WILL THE GERMAN NAVY COME OUT?

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 288, 29 June 1917, Page 1 (Supplement)

WILL THE GERMAN NAVY COME OUT?

Tliosa with an inside knowledge of how things are trending incline strongly towards tiie belief that recent events have increased the probability of a naval battle at an early date. Without entering minutely into the reasons for this inference, one may say that the pundits who keep asking "When will the German Fleet come out?" have grasped the wrong end of the stick. The determining question is no longer " When will the German Fleet come out?" but, "How march longer will the German Float be able to stay in?" Cue may argue that there is no difference in substance between these queries. But there is—and a very wide one (writes the Naval Correspondent of the "Weekly Dispatch"). Hitherto it has rested with the Germans to say when a sea battle should be fought or whether one should be fought at all. In so far as this important decision was involved, our Fleet has been at the enemy's disposal, as it were. Now circumstances are gradually depriving the Germans of this strong advantage. Whether willingly or otherwise, the High Seas.Fleet may soon l)e obliged to leave its "dug-outs" and accept the fight that is waiting for it. One of the factors in putting this kind of pressure on the reluctant Hun is the failure of his U-boat operation.?. Right from the beginning of the war Germany has regarded her submarines as a blockade-breaking weapon. And their first failure in this capacity did not destroy her faith in their ability eventually to do what she wanted of them. The Hun is tenacious. Once an idea gets into his head it sticks there. Finding that his earlier U-boats were unequal to the task of loosening our grip upon the North Sea, he set about equipping , himself with underwater craft of a much more efficient type. '! heso he built in considerable numbers and on a standardised system of construction, which enables the supply to \>o kept up. Possibly it may not for long prove equal to replacmg the wastage. It certainly wiU not if the profit and loss account, continues to work out as at present. With these new U-boats, and plenty of them, Germany expected she would be able to make the narrow seas so unsafe for our battleships and cruisers that they would be afraid to move f ar from their bases, aa this risk of serious losses would be too grave for us to face. With a great part of our fleet thus penned in and a paralysing attack in progress upon our sea-borne trade, Gvrmany believed she would be able to make a gap in our blockade sufficiently wide to enable some of her own merchant vessels, or other vessels carrying for her t« slip through, especially if they had a protective screen of U-boats sound them. All the world knows that in neither rf these respects have her plana succesded. v Having thus failed in her purpose by one means, Germany must-either try to accomplish it by another or give it up altogether—and this she cannot afford .to do without at least making the attempt, as such action on her part would Im equivalent to a declaration of unconditional surrender. Public opinion may not count for much in the Fatherland, but it is not such a negligible quantity there thai the War Lords can ignore it altogether, and the German people have in the past been told so many boastful things about what their fleet would do to the hated English when it got the chance that th£re will be big trouble made for the Kaiser and his entourage if the fleet ends nip by doing nothing, not even getting itself smashed up agiin. Aheady the German populace are beginning to i<sk with increasing .emphasis when the vaunting promises rrvide for the navy that has cost them so much good money are going to be justified by deeds.

HINDENBURG'S POWER. And Hindenburg ranks with the malcontents It is no secret that for a iong time past he has been expressing himself strongly about the ineptitude of tha High Seos Ftot. At first sight it may not appear that Hindenburg has my control of naval policy. But he is the Power (and that with a very big P) at the moment in Germany, and wlico. vvc\r Hindenburg decides that the situation demands naval action this will have to be taken. Any day that Hindenburg says the fleet must go out and fight (and he may say this any day), out it will have to go. Every -ft back to Germany's arms on laud also brings nearer tho time when she can no longer avoid making :v definite move on sea. As she is forced back on the Western front and els- 1 - whe-ra f,he effect will lx> to cause a " bulge" in another direction, and there exists only one in which it can occur. The cumulative effect of these various factors must be to force that naval action foi which Germany has been assiduously preparine;. That she, has been, and even now continues, preparing with ail her might to make the strongest possible showing at sea when she becomes obliged to hazard her last throw there admits of no doubt, (mo cannot say to what oxtent her fleet has been strengthened since Jutland. But her shipbuilding resources are much greater than tb." majority of British people realise, and one must not. underrate her energy by assuming that she has not made full use, of them.

NEW GERMAN SHTPS. Germany possesses approximately xhirtv largo shipbuilding establishments htsides many smaller orios, and finite a host of factories in which contributory work can I>p don." . We know the systematic principle upon which slio hns organised her plant; for turning out submarines in quantities. Tf she has in tin same manner toordinated her other ifsoiircvs to "speed up" larger construction, there is no reason why she .should not have lux) somewhere about twenty-five battleships or cruiser:; building at the one time. About, ♦ welvo of her vards are so well equipped that they ean'build large warships com,,'fte Oth'.'n are caoable of turning out smalW craft (|iiickly. The Behicau Yard at Elbing specialises in destrov. o-'s. lifting abfe to construct some fifty ( .f these complete in a year. l'u<! "■ wai pressure the yard niav hava dor," ev.Hi tetter than this. While if' remains uncertain what additions :n capital shim Germnnv has made to her fl'i ct it is known that she has placed a nurahoß of new small fa=t cruisers in it. One may fairly assume also that when the Gorman Fleet dres venture out