Rangitikei Advocate. MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1909. EDITORIAL NOTES.

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XXXIV, Issue 9348, 18 January 1909, Page 4

Rangitikei Advocate. MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1909. EDITORIAL NOTES.

alarming statement made by Lord Roberts in the House of Lords recently that given the command of the sea for a short time Germany could land 150,000 picked troops in England has naturally caused a great deal of discussion in military and naval circles, both at Home and abroad. Lord Roberts did not make this assertion without careful investigations in which he had the assistance of a number of experts on shipping matters to supplement his own knowledge of the military requisites. Put in brief the situation is that Germany is able to send out from her North Sea ports 150,000 men completely prepared for the invasion of Britain within 36 hours of the receipt of the order to act. Whether such a force could reach England in, safety simply depends on whether Germany can obtain the command of the North Sea for 48 hours a period which would allow time to get the vessels across and to land most of the men and stores. It is obvious that the invasion of Britain would only 1)3 attempted when that country was engaged iusome other part of the world there can ba no doubt that‘~tbe problem has been deeply considered by the G?rmm general staff. A

German officer described by the Tagehlatt as “one' of the first and most highly esteemed military authorities in Germany,” has admitted that the operation sketched by Lord Roberts, though difficult, is not impossible. “It lies,” he says, “within the bounds of possibility and accomplishment, and more particularly would this be so were it undertaken at a moment when England was occupied in another part world. Once the landing was accomplished I believe that occupation could also be successfully carried out. Should the main force of the British Navy then reappear and cut off our retreat, Germany would dictate peace, and we should have England’s head—namely, London—in our power.”

THE British naval authorities have maintained a discreet silence as to whether they consider it possible for Germany to defeat or elude the North Sea fleet so as to make a landing in Britain feasible. To most persons it will seem at least within the bounds of possibility that a strong German fleet should temporarily manage to deceive even the most watchful British Admiral, and that transports should succeed in reaching the coast and landing a large force. Assuming that this can be accomplished at present the question arises what steps can be taken either tc prevent invasion being atttempted or to deal with the invaders as soon as they set foot in the country. Some authorities maintain that all'that is necessary is a further increase in the navy so as to make it absolutely hopeless for the German transports to attempt the passage to Britain. This idea seems likely to lead to an enormous expenditure, the amount of which will depend on what Germany and other countries choose to spend on their navies, and we, therefore, think it would be more profitable, while maintaining the two-Power standard of sea power for the sake of the Empire to strengthen the land forces in Britain to an extent which would either effectually deter all attempts at invasion until the navy had been absolutely driven off the seas or provide an army strong enough to defeat any raiding force that could be landed in Britain.

THE British regular army cannot be increased to any great extent, first on the score of expense, and second, because it would not be possible to get the -men on the present system of voluntary enlistment. The defence of the country against invasion must therefore he mainly left to the territorial army. It is considered that four summarily trained men would be required to meet one regular soldier, and, therefore, 600,000 territorials would Ibe needed to dispose of 150,000 invaders. As about 200,000 territorials would be required for local garrisons, and Ireland, it is clear that the second line in Britain should be not far short of an establishment of a million men in order to provide the actual strength required to meet a possible invasion. Mr,. Haldane’s force has provided a nucleus which is capable of indefinite expansion, and we believe that an efficient second line would be the cheapest way of providing safety for Britain. At present there is a distinct feeling of nervousness about invasion and this would disappear were the army capable of dealing with any force that could possibly be landed should the navy be temporarily deprived of the command of the North Sea.