KAISER'S SWORD

Rotorua Morning Post, Volume 2, Issue 252, 15 June 1932, Page 3

KAISER'S SWORD

AGADIR CRISIS "THE DRESS REHEARSAL OF THE GREAT WAR." WARNING TO GERMANY There is among the general ptihlic a belief that diplomatic correspondence must necessarily be dull and dry as dust. But the documents contained in the new volume of British Foreign Office papers (writes Professor M. Geronthwohl, in the London Daily Telegraph) pulsate with life and drama. They bear on a period in the world's history — the Agadir crisis in Mexico — which was aptly epitoxnised by one diplomat as "the dress rehearsal of the Great War." . Mr. Lloyd George had delivered his historic warning to Germany in a speech at the Mansion House on July 21, 1911. The Kaiser complained bitterly to our Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, of what he called British interference. "He said that we had only one friend in Europe, and that was himself, and yet we did everything to he disagreeable to him, to thwart hina." And he proceeded: "Why on earth are you always against me, the grandson of Queen Victoria, and your only real friend in Europe? Personally, I have no reason to complain, hecause everyone in England always gives me the heartiest of welcomes, but you have* an expression in England, "Love me, love my.dog"; and I say, "Love me, love- my nation." Later the Kaiser saw Lord French, who thus described the interview: — "The Emperor said he deplored the , differences between Germany and England, but that they were none of his malcing, and that if we interfered in the affairs of Germany, we must talce the 'eonsequences. . . . His Majesty also remarked upon the necessity for being able to "support one's politics with the sword,' and of "keeping the sword sharp." . . . He added words to this eifect: 'Remember those who run up against that sword will find it very sharp indeed'." But from the point of view of "revelations" the outstanding chapter is no doubt that dealing with "Naval and Military Operations." It shows how, with the honest assistance of the then German Foreign Minister, Herr Von Kiderlen-Waechter, the British Government was able to thwart the attempt of the German Emperor to hring about a meeting of British and German naval squadrons at Molde, at a time when the tension between France and Germany was acute — in July, 1911. The idea of the Emperor and 'his naval advisers was to sow suspicion between Great Britain and France: — "You lcnow the Emperor pretty , well," said Kiderlen to the British Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, "and you can imagine how excited he will be at the sight of the two squadrons. He will certainly want to make the most of the opportunity, and there is every chance that, as an Admiral in both navies, he will amuse himself by putting himself at the head of the combined ' squadrons and going through a series of naval manoeuvres — ending with a great hanquet, toasts, and God knows what." King George's Warning. On October 25, 1911 — the year of the Moroccan crisis — Lord Stamfordham wrote as follows from Buckingham Palace to Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty: — "The King wishes me to let you know that yesterday he heard from a relation in Germany who had recently been in Berlin to the following effeet: 'Admiral Tirpitz said, at the time when the Moroeeo crisis reaehed its acute stage, that Germany would have gone to war with England but her fleet was not ready yet, and would not be until 1915, when the canal would be finished so that all the largest ships could pass through, and by that time they would have enough dreadnoughts launched to deal with any Power. " 'The mines from Heligoland to the mainland would not he ready until 1914.' If war broke out now, the Admiral said, the German fleet wrould be smashed for no reason at all (i.e., with no advantage to Germany). "The writer then went on to say: 'That is the reason why Germany gave in; so far as II can see we shall be fighting in 1915." General Joflfre. Here for the first time may be read a singularly graphic description by the British Military Attache in Paris, Colonel Fairholme, of the personality and views of General Joffre. ' The time was August, 1911. Fairholme found Joffre extremely well disposed towards England, and decidedly optimistic (as he proved himself to be in 1914) regarding the outcome of a possible war with Germany. The one unlcnown factor was whether the Germans meant to come through Belgium or not. "I wish I knew that," observed Joffre, "and I wish I knew that they intend doing so; it would be better for us." He added that, in any case, Germany must pour a large force into Alsace and Lorraine, as, "if they allowed us to gain a footing there, the populations of both provinces would rise. This we know for certain." Of the confidential diplomatic documents now issued, the most arresting is undoubtedly Sir Eyre Crow's Memorandum of January 14, 1912, on the secret Franco-Germai^ negotiations for a rapprochement, of which M. Caillaux was the promoter, after he had arrived at the conclusion, which he revealed in an incautious moment, to Sir Francis F. Bertie, our Ambassador in Paris, "that he did not see any advantage in the AngloFrench Entente." Sir Eyre's subsequent pithy comrnent on this backstairs diplomatic transaction was the following: — "So far as our relations with France are concerned, M. Caillaux's disappearance from the sphere of foreign policy can only he regarded as a blessing. He might, or might not, have acquired the power to direct French policy into a channel hostile to England. He was clearly not reluctant to make the attempt. The public opinion of France, on the other hand, rose to the occasion, and. the sound sense and instinctive judgment shown in every quarter is a most eneouraging feature in the situation."