HAS TRUMAN FAILED ROOSEVELT IDEALS?

Rotorua Morning Post, Issue 5281, 18 December 1946, Page 2

HAS TRUMAN FAILED ROOSEVELT IDEALS?

POLICY TOWARD U.S.S.R. FORMjRIR PREISIDENT1S . CLOSE ASSOCIATE GIVES VIEWS. Whenever the course of pfeacemaking comes up> against another hurdle, several voices are always raised contendiing that matters would be different if Mr. Roosevelt had remained at the American helm through the immediate post-war » period, writes Joseph C. Harsch in the Christian. Science Monitor. Such voices, however, seldom agree as to what Mr. Roosevelt would have done differently from Mr. Truman and Mi^ Byrnes. Some argue that he would have played his hand in precisely the same manner, although perhaps with greater skill and effectiveness. Others argue that he would have done it quitc differently. Since we in the Washington Bureau do not know of ourselves how Mr. Roosevelt would have hehaved — not having" heen in his inner confidences — we were minded of the fact that there are several people still around Washington who went to all of the great war-time conferences with him and who did' have a good chance to know what was in his mind as.to the course to ihe pursued aftet the war. So we put on our hat and called or one of these persons with the question, "What would Mr. Roosevelt have done?" Answer from. an Associate. Perhaps we would have obtained different answer s from. the different persons who could haye given them. Therefore, we do not offer this as the full, authoritative answer to the question. But ■ it comes from a man who worked closely with Mr. Roosevelt durin'g all his negotiations with the Russians. H^ere, in general terms, are his views : The course of American relations with Russia would have differed in two ways 'under continued Roosevelt guidance. First, Mr. Roosevelt would have heen rnore effectively flrm where tlie Russians overstepped the bounds. Second, he would have given the non-Russian world more cause to cooperate enthusiasticaily with America, and therefore, in turn, the Russians more cause to feel that they had tangihle things to gain hy working with the Western world. t? The essence of the first point, as made to us, is that Mr. Roosevelt was acutely sensitive to specific aetions which could' upset peace and that he also carried great weight in Moscow. We were told that on several occasions toward the end, he let Stalin know in no uncertain terms that some of Stalin's hoys were disturbing the solemn agxements made at Teheran. These protests produeed immediate results. We are told that Mr. Roosevelt could probably have prevented the Iranian affair from going as far as-it did and would certainly have tried, and probably succeeded, in persuading the Russians to observe more of the spirit of the Yalta formula a*egarding tlie Balkan countries. World Reconstruction Plans. On the second point, we were told that Mr. RooseVelt had in mind a sort of "Lend-Lease for Peace" programme — a plan which would have injected a missing element of the positive into America's relations with the nonSlavic world. As it is, the policy has a rather negative base. The cement of the Western world is a common distrust of Russia, but that is almost the only quality which hinds its parts together. There were other plans which have fallen apart under the pressure oi disorganised domestic American reconversion. Food and relief commitments could not he maintained after rationing w'as abandoned and1 prices started booming. « Financial aid plans have fallen apart. Other countries are beinig urged to return to free trade methods more hy ibludgeon than by inducement. What Mr. Roosevelt had in mind, we are told, was a long-term programme of rehahilitation and development foi; the damaged: and backward countries to make it possible for them to be more prosperous and therefore to be able to trade more advantageously with America. In simplest terms, he wanted companies formed with 49 per cent. American capital which would promote such things as T.V.A.'s for the great river valleys of China and Inidia. .He would have tried- to expand American trade hy' expanding the capacity of other nations to -trade. This, in theory, would have given the non-F-lavic countries the greatest reason to look to America for leadership in every field — economic and cultural as well as political. Rusjsia would have faced an outside world growing • -stronger and more prosperous as a unit. This would have discouraged Russian adventures; would have erected a constructive ibulwark against Communist propalganda, and would have given the Russians a positive reason for wanting to share in the general prosperity of the outside world. Mr. Roosevelt did not expect the Russians to he easy associates in the early years. But he planned to give them fewer reasons for finding trouihled waters attractive, and rnore reasons for fliscovering their own hest interests in terms of^co-operation.