PLAIN TALKS ABOUT DEMOCRACY.

Shannon News, 7 October 1924, Page 1

PLAIN TALKS ABOUT DEMOCRACY.

(A. Ernest Mander.) ■ IL Yesterday I tried to expose the absurdity of the assumption upon which the whole of the current demand for electoral reform seems to be based. The assumption is that, it is ; hideously wrong for three hun- ; d>red thousand people to be ■ able to < rule three hundred and one thousand, while" the majority, the three hundred and one thousand, have .some sacred natural right to rule the three hundred'thousand who form the minority. This is not, however, an argument against any proposed'- change in our electoral system; it is only an argument against taking any such proposal too seriously and indulging in a lot of cant vabout it. The advocate of some new electoral system must show either that the possession of the odd yote confers sdihe mysterious' “right”' upon the party which hag gained it; or else that his new system is more expedient than the one which we have now. He is notJ entiili&V to6 V6ij? to ah-' sume either—and then argue upon that assumption. One’ thing is clear; both parties cannot rule together. So, under Democracy, some rough-arid-teady method ; must be agreed upon for deciding;' which 1 of the two mobs shall have its why. Cpunting"'heads to see • whiblfr crowd* is larger is, perhaps, as goog a method as any. But surely it is not a life-and-death matter; there is no vital principle involved; it ig purely an affair of practical expediency.'

The Greatest Happiness. But we shall be told that this demand for absolutely accurate repretation relates, ultimately, to the principle of securing the greatest ; happiness (or welfare) of the greatest-num-ber. But there is a further assumption involved in this; and again- it is an assumption which we cannot allow to pass unchallenged. The assumption i s that the rule of the majority, simply ; because it is the majority, is most likely to produce the greatest good for the - greatest number. Indeed, advocates of proportional representatien seem to think that it can be worked* out with mathematical- accuracy down to the last decimal place, so that a few hundred votes one way or the other will make all the* 'difference; They imply that if/three hundred and one thousand people rule three hundred thousand, then there will be “greater happiness” than if the position were re versed. A truly remarkable assumption! : , The Greatest Wisdom. Or perhaps the assumption is rather that < the virtue of numbers depends upon the aggregation of wisdom. Are three hundred thousand men three .hundred thousand tithes as wise as one man ? If so, then {there' may be a greater aggregate of wisdom in three hundred and one thousand than there is in three hundred thousand. If we were concerned with a body of- exp erts studying public questions quite impartially then there might be some' justification for supopsing that, where they' differed, the majority was more' likely! than the minority to be right. Possibly! But we are concerned, in fact, with ordinary electors, most of whom are by no means experts in social and' economic matters, and most- of whom really take very little interest dn such matters, either impartially or otherwise. What grounds are there, then, for supposing that the majority is any more likely than the . minority to be right—to be able to secure the greatest good for the greatest- number? Let us consider a few relevant facts.

Ourselves, the Electors. Amongst us, the general body of elec tors, ! there are two degrees of ignorance: Some of us know just enough of the’ facts to realise how exceedingly complex these social and economic' problems are, and how hopeless it is for us (or anybody but an expert) to attempt to solve them. But, apparently, most of u s do not know-enough of the' facts to make us realise even that § To those who belong ito this second and larger class the whole problem, 1 therefore, seems delightfully simple: Not because of our knowledge, but because of our sheer ignorance, the' solution of every public question seems perfectly obvious. If we know and have to consider a thousand facts we may find the question difficult. But if we know only two or three of those facts we shall find it quite easy—and we shall not be able to understand why anyone else should find the slightest difficulty in it. It is clear that most of us, ordinary electors,' do find 'all the big social and economic problems very simple indeed—because we are blissfully ignorant of most of the relevant facts. And, knowing two or three' of the thousand facts, we are therefore eager to jump on a tub and tell the world how obvious the solution of the problem is to us. Our educational system has certainly succeeded in instilling a "little learning”; but so far it has'failed entirely to instil also the v4ry necessary caution that “ a little learning is a dangerous thing." If only we could recognise our own limitations, if only we could be aware of how much we don’t know, we should be better fitted to function in a democratic state.

At present we do not need to look very far to find someone who knows practically nothing whatever about, say, Banking, who would yet be de- ’ lighted to favour u s with hig opinion —his • absolutely worthless opinion—> about the proposal for a State Bank, or about the operations of the Bank

of New Zealand. It is immaterial in this connection whether the proposal . for a State Bank happen to be sound or unsound:' whether the 'operations of the 1 Bank of ; New ; Zealand are* socially-' useful or anti-social; 'the point is simply that most of those who talk the loudest do not know enough of the facte to form ah opinidri *Of any value Yet it is not the opinioh of experts, but the opinion of the masses of us (who are ignorant of nine-tenth s of the facts), which wih determine the policy of the State in relation to banking. And it is the'skme all through the list of * our social and economic questions. ’