“W.E.A”

Shannon News, 2 July 1926, Page 3

“W.E.A”

“REASONING.” The usual weekly meeting ol the Levin branch was held in the Y.M.C.A. rooms on Tuesday evening, at 7.30., Mr C. Gayne occupying the chair. ‘ Tlie lecturer said that the reasSoner was, strictly speaking, an explorer, and the culminations of his explorations is the perception of some fact previously unknown to him. This mental exploration must be distinguished from motor exploration. If I have occasion to need the hammer and discover that it is not where it is usually kept, I follow motor exploration when I aimlessly ransack the house hoping that the missing tool will turn up somewhere. But if I think back to the last occasion I used the hammer, decide that probably I left it where 1 last used it, go to that place and find it, then 1 follow mental . exploration—in other words I “reason.” There are two

kinds of thinkers—the emperical or “rule-of-thumb” sort who can de-

duce nothing from unfamiliar facts. ' This sort is reproductive only. The reasoner is productive, for even if ~ he be placed in unfamiliar surroundings he atones hy his ability to draw inferences from them. . Mental exploration must be conducted really on the same lines as motor, i.e., a system of “ransacking.” *A question of vital interest is: “Is man the only (reasoning animal?”

Experiments have been conducted \ and splendidly careful and exact records kept and the weight of evidence ‘serins to be distinctly an answer in the affirmative. One insuperable difficulty is the matter of sep-

arating what seems >to • be “reasoning” in the animal from what may be only instinct or the result of, training. What is known as the “learning curve” in animal behaviour fails to show any sudden im-

provement such as most v (human learning curves show. It is significant that while, the average untrained observer of animal behaviour strong-

ly inclines to the opinion that many animals do reason, no definite statement has been made in this (direction by scientists. Comparisons 'have demonstrated certain differences in favour of an affirmative. (a) The human can be seen studying a problem—scrutinising it from various viewpoints. , -

(b) Thinking typicallyA-vith eyes closed, or abstracted into spaie, trying to recall something. (c) Sudden “insights” when the problem in hand is seen in the light of previous experience. Reasoning (contains analysis and abstraction. The reasoner in tackling a problem tries to “break it up” to get its '“strength.” Hie selects some attribute aiid examines that. He discovers that it has .->ome relationship to the whole. He then tries to find a subordinate relationship.

He calls the fact: :S. The attribute: M., The relation: P, and he discovers that an “inference”, can be drawn from p and S through M. His reasoning then becomes a syllogism:— M is P. S is M'. S is P. and here he demonstrates hy reasoning a relationship between S and P that was not apparent when he took hold of the situation. Infer i ice typi-

cally is a response to two facts and

the response consists in perceiving a third fact' that is hound up in -hf other ifewoj One does not ‘infer what one can see directly by the aid of the senses. Two men of unequal

height standing together can be se*n to he unequal in height; but if I am told that Jack is sft 9in, and Tom is sft Sin., 1 compare these sets of numbers and infer that Tom is shorter than Jack. Just as illusion is a false sense perception, so a false inference is a fallacy. The great cause of fallacious reasoning is the confused way m which the facts of a situation are sometimes presented to' the senses, resulting 1 in failure in seeing a clear relationship. The great rule in reasoning is to get over facts clearly and then one is not handicapped in reaching one’s inference. As reasoning is always used in Oder to reach some particular conclusion it must be conceived rightly. The result may be hit upon by accident, but this is not 'so frequent an occurrence to justify slipshod habits in thinking. One ivitafl difference between the trained and the careless thinker is that the former feels compelled to avoid fallacies and to admit his conclusion even when it displeases him; the latter is often in danger of thinking fallaciously in (.order to reach a desired c.inclusion. Jn this case the “wish is father to the conclusion.” If one is asked to purchase a certain oar and declines on the ground that “it looks as if it will not stand up to its work” one’s judgment, though possibly correct, is an “emperical” judgment it is not a reastoped judgment. But if one * knows 1 that in the construction of that particular make of car a certain kind of skill is largely used-and one knows ulso that that skill is un-reliable-then one used judgment. The thought of that steel is an attribute between the car and the idea of high upkeep costs and i effective as ,an argument against, purchase. “Why cannot anybody reason as well as anybody else? Why a Newton to discover the law oi gravitation? Why a Darwin to die- , cover the law of survival of the nitest? Many reasons together provide an answer. Sometimes heredity plus experience plus named observation, plus, in many instances, taking pains. Someone has said that genius is only an infinite capaci y If pain*,” and in this man-

ner probably has supplied the best answer to be found. Mr McArthur spent' some time explaining the various kinds of reasoning employed—'deductive, - drawing a particular from a general; and inductive, reaching a universal from a particular. By way of conclusion, the lecturer asked the members of the class to solve certain problems. Some very simple, others of a somewhat sterner calibre, for instance: “If a town clock takes 3 minutes in striking 3, how long, at the same rate, does it take to strike IS?—the correct answer being 16| minutes. The subsequent discussion was exceedingly interesting and instructive, mostly dealing with the question of .reasoning in animals. Some unique instances were recorded, hut as to he expected, no proved case could be discovered.