Rangitikei Advocate. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, '09. EDITORIAL NOTES.

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XXXIV, Issue 9362, 3 February 1909, Page 4

Rangitikei Advocate. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 'O9. EDITORIAL NOTES.

THERE is reason for grave suspicion that the noisy agitation for an enormous increase in the British Navy is not altogether free from party motives. It is no doubt essential that the two-power standard should be maintained, but that is not any reason for hysterical abase of Jthe Government, not for what they have done in the past, but for what they are assumed to intend to do in the future. In the December Nineteenth Century Sir William White, who was for- some years Director of Naval Construction, makes some interesting statements as to the relative positions of the fleets of the chief naval powers. Sir William White lias the advantage of knowing what ho is talking about, as he planned all the British warships laid down between 1885 and 1902, and ho is also an unprejudiced witness, having now retired from active work. In 1910 the British Navy will possess 12 battleships and cruisers of the Dreadnought and Invincible types, as against six similar ships possessed by Germany and four by the United States. As

none of the French battleships of the first-class will be ready till the following year, Sir William White concludes that “so far .as these types are concerned, the Royal Navy during the next two years will retain a considerable superiority in numoers over the three' most powerful fleets combined, even if their programmes of construction are completely realised and no delays occur from nou-prevenfcahle causes.” Sir William White considers that the Dreadnought cannot reasonably be regarded as having “nullified the existence cf the previous kinds of ships,” and seat them all to the “scrap-heap.” He, therefore, holds that though the Immediate concentration of an over-powering force may be more than ever the firm object in naval strategy, the capacity for dispersion must still remain a valuable and indeed, for a great commercial Power, a necessary supplement. If this be so, it is not fair to concentrate attention entirely to Dreadnoughts, and Sir William 'White prefers to include all battleships and armoured cruisers less than twenty years old. Applying tins test, he shows that Britain has 90 efficient armoured ships with a tonnage of 1,222,200, while the relative strength .of her chief rivals is as follows: United States 41 ships, \527,000 tons; \ France 40 ships, 415,200 tons; Ger- ' many 32 ships, 361,200 tons. If “obsolescent” ships are excluded from the computation, Britain’s margin over Germany is greatly increased, and she is still well ahead of the largest twc-Power combination—that of France and the United States. Sir William White accordingly finds “not a shadow of justification” in the panic-stricken note of some recent utterance?. On the contrary, he considers that a grave mistake was made by the British Admiralty in forcing the pace of naval construction in 1905, and in setting“the example cf secrecy at the same time. He agrees with Mr Asquith that we must maintain a strong lead, but that at the same I time “wo want to do everything in our power to prevent a new spurt in shipbuilding. ”