SPAIN AND MOROCCO.

Shannon News, 28 September 1923, Page 1

SPAIN AND MOROCCO.

CONSTANT TROUBLE.

LOSS OF LIFE AND PRESTIGE. As the recent “coup d'etat” in Spain was due mainly to the failure of the unpopular campaign campaign in Morocco, some details of the operations in that country may be of interest. For centuries Spain has had settlements on the coast of Morocco, largely used, as convict establishments. The dispute with regard to Morocco was originally an international affair, and at one time nearly led to a European war, the German Government sending a gunboat to Agadir, “to protect German interests.” These disputes were partly settled by the Algeciras Conference in 1906, which ended in a diplomatic defeat for Germany. Ilie Government of that country! however, never forgot the slight, and from that time her definite preparations for a European campaign may be said to have commenced. As a result of the negotiations, the contending claims between France and Spain in Morocco were settled, the latter country being conceded a protectorate over that portion of Morocco which faced Spanish territory, the final treaty being signed in 1912. By July, 1921, Spain had effectively occupied little more than two thousand square miles of the Moroccan coast, it had taken twelve years to do this. The fertile parts of the plains were being farmed by Spanish peasants, and Melilla itself (already occupied previous to the treaty) owing to the trade with the hinterland, had become a prosperous colonial town of 50,000 inhabitants. CENTURIES OF TROUBLE. The history of Spanish adventure in Morocco is a long one, extending over several centuries, during which time at least a score of campaigns have been waged, but although each campaign was heralded as a victory, Spain never made much headway. During the present campaign, as many as 150,000 Spanish troops were maintained in the country, and the cost in blood and treasure has been heavy. The estimate of ten thousand killed is probably below the mark. One army of 19,000 men was wiped out by a force estimated not to exceed three thousand tribesmen, badly armed. It is Tio matter for surprise therefore that the Spanish campaign is unpopular in-Spain and that there is a strong party which demands the evacuation of the country. Raisuli, the leader of the Moroccan bands, is a name not unknown to those who have watched the march of political events. He has been active for many years. On one occasion he captured Kaid Mac Lean, -the famous Scotchman who was at one time instructor of the Moroccan army, demanding and obtaining for his release a heavy ransom.. The campaign has ended in a triumph for this Moroccan De Wet; he opened negotiations with the Spaniards and brought them to a propitious close. His stronghold at Tazerut, severely damaged by Spanish shellfire and bombs is being rebuilt for him at the expense of the Spanish Government; his confiscated properties have been returned to him and an annual income guaranteed for the future. The brigand Raisuli is once more His Highness the Shereef Malai Ahmed. It required a campaign of three consecutive summers for the Spaniards to arrive within the neighbourhood of his stronghold, with the only result that he is once more in power and will remain a danger as long as he lives. The Spanish taxpayer has already forfeited millions of pesetas in expeditions to kill or capture him, and. It is now adding to all these previous expenses the brigand’s pension. No wonder there is discontent in Spain. BRITAIN’S EXPERIENCE.

The Spanish occupation of one or two points on the Moroccan coast is worse than useless unless they can also peaceably occupy the hinterland on which the trade of these ports depends. So long as'the back country is occupied by hostile tribes the coast towns become merely a useless expense, necessitating the maintenance of strong garrisons at great cost. This truth the British Government has also learned to its sorrow. In 1662, when Charles 11. married Catherine of Braganza, the Portguese Government, as part of her dowry, ceded to England the fortress of Tangier, on the Moroccan coast. No doubt the Portuguese were glad to get rid of a possession which to them was merely a white elephant, and so also it proved to the British Government. It was soon found that Tangier was useless for any standpoint. The natives of the interior were hostile, so no trade could be done. On the other hand, a large garrison was necessary for its defence. The expense incurred by this and by the construction of strong fortifications proved to be ruinous, and in 1683, after the English had occupied Tangiers for only about twenty years, the fortifications were dismantled and the place evacuated. It is not impossible that Spain may pursue a similar course with regard to her possessions on the Moroccan boast. One of these, the fortress of Ceuta, possesses a particular interest for the British. It is situated at

the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, directly opposite the famous British fortess, and is itself a fortress of no mean strength. It was greatly strengthened at the end of the nineteenth century and it was proposed to convert it into a first-class fortress, although it is dominated to some extent by tho surrounding heights; which, however, could themselves ba fortified. Some years ago it was seriously proposed by British military authorities to exchange Gibraltar for Ceuta. Gibraltar, it was argued, has no longer the same military strength it had a century ago. Owing to < tha increased range and efficiency of modern guns, it would be easy to-day to bombard Gibraltar from the Span--isli shore at Algeciras, only five miles distant across the bay, while tha harbour of Gibraltar, constructed at great expense, would then be quite untenable. In any case, if Ceuta should fall into the hands of tha French or any other Great Power, tha position of Gibraltar as the guardian of the western entrance to the 'M*editerranean would be seriously challenged.—J. D. Leckie, in the Auckland “Star.”