DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 282, 8 June 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES.

The weight of available evidence seetes io show that the submarine is regarded in Germany as the principal remaining weapon of offence, and that upon the results achieved by its ruthless use depends Germany's chief -opportunity of imposing her will upon her enemies. The submarine campaign is in tho main responsible for the important changes in the Admiralty announced a few days ago, and these

(changes alone are additional proofs of

the seriousness with which Germany's .attempt to interfere with Great Britain's food supply is viewed by those in

.authority in England. Perhaps tli-J most important statement on this subject, apart from those delivered at the .recent secret session of the House of ■■ Commons, was that made by S r Edward Carson, First Lord of the Admir-

alty, in February last. The figures which were then made public regard-

ring the losses sustained by the enemy in the course of his attacks on merchant shipping, represent practically the only official information afforded the public regarding a very important

feature of the campaign, concerning

-which, fot obvious reasons, neither side can afford to supply accurate detailed

particulars. These figures are given an -added significance by -Mr. Arthur PolJen, tho naval critic of ' Land and "Water," in the issue of March 8. which .arrived by the last English mail. "By far tho most interesting light on the •whole campaign was the figures Sir Edward Carson gave of the progress of our attacks on submarines," writes Mr Pollen. "In the first eighteen days

of February there were more than two •encounters a day between Armed merchantmen, transports, destroyers, patrols, aircraft and the 'hidden' eiumy.

The First Lord was giving lis reason for publishing no estimate of the numb?r of submarines destroyed, and to .show the difficulty of milking an estimate he picked out from tliese forty ■encounters nine representative of the ■different stages of probability that at-

iached to each report. Of these nine, tho first was an absolute certainty, •the second a virtual certainty, and tho probability that two submarines tvere sunk in the third seemed very

highly probable indeed. Of the fourth,

fifth, s'xth and seventh there were possibilities, and perhaps high possibilities, but no evidence of certainty. The

.eighth and niifth were cases in which airship and an aeroplane had dropped bombs on the spot where the sub-

marine had been seen. It seems almost niircasonabl.e to suppose {that out of these nine cases referring to ten boats

less than four were certainties. And if tho cases were representative, that would give sixteen for the first eighteen days of February. It is highly improbable that Germany can be building submarines at a greater rate than eight

or nine in tlrs period, so that if only

ii~.lt of the 'high'y probables' are certainties, submarines are being destroyed at least as fast as they can be built.' The writer adds that this is extreme-

ly cheering, because the forty encount-

ers did not include a single case it submarines either running upon mines .-jjr being wrecked by the ordinary hazards of tho sea, and it is impossible to suppose that at least sometimes an

.underwater beat is not caught by our amineiields. While he contends that our rjiiti(-*'icld.s can he increased, -Mr. .Pollen states that th? extension of our jneans of attack is not limited to this.

Patrol boats, faster and more see.

worthy than submarine;, armed with sufficient for/.-e to sink almost at sight, and far better equipped with the means of detecting the submarines' presence, and of communicating with consorts for

coml)ined operations, can clearly he .built much more cheaply and far more ■quickly than can submarines. It seems to stand to reason that our force alorn; both lines must grow, and if at a

minimum to day we can counteract the enemy's efforts to add to his submarine

strength, we must soon, and increas-

ingly in future, bring about a marked •eduction in his force. Nor is it ne-

cessary to point out that from such a reduction a diminution of our losses

must ensue. Two final points of great interest are these. If we include sailing vessels, trawlers, and the small fry of the sea, there are 134 vessels of all kinds sunk in the period reviewed by tho First Lord. Of the small craft only a very small proportion would es-

cape, so that perhaps we shall not be far wrong in supposing that certainly not more than IG-) attempts were made, and of these a high proportion must

2iave been attacks from below the surface and without warning. If these

numbered forty, or a quarter of the total, it would mean that there were 320 surface attacks made by submarines and forty surface attacks made on submarines. It is surely wry significant that on one in four of the occasions when the submarine conies to the surface to do its work, it is exposed to the risk of gunfire, of the rani, or of the bomb. It certainly gives one a vivid idea oi the übiquity and the vigilance of our offensive, and we are to remember that it is a growing offensive, growing in numbers and m efficiency. How long will the morale <i the I' boat • rews and of the captains keep at the necessary level for effect, under tlrs strain? Lastly, the-e statistics of attack should give pause to those who maintain that the submarine i- destined to drive the surfac-ship off the sea.

ion account of its invisibility. They are a final proof that, to Ie olhVcnt, the submarine must do the bulk of its wo'k a surface ship. Its invisibility, jh 'ii. Is an advantage that has clear limits.'