TRUCE IN CHINA

Rotorua Morning Post, Volume 3, Issue 665, 18 October 1933, Page 7

TRUCE IN CHINA

REASON FOR DECISION MILITARY OFFICJF3RS SUFFERING FROM INERIORITY COMPLEX. PARADOX OF PEKING. The deeision to accept an armistice •on the northern front was not an easy one for* the Chinese Government to take; it was in some measure a disavowal of its past policy, wriites William Martin in the Manchester Guardian. The Premier, Mr. Wang Chingwei, had declared so often that he would never sign anything. Mr. T. V. Soong went to Europe expressly in search of effective assiistance from the Powers for China in her distress. Quite recently the Foreign Minister delared that to recognise the right of the Japanese to remain even temporarily on th'e River Lan would be to recogniise implicitly that chey had a right to be in Manuchuria. Only General Chiang Kai-shek said nothing; but every one in touch with him knew that he too was resolved to go on with the defence of th'e national territory. Three compelliing reasons led these men to the deeision. The first, which was reason enough in itself, was that no one in the North, neither generals nor soldiers were ready to go on fighting. Most of the generals had studied in Japanese military. seh'ools, and they were extremely limpressed by the strength of the Japanese, and, indeed, were suffering from a sort of military inferiority complex. The soldiers were Miarshial Chang Hsueh-fliang's men, and differed in no respect from those of Tang Yu-lin, the defender of Jehol; they were essentially Manchurian soldiers, brothers of those whom the Japanese had enrolled in the army of "Manchukuo." One must not be too severe on the soldiers. Many of them fought and fought well. In killed and wounded the Chinese army lost some 30,000 men, evidence enough that it put np a resistance. The soldiers were, moreover, fighting in the worst conditions. Not only were they without arms and unprotected from the Japanese bombs that .raiined down on them, but they had at their back a deplorable public opinion. No army in the world could fight and win while reading every morning in the papers that the bloodshed was useless, that Chinese emissaries were talking with the Japanese, that peace was inimiaent, and so on. If men are ask&j v-j go out to their death they must at least to he told that it is for some purpose. In such circumstances it is not surpnising that the army melted away. For some days4;he Chinese troops had been disbanding. One saw troops leave on foot with' their rifles and return without them, riding donkeys or mnles stolen from, the peasants and earrying their spoils behind them. The military and civil- authorities of Peking and Tientsin took fright. They feartd that this routed army would enter the towns, where the Japanese seemed to want to drive them, and where no one could say -vvhat thy might do. The apprehensions of the Chinese command were sufficient to induce them to accept the dispatch by rail of 600 Japanese soldiers to Peking to maintain order. It was a veritahle occupation, since the Japanese had no right under existing treaties to reinforce the garrison of ■their Legation, the very existence of which at such a moment was a challenge. And for some days one had the paradoxial situation of Chinese soldiers operating anti-aircraft guns against the Japanese from the walls of Peking while they were being watched from the rear hy Japanese soldiers, for whom the spectacle served as military instruction. Could Not Last. This situation could not last, and conversations between Japanese and Chinese generals, who were already well known to each other, began spontaneously, without the Government being even informed nntil later. The igenerals faced the Chinese Government, and, indeed, the Japanese, with accomplished facts. The Chinese Government had a second reason for giving way. The internal situation had for some time been giving rise to grave anxiety. It is well known that Canton is virtually autonomous and has become the refuge of Opposition leaders and disgruntled generals. Their complaints against the central Government may have justifications, hut theiir attitude during this national crisis is difficult t0 justify; they have indirectly been helping the Japanese. They did so especially in their origiinal refusal to agree to Chiang Kaishek's request for assistance against the Communists, which would have enabled him to send more troops north. To- make up for thiis they themselves sent an army to fight the Japanese. They made it take the land route, th'e longest and the most inconvenient. This army was to cross the province of Hunan to Hankow, on the Yangtse, and there to take train for Peking. But it was £uspected that once at Hankow it would take not train hut boat and would go down-stream to Nanking. Civil war might not be intended, but it seemed probahle that the army might he meant to stage a coup d'etat.

Feng's Revolt. At the same moment General Feng Yu-shiang raised the standard of revolt in the north. He is called the "Christian General," it is not easy to see why, for he is not more Christian than Chiang Kai-shek and many others. However that may he, the two movements gave food for thought to the Government, which took precautions against the possibility of civil wai; one of these was the ordering south towards Hankow of part of the army of th'e north — further weak'ening the anti-Japanese front. If China had had the least hope of see,ing the Powers intervene in her favour she would without doubt have continued to fight. Now the Government is consoling itself and reassuring public opinion by saying that nothinig h'as heen lost, since honour has been saved and poli--

tical questions have not been in any way prejudiced in the armistice. That is true so fa.r as it goes; the armistice is purely military, and in theory it can be ended and the struggle can be begun again at any moment. It may even be said that a recommencement is not entirely impossible even ' in practice, if the army succeeds in reconstituting itself, if the linternational situation improves, and if the Powers give China reason to hope for material assistance. But th'e cumu-lativ-e realisation of all these conditions is at the least improhable, and it is generally easier to go on fighting than, having stopped, to begin again.