MAERICA.

Southland Times, Volume III, Issue 20, 23 December 1863, Page 5 (Supplement)

MAERICA.

(Fiona the Saturday Review). _ It is not surprising that the Northern Americans should. be, triumphant over the destruction of Fort Sumtet and, the . anticipated fall Tof Charleston. The progress of the attack proves the superiority* of the besiegers in the mechanical appliances of warfare, and probably it will convey useful lessons to military engineers. The ironclad vessels seem to have been almost exempt from casualties, and General Gilmore's artillery has proved fatally effective. When the attack was expected, General Beauregard informed his army that the contest would be decidod by the bayonet ; bat it ii difficult to understand how troops can act against land and sea batteries, especially as the Federal army is held in reserve during the bombardment of the forts and the town. It would seem that Fort Sumter has not been surrendered or occupied, although it hat been destroyed and silenced by the enemy's lire ; and thj Federal commanders are undoubtedly right in abstaining from risking the lives of their men if they can effect their object by the overwhelming force of their artillery. At present, no doubt of early success is entertained in the North ; and irUhe Federal hopes are realized, a hckvy blow will have been inflicted both \*p the prrde and on tbe resources of the Confederacy. A large portion of the foreign supplies of munitions of war hai been introduced throngh the port of Charleston ; and after the fall of New Orleans, the city itself was one of the most obnoxious to the enemy. South Carolina has done much to deserve the exceptional hostility of the North, having originated the theory of Secession, having been the first State to leave the Union, and, above all, having commenced the war by the attack on Fort Sumter. The supposed Union party which, according to the Federal creed, has been held down by military force in other portions of the Confederacy, was never supposed to exist in South Carolina. Since the days of Calhoun, the project of breaking up the Union has always been cherished by the State, and its leading politicians would probably have tried the experiment alone, if the remaining Slave States had refused to concur ' in the establishment of a separate Confederacy. It. is difficult to conjecture the fate which might have attended an isolated act of secession. Though the unaided force of the South Carolinians would have been comparatively insignificant, it is possible that the act of a single State might have been judged more dispassionately than the general disruption of the Union. South Carolina alone would have been well able to resist the regular army of the United States, and the sympathy of the neighboring Slave States would have rendered it difficult to commence hostile operations by land. The alliance of nine or ten Southern States seemed to a d enormous force to the party of Secession, but the extraordinary and unfore- ' .seen efforts of the North have been j chiefly provoked by the magnitude of the revolt. Fort Sumter itself is popularly regarded as a symbol of the rebellion, and as the destined trophy of Federal success. The controversy between the belligerents as to the cause of the original attack on the fort is not likely to be settled. The advocates of the South assert that the Cabinet of Washington, after promising not to relieve ihe garrison, treacherously despatched a fleet to Charleston harbor with sup plies and reinforcements. According to a more elaborate theory, the President and his advisers had not seriously intended o relieve the fort, but only to force the Southern commanders, by an empty menace, to commence hostilities. As the Federal Government had, at the time, neither an army nor an efficient navy at its disposal, it is highly improbable that it should have desired to precipitate a collision ; and it seems more likely that the Confederate leaders considered it necessary to force tbe Border States out of their continued hesitation, and to compel them to choose a side. At the time of the attack on Fort Sumter, Virginia, which has since borne so large a share of the burden of the war, had not passed an ordinance of secession ; but Mr Lincoln's summona to the militia, which immediately followed on the surrender of Fort Sumter, drove fottr or five States to join the Confederacy in the course of a few days. Mr Jefferson Davis had calculated with perfect accuracy the conduct of his friends ; and if he failed to foresee the extemporaneous burst of indignation in the North, he only shared the blindness of Republican as well as of Democratic politicians. Mr Seward had shortly before admitted that there was no power in the Constitution to reclaim seceding States by force ; and even after the capture of Fort Sumter, General Scott, who was then the popular hero, earnestly advised theGoverjiiment to allow wayward sisters to part in peace. English partisans of the' Republican cause then believed themselves to express the opinion of the North when they pointed out the superior wisdom and calmness of a democracy which shrank instinctively frbin, coercion and from war. An aristocracy and a standing army would, it was urged, have committed the unpardonable crime of making a peaceful secession a pretext for the exercise of force. European enthusiasts understood the Americans M little as they understood themselves, the insult offered to their flag produced an irritation which had not been caused by the secession itself. From the first armament of the volunteer levies, who anticipated an early and complete vieI^Apry, the war has propagated itself gradually changing motives and objects. Both parties have been surprised by the greatness of the struggle,

