HIGH SPEED IN THE NAVY.

Southland Times, Volume III, Issue 34, 25 January 1864, Page 5 (Supplement)

HIGH SPEED IN THE NAVY.

(Ttom tho Mechanics'. Magazine -J The exploits of- the Florida and Alabama convey too important a lesseaHo be lightly passed over. They afford., an ; example from which much may be learned, much gained, if we 7 please to profit by the "information —which/their career — almost unexampled iv the history of maritime warfare — j supplies to the nation and the Government. We have here two steamers of. small size, with light guns, unprotected by armor, aad with crews of, perhaps, at most a couple of hundred men each, doing au unparalleled amount of injury to an enemy's commerce and trade, -■•^burning and destroying whatever they please, and setting at defiance the entire Federai navy ; fighting when so disposed, flying when occasion requires-; intangible, vanishing from the grasp of the destroyer only to destroy. The characteristics of the Alabama are well known. The Florida is described as a " screw steamer of extraordinary swiftness ; her hull long and low ; no external traces visible of her real strength and p "wer." It is stated on evidence, which we see at present no reason to doubt, that this little vessel has destroyed not less than 9,700,000 dollars worth of Federal property up to the 11th of last May, and,, most suggestive fact of all, she has managed to elude thirteen Federal cruizers sent specially iv pursuit of Iter, Even if w,e take tbese statements -cum. grano salis, the •mere fact of the Florida and Alabama being still in existence proves how difficult it is for regular men-of-war to capture or destroy vessels whose great speed permits them to act. the part of guerillas, the rapidity of whose movements prevents the acquirement of accurate knowledge of their whereabouts. The history of naval warfare shows unmistakably that heavy frigates and ships of the iine are totally unfitted to pursue privateers ; just as regular troops usually fail in operations undertaken against men who carry on a predatory half-savage warfare — half-savage in that each man acts more or less on his own responsibility, exposes himself to danger as little as possible, and invariably selects those moments when his enemy is off his guard as the best opportunity for making an attack. In the face of such evidence we continue to devote all our energies to the ■•■ production of a magnificent fleet- of iron-plated vessels admirably Suited for performing the weightier operations of warfare — ships which may probably add hereafter to the long list of sea battles in which England has been victorious. But we state witliout-hesita-tion, that these are not the vessels to cope with such craft as the Alabama la y«.d Florida. The Warrior could uot J fcWasta-ts-iher time in looking for such * -ships. True, she might haply fall fou: of one of them now and then, sink buru and destroy ; but .we imagine ships of the Alabama class would take particular care to keep ar; that safe distance which prudence dictated from our heavy frigates, and very littlt-. «xaruination o; inquiry is necessary to undertake the destruction of such dangerous foes to commerce. It is folly to propose the dispatch of a frigate costing over half a million sterling in pursui- of a craft not worth the tenth part ofthe sum. We may rest assured that recourse will never be had to such ■aa expedient while it remains possible to avoid ic. What the exact amount of destruction to our commerce may be which Would render it impossible we can form no idea — that it would be very considerable we have no doubt. Thus, in 181*2, an American war brig, the Argus, at one time took up her station off the south coast of Ireland, cnii.-dng between the Tuskai* and the Saltees, about the • Ist of August. " The West India fleet now began to return, the ships of j war leaving them at the chops of the J Channel, and proceeding to Portsmouth. Now began the Argus's destruction of the homeward bounds. For several days and nights captures were made, and with their rich and valuable cargoes consigned to the flames, which "Were seen blazing and smoking as they •drifted by. ~so large ship of war could be spared at the time for the Cork station." After doing an incalculable amount of mischief, the Argus was "destined by the Pelican, sloop-of-war, sent specially in pursuit of her. We are not a whit better prepared for such foes now than we were in 1812. It is not with gun-brigs we would have to deal in the event of a modern war, but with steamers whose speed would enable them to laugh our ships to scoru; and it is, therefore, well that the attention of those in power should be drawn to the necessity of providing a fleet of small steamers, specially constructed to encounter the privateers — for we will so term them — which a hostile Government would j launch by the hundred against our mercantile marine. The construction of such a fleet ■would entail lii tie expense. Half a dozen serviceable war steamers might be built, engined, and fitted for the price of the Warrior ; but, to be efficient, they would require to be extremely unlike any of the small sloops or despatch vessels we bave now afloat. The first consideration must be speed. On this their powers of attack, their capabilities for making reprisals, and the facility for escaping when threatened by an overwhelming force would enrittdy depend. Length would be nectary to ensure velocity; lioht draught of water to enable them to pursue or fly into shallows ; a qualification which would seem to dictate a recourse to the twin-screw principle, or something analogous. 7 To cover such vessels with armor plates would be simply to render them

