may prevent the assembling of such a Conference ; but if it were held, the could scarcely fail to derive from it some of the advantages which, in his supreme moment of hesitation, he fancied a Congress might give him.
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Southland Times, Volume III, Issue 42, 12 February 1864, Page 8
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1,951HE CRISIS IN EUROPE. Southland Times, Volume III, Issue 42, 12 February 1864, Page 8
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