BRITAIN, EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

Rotorua Morning Post, Issue 5309, 23 January 1947, Page 3

BRITAIN, EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

,NEW TREATY CRISIS #- - STAND AGAINST CRUDE CAIRO IMPERIALISM " It is, as indeed are most political phenomena, a result of history aud geography that the British Government and British Foreigr. Secretary have at any given moment some diffi■cult problem with which they must deal, writes W. N. Ewer from London on January 11. At this given moment of time there is a temporary quiesence in the fields of irternational affairs. But the British Foreign Minister and his colleagues must turn aside to deal with two local, bu t by no means unimportant, crises — those of the long negotiations over Egypt and over Palestine. That there should in January, 1947, be a- eritieal situation between Britain and Egypt is absiud. Sixty-six years ago, British troops occupied Egypt, and for all practical purposes the Government of Egypt came under British control. Thus was created a situation from which — though not for many years — there developed a struggle between Egyptian "nationalism" and British "imperialism." Policy Transformed. But so far as rhe governing oi" Egypt is •eoncerned, that is long sinee over. British "iniperial" policy has been transformed.' And quite voluntarily all Brtiish control over the ad- | ministration of Egypt has been abolishc( 1 . Botli as regards its ovvn governance and its oxternal relatious, Egypt is an entiroly indcpendoi t country, vo'.untarily allied with Britain. One relic only has remained of the old days of occupation. Under the treaty of 1936 Britain has a right to maintain a small garrison in the Suez Cana! zone for the defence of tlie eanai. Dui'ing the years of crisis and wai-,. British troops also remained — fortunately for the world in general and Egypt in particular— to defcrd the whole country. Already they are being wit'ndrawu. In any case, cxc^pt ior che Canal Zone, there would have been no Britsih soldiers in Egypt by the end of this year. But, raturally enough, the Egyptians at the end of the wai- aslced for more. Now that the immediate trial was past, why shoild fhe British remain even on the canal? They askod for immediate revision of the 1936 t roaty. At once the British Government agreed, though it eould have refused until 1956. In the regotiations it agreed to complete withdrawal, even from the Canal Zone, as soon as the Egyptian army jcould he fitted to talce over the responsibility for guarding the canal. A treaty has been drafted and virtually apl^ed — wlfich wouid give everything Egypt asks for h-er own national stat;s and prestige, aiid which would vemove within two or three years the last relics .of the 66 years' era of British occupation. -'Crisis is Absurd. . It seems then absurd that there ! should be a crisis. But there is. It. I arises not on any Egyptian question, I but or that of the Fudan, in no way i Egyptian in population, which has | been sinee 1899 under Anglo-Egyptian sovc'i-eicntv.

The Egyptians, on rather flimsy historical grounds, claim that the' Sudan sliall be reeognised as pavt of the Dominions of the Egyptian Crown, an integral part of the Egyptian State, tho.gh, its administratior for nearly f.9 years has bt-en, in ihe hauus of British offieials. The British Government, on the other hand, is not clainiwig that the Sudan shall remain British. For years past, the whole policy of Ihe Sudan Government has been direeted to preparing the Sudanese people for* self-government. Wlhen the time eomes — so l-uns the British thesis — the Sudanese themselves shall be able to decide their own fnture freely: to choose whether Ihe Sadan shall be completely united with Egypt, associated with it in samc k.ind of politic federatian, or be entirely independent. It is a fantasik- situation. There is no longer any conflict between British "imperialisin'' and Eg-ypUan "nationalism." To-day Britain is ehamjiioning the right s of Sudanese nationality agaiust cvude Egyptian "imperialism." Cannot Yield on Issue. It is an issue on which the British Government cannot yield, though no British interest is at stake. For to yield would be both to deny every principle on which present-day British colonial policy is based, and also break specific promises given to the Sudanese. v And so, in this strange fashion, the new crisis has come about. There seem orily tv/o ways out. One is that the Egyptians shall accept a "Sudan protocol" which will recognise the ultimate right of the Sudanese to complete self-determiration. The other i is that purely Anglo-Egyptian matters } shall be decided now by a new treaty leaving all Sudanese questions for later negotiation If the Egyptian Government should reject both of these, then the consequence 3s plain. There can be no new treaty. The 1936 treaty will remain in foree. And the -Egyptians will have thrown away the .substanee of complete evacuation for the shadow ^of an unforceable claim for permanent dominion over the Sudan. It is for Egypt to choose. As to the sugestion that she will appeal to the S-ecurity Council, one only has to ask what in the world she proposes to appeal about.