EASTERN CRISIS
THE ROLE OF JE1HIOU STRATEGICALLY IMPQRTANT TO BOTH JAPAN AND CHINA. A PART OF M AN OHURI A. Out of the maze of contradietory statements about the .present erisis . in th'e Far East emerges the simple fact that the Japanese are determined to take Jehol. In the new eapdtal, Hyinking (formerly Changchun) plans have heen xniatured to place the new State of Manchukuo on a sounder basis, territorially as well as politically and economically. The acquisdtion of Jelhiol has been part of these plans las, little by little, the Japanese troops, aided by their Manchurian allies, have gained igfround against the bandits and insurgents of the new State. Jehol Spe'cial Distriet, a division of Inner Mongolia, which wiais under the influence of the Manchurian authori- ' ties, was converted into an additional province and came to be regarded as part of Mancihiuria. It hias an a'rea of about- 60,000 square miles, a population of about 4,500,000, and lies to the south-west of Manchukuo. Latterly Jehol has been under the contro>l of Governor Tang Yu-lin. From the yery oreatiqn of the new State it has been mentioned as part of Manchukuo. But Tang seemed to , lean mere towards the Government of China than towards Hsinking and the Japane'se ■a,rmy leaders, finding persuasive words insufficient^ finally decided to employ force to bring him to terms. • With the inclusioii of Jehol, the lines of the new State are fully delineated. Not Resigned. Naturally, Ch'ina hasi not viewed this new move by the Japanese to take further unoccupied territory With any resignation. Jehol as important ; to Ghinia as a base for operations for ! the recovery of Manehuria, and in j Deeember the Japanese suddenly made ; charges that China was concentrating i forces in the province and was .seek- | ing to create la united' front againist i Japan, Early in the New Yiear Japanese aeroplanes began bombing : Chinese troops within range of Jehol ' Province; a few days later LieuteniantGeneral Kotaro Nakamura, coxnmander of the Japanese forces, stated: the position in unequivocal terms. "By continually ignoring our wiarnings and steadily bringing up> reinforcements to the Shanhaikuan area and into Jehol, the Chinese authorities are inviting the most seriousi trou- ' ble," said the general. Japtan, he de- ' clai-ed, had no intention of occupying North China, but if the Chinese persisted in mobilisation where th.ey would be a menaee to Manchukuo by way of Jehol effective steps to meet this menace would foecome a necessity. The igeneral evaded questions fohowing the reminder that another general, Shigeru Honjo, had said a year ago that Japan must eventually occupy the Peking-Suiyuan nailway to outflank Russia's hold on Outer Mongolia. In Deeember, General Nobuyoshii Muto said that Manchukuo must handle Jehol unassisted and declared that the Manchukuo larmies were strong enough for the task. 'General Nakamura denied this and: unhesitat-i injgly said that Japan would aid Manchukuo and would, if necessary, alsio take action in North China to relieve the pressure on the new State by way of Jehol. Much Opposition. While the Japian'eBe military act without check in Manehuria, the Japanese civilians have encountered considerable opposition. They have run up against the resistance of the Chinese to being governedj no.t eo much by outsiders as to being governed at all. Therefore, miany political adjustments have had to be made. At first, all management was in the hands of japanese, centralised in the personage of Tukuzo Komiai, long resident n Manehuria. As Director; of the Bureau of General Affairs, Komai held in his hands all the strinjgis of government, put his agents in every ofRce, and kept every person of note under surveillanee. But it was foimd that this was not the wiay to obtain Chinese co-opera-tion. So Komai was promoted to the Manchukuan Privy Council, where he would have a less iaictive role, and it was d'ecided that the Manchukuans should more and more manage their own laffairs, iso long as they did not d'isturb the economdc, or strategic advantages obtained by Japan. The general tone of the Government is once more Chinese. The provincial Govenors assert themselves as the rullers of their areas; they have a large voice in the administration of thie oountry, and an effective control over revenueisj. This ds not to say that Japanese influence no lonjg|er is- the dominant factor. Most of the offices of the Government have retained Japanese adviseris, and in some instances Jiapanese holi high office. Yet