A SIGNIFICANT ADMISSION.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 288, 29 June 1917, Page 1 (Supplement)

A SIGNIFICANT ADMISSION.

Ono of tha most important and encouraging items cf last week's war news was the reported admission cy t!:e "Deutsche Tages-zcitung*' ("German Daily Times") that "Germany cannot rely on the submarines to secure victory." The statement is particularly significant because of tite fact that it i* made by an important German newspaper. Outclassed in every other military department, the Kaiser and his war lords had. it is generally believed, staked their last hope of victory on the success of the iniquitous operations of the U-boats. The superiority of thj Allies' strength on the Western front has been apparent for some- considerable time, and is constantly increasing. They have more men, more guns, more shells, more railways, mora rolling stock, more food. In the East the enemy has a heavy superiority in material, and his position there has been temporarily improved by the Russian hold-up. Russia, however, is not vc * completely out of t!ie war, and it may be that the American journalists who have been making investigations in Petrograd will prove to be right in their assumption that Russia "is capable of coming back with tremendous blows that wiil surprise tli£- world." But even if Russia failed altogether to come back, the Allies' superiority in man-power would not be gone, because the immense resources of the United States have now to be counted in, although, of course, they cannot be made immediately available. Broadly speaking, therefore, although a conclusive victory is not yet in sight, the is mastered on the land, and h's fleets are still completely immobilised. His one remaining chance was to paralyse our lengthy and perilous communications by sea, and to this enl he has exerted himself to the utmost. Maritime communications are always perilous, always cumbersome and slow, always exceedingly expensive in men and material. To-day these drawbacks arj far greater than they were in the past, for three reasons: T)ie necessity ot maritime communication is greater than ever before; their length is greater than ever before; their peril is greater than ever before. Although the submarine menus c has at times assumed ugly proportions, there has been all along among the peopues of the Allied countries an underlying belief that the infamous TTboats would ultimately be defeated. Writing in February last, Mr. Hilairj Belloc held it to be clear that, as part of the military problem, the unaided submarine weapon cannot be decisive. The margin between luxury and necessity in imports, the power of importing ultimately by submersibles the time still required to embarrass the supplies of Great Britain at all seriously; the incapacity to interfere with direct communications vjth Franc-:; the potential addition of half a milium tons of shipping from the other side ot the Atlantic; the progress of methods for dealing with tho aew submarines—all these factors combined mac'.c it certain, in Mr. Belloc's opinion, that serious military pressure upon* land (tiic preparation of which he may Jiopo in vain to hasten or impose) will conve long before the menace upon our maritime communication could be really decisive. Again, when the unrestricted campaign opened, Mr. Belloc said : "It is worth repeating that the theory of defeating the submarine is unde:staod but that the material necessary for putting the theory into effect takes time. Yet much of it is nearing completion, and first a mitigation, then the defeat, of his campaign may be expected. There is not the remotest trospe.t of it achieving its purpose, which is to starve us before the Western war reaches its predestined end." And now, seemingly, thj Germans themselves have como reluctantly to iivognisc the futility ot their submarines a_s a decisive factor. But even if th:s proves to bj the case, and tho Germans are genuinely convinced that their under-watcr campaign is doomed to failure, it does net mean that they will cease this method of warfare, or that th:-re is any justification for tl:e slightest relaxation of precautionary and defensive efforts on the part of the Allies. Tho Germans will continue t> use their U-boats as long as it is possible- for them to do so; but it is at least smie satisfaction to know that they have been forced to realise that they cannot rely on them to secure victory.