ENGLISH POLICY IN CHINA.

Southland Times, Volume 2, Issue 108, 30 October 1863, Page 6

ENGLISH POLICY IN CHINA.

Lord Naas expressed a general opinion when he deprecated unnecessary interference in Chinese affairs. The unforeseen establishment of an English Empire in India has proved, on the whole, a successful accident ; but the risks and the drawbacks of the experiment form a sufficient warning against any attempt to repeat it. Political economy has come into existence since the days of Clive, and traders no longer believe in the expediency of commencingoperations by conquering their customers. Even if the golden days of the East India Company could be recalled, China would scarcely reward the enterprise of the adventurous soldiers and statesmen who supplanted the Great Mogul. There are no Chinese Rajahs or Nawaubs to dethrone, nor are there jagheers to earn from the gratitude of pretenders restored to their dominions. It is only in a rhetorical and hostile sense than an English Ambassador at Pekin can be called the Prime Minister of the Emperor. There may possibly be a risk of renewed war with the central Government, and, at present, occasional collisions take place with the rebels ; but the House of Commons may be well assured that no English Minister will attempt to create a territorial dependency in China. As Mr Layard said, there is no disposition to imitate the policy of Russia, which has lately expanded in the remote East for nine hundred miles along the coast. In endeavoring to create a little India of her own in Cochin China, France is imitating a policy which England has definitively abandoned. The present state of affairs in China is sufficiently perplexing, and unfriendly critics can j easily show that the commercial activity" of England involves an anomalous interference with the affairs of a foreign country. Mr Cobden's plan of buying tea and silk, and of asking no further questions, would, if other things were equal, be in all respects preferable to a complicated mixture of diplomacy and military assistance ; but it must be remembered that before purchases can be made there must be an accessible market, that the trading ports where tea and silk are procured were opened by means of successive wars, and that they would probably not be retained if all active exertions were -wholly discontinued.

Like all opposition speakers on Chinese affairs, Lord Naa3 denounces the trade in opium as the original cause of the first war with China, and as the immediate consequence of the suppression of the Company's monopoly. The discussion of the subject could

only be material if any party, in or- put of Parliament, proposed to renew the exclusive license of the C6mpanj;,:;or to prevent the Indian Government from sending opium to China. .It may; have been both immoral and imprudent to coerce the Chinese into commercial intercourse, and finally t,o compel jthe signature of a treaty within the Wails of Pekin. Nevertheless* the vast extension of the trade is exclusively i attributable to the strong measures'. wh(ch have been adopted; and probably neither Lord Naas nor Mr Cobden woujld be prepared to rocur to the insignificant dealings of thirty years ago. ; It 'is, jas Lord Palmerston argued, impossible |to retire from China, or to subside into total inactivity. At present, the representatives of the civilised world act jin that remote region With' a harmony which is obviously dictated by common interests; but in the absence^ of' an English Ambassador, the French, the Ltussians, and the Americans might be tempted to use their influence for the exclusive benefit of their respective countries. The common action of the Foreign Ministry forms a sufficient security against the attempt to, establish an English sovereignty in China. Although Sir F. B.ruce has happily no Dupleix or Suffren to oppo.se and to counterplot, his French colleague would certainly not assist him in any project for superseding the Chinese Government. The diplomatists at Pekin appear to be unanimous in their desire to support the Imperial power, and their sincerity is best proved by their freedom from reciprocal jealousy. It is possible that they may have been mistaken in the means which they have employed, and even in the selection of their immediate object ; but it is undeniable that they which to restore order, and to promote foreign commerce by increasing the prospreity of the population. The French priests may, perhaps, feel a special antipathy to the Taepings, on the ground that their confused reminiscences of Protestant doctrines have made them heretics before they have ceased to be heathens ; but responsible laymen support the Government of Pekin, in the belief that the re-estab-lishment of the Emperor's authority would promote the restoration of order. It may be perfectly true that the Chinese in the Imperial service are nearly as cruel as the rebels, and that, under their native generals, they are more cowardly. The sacred right of insurrection is, according to Lord Naas, recognised by Confucious, or by other national sages, and even when philosophers are silent, rebellion often proves itself the most effective check on an oppressive despotism. Asiatic subjects of" absolute masters, may not unreasonably complain of European intruders who render a government irresistible in fact, when it was before irresponsible in theory. The Chinese, though they are, in ordinary circumstances, submissive, are by no means enthusiastically loyal. Some centuries of competitive examination have utterly annihilated all respect for every office except the Crown, which has hitherto not been awarded by marks to well-crammed students. Few reigns have been exempt from provincial insurrections, and piratical fleets have habitually harassed the coasts of the Empire, with the tacit or passive approbation of the community. Lord Nass plausibly remonstrates against any attempt on the part of the English functionaries t© interfere with the Constitutional Opposition which consists in the ravages and atrocities of the Taepings ; and there is undoubtedly no sufficient reason for taking a part in the civil war, except as far as it may be necessary to protect English interests from immediate or contingent danger. All parties agree that Shanghai and the other ports opened by the treaty must be forcibly defended against aggression ; and the radius of thirty miles, which has been tobooed or declared inviolable has been fixed by the Eoglish and French Generals on the alleged .ground of military necessity. The rule of neutrality is on all sides admitted, and the only remaining controversy relates to the numerous exceptions which have been introduced. As the English force has been largely diminished, it may be assumed that the government has no inteution of extending military operations in China. The support which has been tendered to the Emperor and to Prince Kung takes the form of advice and facilities for the improvement of civil and military organisation ; and no reasonable objection can be offered to the employment of English civil servants by a foreign and friendly government. It is more questionable whether military and naval officers should be enconraged to engage in the service of a semi-barbarous potentate. The English or Scotch admirals who created the' naval power of Russia were merely private adventurers, and the English officer who is now an admiral in the Turkish navy has chosen his career on his own exclusive responsibility. The position of Captain Sheraad Osborne more nearly resembles the command of the Spanish Legion by Sir De Lacy Evans under the direct authority of his own Government. If the Anglo-Chinese commander were unfortunately decapitated either by the Imperial authorities or by the rebels, it would be difficult to abstain from exacting retribution. In certain stages of civilization, the most urgent national want is the need of foreign guides and rulers. The Turks, who are, pc baps, the best soldiers on the Continent of Europe, can find no honest or intelligent officers of their own to command them. The Chinese, forming the most vigorous and ingenious population of the East, have, by means of the competitive system, eliminated every capable servant from the ranks of the Mandarins. No Chinese, prize man can be trusted to collect the duties, or to take charge of an army or

« fleet. Prince Kung has applied the only available, remedy to the prevailing evil of peculation by appointing an Englishman to the head of the customs department, and it is not surprising that he should look Jo the same nation for an admiral who cert inly will'not run away, and who will probably clear the seas from, pirates. The adventurers of no particular pedigree i or country, who have lately organised a Chinese force, have the advantage w «f European or | American descent, ;and consequently they' are likely to be more than a match ( for the Taeping* generals. { ,The experiment, however, of employing foreign 1 commanders- who owe allegiance to no, special government is in thejhigb?est'degree dangerous ' officers, who retain, or hope to resume .their rank in their own army or navy, may be trusted I to perform -their engagements 'without ulterior7flesigns ; but Western filibus'terers^fe'not unlikely to speculate on the possibility of carving out kingdoms for themselves. The English Ambassador can offer no 6bjection to the employment of foreign officers by the Chinese Government, but it is highly expedient to avoid all responsibility for the ats of the mercenary leaders: ' For the present there appears to be no r|sk of drifting into a Chinese war, either against the legitimate dynasty or against the rebelsi