Hsingldng maintains) unchanged the .semblance of a capital of an dndependent State, though only Japan has officially recognised Manchukuo. To end China's administrative relations. with Manehuria altogether, the Customs, salt gabelle, and postal telegraph service® have been taken over by Manchukuo, completely eliminating every vestige of the influence of Chinese origin. Debt of Cihina. Mianchukuo has also decided to recoiginise and .to make arrangements to meet outstanding . obligations for good® purchased by the old rqgjime. This decision iss important,' for it involves one of the principal questions at issue between Japan and China, namely, the repiayment of China's indebtedness to Japan. Manchukuo ha's already assumed her sihiare of this debt. The eeonomic stabilisation of Manchukuo is now. a major problem, for the average Chinese iin Miafltichurda will hold the Japanese responsible for conditions in that area, no matter what the de facjto- f ormi of government may be. Perhaps it can be isaid that the people will fiavour or hate the Japanese in proportion to' the improvement of the currency isystem, the reduction ; of taxes, the revival of trade, and ibhe development of means of moving crops. In this direction specific .steps have been taken.- A Budget (has been prepared in which military expenditure's ar e re ducedj a central bank^has heen
Japan for the purpose of builddng roads land stabilising currency. Economic tRelations. Already definitei steps have heen made by Japan to consolidate her economic relations with Manchukuo-. A special committee has been appointed under thie chairmanship of the J.a,pane'sie Minister iof Overseas Affairs to plan the economic developments in this region. The completion of two short railway lines, one from Taonan to Solun on the west and the other from Tunhua eastward, will mean direct transport la.cross all of Central Manehuria to the Korean coast. The process of binding all the . railroads of Manohiuria (except the Chinese Eastern, in which Russia has the dominant voice) into a unified system with the South Mamchuria Railway as the backbone is meanwhile giving Japan a tremendous economic and strategic; advantage. In! other fields — for example, in the unification of eleetric lightt and power plants, in the development of co-opera tive coanm'ercial enterprises between Japanese , and . Manchukuans — there have heen marked developments; But when it comes to trade, Manchukuo is embarrassed, first because of the world depression and secondly because of the unianticipated opposition in Japan. The Japanese capitalisfbs assumed that, like the Japanese soldier, they would ihiave a free hand in the exploitation of Manchukuo. But they found that Japanese Fasci-stsi and the military were opposed1 to an inerease of their power. Thus, the lasit Diet passed a tariff Bill providing a surtax of 35 per cent. on pig} iron and aigricultural products from Manehuria, and the South Manchurd'a Railway, which; owns the; Fushun collieries near Mukden, finds. itsielf in conflict with the Mine^Owners' Federation of Japan, which demianded and obtained a restriction on (the import of Fushun coal. Difference of Opinion. These are but a few instances to indicate trend. There is: an inevitable difference of opinion a® to how Japan's new relationship with Manchukuo, how the investment of Japanese capital in that counitry, are to affect. Japan'is- jindustry., In. Japan to develop in Manchukuo. a competiitor for Japan's mills and factories, or is Manchukuo to be the granary,, the store ■house for raw materials., the market for Japan's manufactured goods? This difference of opinion deeply affects the officials .at Hsinking. It is now the tasik to- prove that they will enhance the livelihood of their people, that they are to. be. preferred as rulers to Qhang Hseuh-Liang, the ou'sted Goyernor, themoney wili he ,silver and not paper, that the isoya bean will move to distant lands as before the derression, thah this new State will be a veritable "paradise." Yet they must await. the outcome of a decision between Japanese capitalists and Fascists as to Ihiow Japanese money is to be invested in Manchukuo, for in the present situation the capital must come from Japan,.
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Rotorua Morning Post, Volume 2, Issue 470, 2 March 1933, Page 2
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1,402EASTERN CRISIS Rotorua Morning Post, Volume 2, Issue 470, 2 March 1933, Page 2
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