LIGHT WAR RAILWAYS.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 272, 4 May 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

LIGHT WAR RAILWAYS.

PROVED INDISPENSABLE BY FRANCE.

TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME.

Mr. H. Warner Allen, in the Morning Post, doscriljcs tho immense value of tho French system of light railways which havo l>een laid down to feed the armies at the front, and to keep them supplied with munition.'}. It was found early in the war that road traffic could not cojte with the ordinary needs of a" trench sector. Then tho light railway was adopted. It could lw laid down at a minimum of cost and a maximum of speed, it takes up little road sjkvco, it can twist and turn with tho nature of the country traversed, and if interrupted I»y tiic enemy'* fire can lie speedily repaired. They have now Im'cii built over every part of the French front, and havo added largely to tho efficiency of tho armies in tho field.

/"\F all tho machines that have been " been pressed into the service of modern scientific warfare, none appears to have more of an individuality of its own and more consciousness of its own importance than the light railway. With its fussy little engines, it is to ho found everywhere behind tho front. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that without tho light railway tho artillery preparation, which is the essential preliminary for any attack on a trench position, would bo impossible. Without it tho deadlock on the Western front might well bo as complete as the German optimist must hope it is. Tho fact is that in modern conditions 110 offensive can lw successful unless it has behind it a complete system of light railways, which can alone leed the guns with that enormous quantity of ammunition needed not only for the preparation but also for tho barrage tiro that must precede tlio attacking infantry, and for the unceasing bombordment that mir>t follow even the most decisive success. And it is not only in a sector of assault that the light railway is indispensable, for not the least of tho vital services that it renders s the bringing up almost to the front line of all material needed for tho construction of the modern trench and shelter.

of G()-oentimetre railway track ready for immediate use.

ROLLING STOCK

Before this war tho importance of the light railway was not fully realised, and it was not until trench warfare in its present form had been in progress for some little time that it really came by its own. Everything needed by the Army was, of course, brought up as close as possiblo to tho tiring line by tho normal gauge railways, but owing to tho great range of modern heavy artillery tiams cauuot iiupo to cumo up along tno ordinary lino with salety and regularity to witniu two antl a naif or tineo nines irom the lront. indeed, as a ru.o, the normal line ra'l-liead is l>euveui six and ten miles irom t-ue trenches. At lirst au attempt was niada to carry iorward material and ammunition irom ra:l-lu-jui by hoiso aiiti motor vehic.es. i>Uu this system scon proved uutterly inadequate. Tno batuo of t'iiampagne siioneu tnat practically uniinuteu suppl'es of ammunition were required lor any artillery preparation that Wihj to giv j tno liiiiiutry a cnance ot enter.ng tne enemy trencnes. Inat offensive was made with an admirable system oi lignt railways behind it, and all succeeding ass. ults have siiown tnat 111010 and more such nnes are needed.

GERMAN METHODS

In Units of attack each normal line railhead may have to deal each day witn as much as* 2CXJU tons ot ammunition and material. The whole of this mass must be sent up at once to tlio advanced depots, as any delay would lead to ongisiiuii and utter contusion, to .say nothing of tne decisive advantugo that it might give tho enemy. Such a tonnage is more than roads can deal with. The average load of a moior lorry can bo estimated at two or two and a half tons. To carry 2000 tons a licet of over 1000 lorries would be necessary, and the strain 011 t;ie road surijicu can bo imagined.

SERVICES AT VERDUN

Much has been written concerning the splendid services rendered by the motor lorries at \ erdun, and uiey certainly did much to <»avo the situation. But on tnat occasion they were acting in their" proper capacity as an emergency service. Jliey enabled the French troojis to resist the first German onrush, atid so gave t'lllo to the military engineers to build tho railroads wlncn could alone be regarded as a satisfactory and permanent means of supply. At Verdun nearly 4000 motor lorries w ere employed, and, as it is weil known, there was a continual procession oi' lorries in either direction along the Verdun road. Thanks to magnificent or gan'sation, the road stood tho strain, and an average of 2OUO tons to tho 21 hours were carried along it. This wonderful tour de force, however, did not provide a normal means of transport, which could only be tin* result ot the development of tho railway resources of the district.

