THE WAIMATE FIRE CASES.

South Canterbury Times, Issue 2220, 29 April 1880, Page 2

THE WAIMATE FIRE CASES.

At the Banco sittings of the Supreme Court, Christchurch, ycsterchiy, before Judge Johnston in the Waimate fire case —Theobald v. Studholme. Mr Joynt moved for a rule nisi for defendant to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a new trial granted. The grounds for the application were —(1) Misdirection of the Judge as to the question of negligence; (2) the verdict being against the weight of evidence; and (15) the discovery of material evidence since the trial, which could not have been known before the trial. On the first ground considerable discussion took place between his Honor and Mr Joynt as to what had really taken place at the trial. His Honor’s notes and the report appearing in the Otago Daily “ Times ” supported the view taken by His Honor, but Mr Joynt declared that they were at variance with his own recollection, confirmed by tire opinion of legal gentlemen present at the trial. On this point His Honor refused the rule, and said he did not think be would give leave to appeal. Mr Joynt must proceed by petition to the Court of Appeal. The second ground for the application Mr Joynt abandoned. In support of the third ground, Mr Joynt read the affidavits of Alexander Rugg, William Reynolds, and David Buckley.

The rule was refused. Mr Joynt said lie would take advantage of bis right to appeal. Jlis Honor said Mr Joynt could ask for leave. As he understood it, if he were to grant leave to appeal the result would bo that the ease would go up without any preliminary mailer whatever, but if he refused Mr Joynt would have to present a petition, which ought to be done at the first sitting, and the Court of Appeal would determine whether he (His Honor) was wrong in refusing leave, and if they thought he was wrong, they could then grant a rule nisi-, and the case could be heard at that sitting. He did not refuse the leave because be had no wish that the matter should he further agitated, but because ho held that if a judge had a Jinn conviction on a point like the present, he should not encourage appeal.