useless. As a rule, they would have to contend only with, ships as unprotected as themselves. They would no more attempt to encounter a modern frigate than oue of our 10-gun brigs. of fifty year-* ago would a 120-gun ship. It might, probably, be found advantageous to fit them with a single stroke of armor plates between wind and water* even this is doubtful, and should only be done after mature consideration. The questionof armament is not one difficult of solution. A single 1001 b rifle gun on Whit worth's, or some other principle equally good, and a couple of 681 b muzzle-loaders would, we conceive, be amply sufficient. Did we possess any large guns perfectly trustworthy they could find no place more suitable for the exercise of their powers than on the upper decks of such ships. The evils attending the discharge of the heaviest ordnance between decks, in comparatively confined situations, is well understood. In (he open air, however, and with plenty of room to work them, their use would as quickly become habitual to the sailor as the carronade or the long sixtyeight; but, Unfortunately, the success of any gun throwing shot over 1001 b weight is too exceptional to enable us to calculate with certainty on their capabilities. Masts and sails would, we conceive. be out of place in the ships we speak of. Depentiinp wholly on their engines for the excessive speed which would really be the measure of their efficiency, spars would be of little service, and being liable to be shot away, might foul tlie screw at the most critical moment. They are inimical to the attainment of speed, unless when going dead before ihe wind, or nearly so. It is very well understood that the top hamper of our steam frigates is a priucipal cause why they do not attain the speed of our merchant vessels; and [ ships intended to steam seventeen or eighteen knots an hour could not tolerate their retarding influence, it is generally considered that a j steamer without spars would be powerless if her engines broke down. Perhaps — but there is no reason whatever that when placed in such a predicament she should not resort to the same expedient as a sailing vessel which has lost her masts ; nothing would be easier than to stow jury masts, Sec, so that tiiey could be rendered available when occasion required- The absence of masts and top hamper would I render a steamer burning Welsh coal ' almost invisible at the distance of a few miles.* one of the most desirable objects of the kind of warfare we are speaking of. When we remember how light the armament ueo-.'Ssary to these vessels would be, it is easier to understand tliat great size would be out of place, The real measure of their carrying capacity would depend on the size of their engines, and the quantity of coal stowed. Seventeen or eighteen knots coitid be got iv fair weather from vessels propelled by engines of some 3,000 effective horse-power. 'J OO horse-power has been developed ere now by a 35-ton locomotive ; and there is no reason that marine engines should be much heavier propoitionately to their power. Screw engines and their boilers, with water, of 3,000 horse-power might by a liberal use of steel and wrought iron, instead of cast, be so constructed as not to weigh more than 200 tons. Making every allowance, seventy tons of coal in the twenty-four hours would supply the engines with steam ; and a cruise of eiiilit days, nearly at full speed, would thus come within t;,e powers of the ship. The mere fact, however, of a ship being able io steam seventeen or eighteen knots an hour is no reason whatever that she should always run at that speed. The consumption of fuel increases as the cube of the velocity, and a very slight reduction in the number of knots steamed per hour would enable coal to be reserved for those moments when tbe engines would be exerted to the utmost. A powerful blower, arranged suitably, wouid double the evaporative power of the boiler at such a time. The mechanical engineer would experience no difficulty in constructing engines which, while very light, would be extremely trustworthy. Although run occasionally at the high speed for which they should be specially designed, iheir ordinary rate Would be moderate, consequently repairs would not be heavy ; and uot ouly the ci gines but the ships could be refitted in almost any port on our coasts, as their moderate size would place them within the powers of any private shipbuilding establishment or engineering firm. ' These war vessels would be admirably adapted as well to afford a secondary protection to our own commerce as to destroy that of the enemy, while their comparatively trilling cost would deprive the loss of one or two now and then of any very serious consequences. We have not at present a single ship of the kind. The old steam-frigates of the Bulldog and C) clops class are fast disappearing, their slow speed rendering them utterly worthless. The all-absorbing subject o? ir n -plating has thrown every other question connected with the navy or the protection of our commerce comparatively into the shade, and our naval establishment j will scon be composed of nothing but costly first-rates. That in the construction of heavy war ships is of importance we admit ,* but that it is of an importance great enough to banish all other considerations we deny. A Florida or an Alabama may play havoc with our commerce to-morrow ; and we feel pretty ceatain that our ironplated frigates will be far too busily engaged to prevent them. The Government may, perhaps,

contemplate taking up and arming our merchant steamers in the event of a war. The evidence given before the House of Commons some fourteen or fifteen years ago was scarcely sufficiently encouraging even then to warrant any great reliance on the aid to be derived from such a force. There is not a ship of the kind which would not require immense strengthening before she could be considered to be fit to carry one or two 68-pounders, and war might be half over before they could be qualified to take any part in it. To be at peace, let us be prepared for every description of naval attack and defence. A few hundred thousand pounds properly laid out may possibly prevent the loss of millions hereafter; and our rea <ers may rest assured that the question we have placed befoic them ia one of vital importance, well worthy the careful study of thinking men.