In the earl'er days of the war it was soon found that road traffic could not 1 cope with tiie ordinary needs of a \ trench sector, liorso and motor vehi-j cits were always liable to lw blocked j through the intensity of tho traffic, and I tlio road metal began to go to pieces, i The only solution ot the problem was to ■ bo found in t.'io light railway with a ! gauge of 60 centimetres. Such a. line is easily and rapdiy laid down. Its rails aro riveted two by two to metal sleepers, and can be put together with a minimum of delay. With a thin layer of ballast these rails can bo laid almost anywhere. Thanks to t;..1 narrowness of their gauge thoy can follow the most tortuous course, and hills havo no terrors for them. Thev can negotiate safely curves of which the radius does not exceed 30 yards, and can climb gradients of 3 in 100. In consequence of these valuable qualities the light railway needs relatively little in the way of embankments and engineering, and tin* work of laying down the track can be carried out with the greatest expedition, though experience has shown that satisfactory results cannot be obtained by merely laying the rails on the ground and that a thin layer of ballast is necessary. A gang of a few hundred navvies under tho direction of a few exports can lay down in a single day over halt a mile

The rolling stock consist.? o*l steam engines and motor tractors capable of drawing a useful load of 26 tons up an inclined plane of throe in 100. ill close proximity to the enemy's lines tho engines betray their jwsit'on by the dense \ olumo of white smoko and steam that they pour out of their tunnel. Often near the second or third lino trenches I have taken their smoke for a shell burst or a fire in some ammunition de[>ot. Tho trucks consist of a simple platform mounted on two bogieti, and can carry a lo.id of oignt tons.

The general system is that the lines aro single, with shunting and crossing i places. They run to ammunition depots a few hundred yards behind the batteries, except in the case of guns of tho very largest, calibre. To-day there exists behind ever yarmy on tho French front a regular system of light railways. Tho usual gauge is 60 centimetres (24 inches), though occasionally other gauges may be found. Thus the line known a.s thj Petit Meusien, which has rendered yeoman service behind Verdun, and existed ltefore the war, has a gauge of one metre. Ra'ls with 40 centimetre (16 inch) gauge arc often enough used for hand traction in tho trenches themselves. Tho 60 centimetre systems are organised 011 the following principle. Frcrn tlio ra'lheads of the standard gatigo systems 60 cvntimctro lines run out in the direction of the front to depots. These lines are called by tho French antennes. But th's organisation of lines radiating out fanwise from a centre is insufficient. It may be necessary in a moment of er ! s : s to concentrate all the rolling stock of the light railway system on certa.'n antennes. For thi spurpose the antennes are cut by lines known as roeades, which aro parallel to tho front, and which arc linked up with tho antennes at the'r points of junction.

I have before me at the time of writing a map of the German railways before Verdun at tho moment of the great offensive. It provides eloquent ovidenco of, the extent to which tho enemy avails himself of light railways for tho purpose of his attacks. Behind tlio German trenches the country 's covered with a network of lines that, for their complexity and number, can only he compared to tho filaments of a spider's web. Wherever the ground affords cover for artillery, there the line-) are most complicated and close. At certain points on the most advanced sections of the normal-gauge lino a series of sidings betrays the position of tho heavy guns, wheh fire from tracks on t!ie rails.

Tho French light railways have been constructed I>V the garrison artillery, which has for this purpose boon organised as batteries do construction do voios do 60. These organisntions arc still responsible for the upkeep of tho tracks, while thft actual work'ng of the lints has been entrusted to other fractions of the garrison artillery, called batteries d'cxploitation do voics do 60. Each of batteries is under the orders ui a Line Superintendent, who is in closand unbroken relations with tho Staff of the Army concerned, though actually the direct subordinate of tho Direct/our ties Chem'ns de For any Ann cos.

The light railway is mainly concerned with tho transport of heavy artillery ammunition, and never has it !>eon put to a more severe test than during the Battle of the Sommo. Throughout this lcng-drawn-cut struggle the whole organisation worked perfectly. German pliells toii'.d not interrupt the traffic on tiie lines, since even if l\v a lucky chance the line were damaged, it was a mutter of no great difficulty to restore communication. From this jwint of view rain an dtho consequent mud were enemies far more to be feared. On the ordinary roads these enemies produced very serious results, but they were powerless to interfere with the light railways. Certain antennes, that is single lines connecting railhead with the advanced depots of munitions, transported 110 less than 1700 tons 111 24 hours.

The great advantage of the light railway is that practically it does not take up any road space. When weather permits, tho roads aro left entirely free tor motor and horse-drawn vehicles, which thus become a supplement to tho light lailway. 111 the opinion of experts. based on tho experience of the present war. it is the only satisfactory solution of the transport problem in the most advanced army zone. In peaco time the light railway renders iuvaluable services to French agriculture, and I remember well the difficulty I had in explaining to a congress of French agriculturists the reasons for which so many provincial companies in England havo made 110 provision for goods traffic and depend entirely for their profits on a passenger service. It w as, perhaps, therefore natural that the French should have been the first to realise in present circumstances the jsotential value of the light railway. This value has now been realised by t.'io British Army, and there can Im> no doubt- that every elfort made to diminish the traffic on the ordinary roads, whether by motor lorry or by other conveyance, and to increase the volume of heavy artillery ammunition and other material sent up by light railway can only add to the efficiency of our armies 'n tli 1 field.