DEALING WITH PLOTTERS

Rotorua Morning Post, Volume 1, Issue 109, 30 December 1931, Page 4

DEALING WITH PLOTTERS

There is, as a recent news paragraph cabled from Riga points out, something decidedly intriguing in the way the Soviet deals with officials who fail to live up to their master's expeetations. The other day a sensational story was published announcing the recall of a member of a foreign mission at the request of the Soviet Government, who charged him with trying to persuade a Soviet official to take part in a plot against the Japanese Ambassador to Russia with the object of fomenting war between the two countries. With characteristic picturesqueness, it was stated that the Soviet official, whose identity was not disclosed, had advised his Government of what was afoot as he "wanted to atone for the wrong he might have done through inexperience of such dirty and disgraceful activities." The use of the word "might" in conjunction with the claim to inexperience is, in view of the record of Soviet officialdom, little short of a stroke of genius. But this is not all. Two days later, to cap the story, it is announced that a certain official has died, quite suddenly and as the result of a severe illness. Accepting the implied connection of the death with the plot, what a field for the imagination is opened up. How limitless become the possible disorders which so suddenly and so soon after the disclosure afflicted the dutiful official. He might, of course, have had 'flu, or measles, or mumps. Quite as easily and far more probably, he might have suffered a fracture of the skull as the result of a collision with a rifle bullet, or perhaps even a heart attack following a heavy meal of strychnine or some other unwholesome food. The Soviet is reticent regarding details. For this several reasons are more or less obvious, the most probable perhaps being a desire to save others of its servants from a similar unhappy fate. When such loyalty as this official displayed is so promptly and effectively rewarded, how careful will his colleagues be to avoid meddling in things which do not concern them. A Government which, like the Soviet, lives by the sword and the knout cannot alford to be squeamish if it would maintain its position. One sign of weakness — others might call it mercy — and its power is in danger of collapse. In a British country we do things differently. Our theory of life, and of Government is the direct opposite of the Soviet's and just as it carries severity to extremes, we are apt to err in lenity. With us all sorts of dangerous disloyalties are permitted to weaken the moral fibre of the people in the sacred name of free speech. Behind this benevolent supineness is an ill-thought-out idea that our political cranks, as we call them, serve a useful purpose as safety valves through whom diseontents of various kinds find a harmless outlet. This, with our own people, may be so, but in our dealings with alien raees it always has been and always will be a serious mistake. What it is costing our Empire in these troubled times is beyond computation. Mr. H. F. von Haast, a leading Wellington lawyer, who returned on Monday from a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Shanghai tells us that Great Britain's conciliatory attitude toward China is raisunderstood by the Chinese, who look upon it as a sign of weakness. Similarly, in India, where the position of the British community has been difficult for years, the difficulties have multiplied a thousand-fold since the Home Government permitted sentimentalism to cloud its vision and weaken its grasp on the realities. The sentimentalist's conimonest mistake is in believing that all men think alike. They do not, by any means, and so, what may be desirable for the white man may, and probably is, wholly pernicious to the brown man and the black man and the yellow man. There are signs that the new; Government at Home realises this and that a firmer policy is to be pursued in India and elsewhere where the Empire has responsibilities, both to its own people and to a native race. If so, much good must result to both sides, as all who have had experienee in dealing with native races will testify, though it is unlikely that Soviet methods will be found necessary.