and it is fair to admit the energies of both have proved equal to the occasion. If Charleston falls, the besieging and blockading squadrons will be disposable for further operations, and the remain ing ports of the Confederates will be attacked in succession. Tbe more zealous Confederates have repeatedly declared that, even if the enemy occupied every point of the coast, the struggle in the interior may be prolonged for an indefinite number of campaigns. Experience only can show whether a resolution which has few parallels in history will survive misfortunes which might well excuse the submission of any ordinary population. The real danger to the Confederate cause consists in the exhaustion of the supply of recruits, for the general levy which '-was lately ordered by the President can have scarcely left a reserve behind. The main army in Virginia still faces the enemy on equal terms, and, a considerable force under John- ] .stone and Bragg is attempting to stop the advance of Rosencranz on the western border of Tennessee. The exchanged soldiers of Vicksburg are | said to be returning to their colors, and some thousands of Confederate troops are scattered over the vast regions of Arkansas and Texas, The only serious operations by land are conducted by Rosencranz, who is believed to be commencing an active i campaign by "attempting to take or to burn the defences of Chattanooga. In preparation for an invasion, the State of Georgia h levying a defensive force, and the Confederate army has the advantage of a friendly population around it, and of immediate proximity to its supplies. The Federal line of communication with Nashville is inconveniently prolonged, and the proclamation which Rosencranz has issued against guerillas indicates his fear of attacks by irregular bands on his trains and magazines. It may be doubted whether the Confederate generals will risk any engagement which can be avoided at a time when it is so necessary to economise the lives of their men. One of the objects of their defensive campaign will probably be to prevent the despatch of reinforcements from the Western department to the army of the Potomac ; for General Lee might be unable to provide, at the same time, against an advance through Northern Virginia, and a repetition of M'Clellan's movement on Richmond by way of the Peninsula. The use of the missies which are called Greek fire in the seige of Charleston supports the opinions of those who have habitually doubted the alleged tendency of modern warfare to increased gentleness and moderation. It seems a cruel measure to force armies to submit by burning the houses of non-combat-ants ; and, if the Southern journals may be trusted, the mode of attack is likely to be as inoperative as it is probably unprecedented. The Federal Government has exaggerated the privileges of belligerents against neutrals, and its troops have plundered almost as indiscriminately as the armies of Napoleon. The sympathy with the cause of the North which is abated by the proceedings of the generals is still further cooled by the repeated announcements that peace with the South is to be the commencement of war with England. Journalists playfully threaten to ravage Canada, and to leave it occupied only by ice and snow, or they declare that, although the West India Islands are not especially required at present, they will be taken as soon as they are wanted. There are probably few Northern Americans who have not declared that the continuance of the war is due to the hostility of England, and, although the assertion is absurdly untrue, the more ignorant portions of tbe population believe what they say. There is a real danger in incessant menaces and professions of anger, although they may, as in the present case, be wholly unprovoked. As long as the popular feeling of the North is directed against England, candidates for office and for influence will flatterthc delusion ? and the first cause of difference between the Governments may produce a lamentable rupture. The professed friends both of peace and of Federal America will do well to observe that their favorite nation openly professes the belief that want of sympathy, revengeful feeling, and territorial ambition are, separatively or collectively, sufficient grounds : for war.- European Governments have long since thought it necessaay to provide more plausible pretexts for even their most questionable acts.