DEFEATING GERMAN AIMS.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 272, 4 May 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

DEFEATING GERMAN AIMS.

Some interesting questions bearing upon Gorman aims are raised in the "Nineteenth Century and After," by Mr. L. E. Mallet, formerly Financial Secretary to the War Office, who is particularly insistent on tlis need of checkmating Germany in the East, as weil as on her Franco-Belgian and Russian frontiers. Ho considers that Germany made war for two main objects: first, to secure her hold on the Balkans and on the Ottoman lands beyond, which tho events of 1912-13 had seemed to imperil, and, secondly, to break the power of the Franco-Russian alliance, which she regarded as a menace to tier expansionist plans. In this contention Mr Mallet is doubtless right, provided it he borne in mind that the results Germany hoped to achieve in the present war were to Ik 1 , irom the German point of view, only the means to further aggressive ends, which should be reacned either by a subsequent war or by tue gradual effects in time of peace of economic pressure and "mailed fist diplomacy." The ultimate objective of Germany after defeating France and Russia and establishing her predominance in the Near and Middle East, was to smash tho British Empire and her for herself, as much as possible ot its oversea territories and commerce. She had hoped to accomplish her immediate purposes in tfiis war without having to tight Great Britain as well as France and Russia; but even when Britain came into the war, she still expected to attain to a victorious peace which would satisfy her immediate aspirations and leave her-in a position of vantage for delivering, sooner cr later j the "coup de grace" to our Empire. With this important proviso, Mr Mallet's statement of German designs may be accepted as generally correct. He points out how Germany had for years been up her influence in Turkey and in the lesser Balkan States. "It is," he urges, "becoming daily clearer that Germany's Eastern ambitions formed her chief motive in declaring war, and constitute at this moment her chief hope of deriving profit from it. Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey, wero to bo welded securely into the system which takes its orders from Berlin. The great economic and military resources wero to bo placed at Prussia's disposal, and organised as Prussia inigiit dictate. Russia and France were to be taught by a few swift victories that they had no power to interfere with this or any other German scheme. When beaten Russia was to be forced to t,' e up Poland as a buffer State to guard the East, and very likely to compensate Austria for largo concessions to the Fatherland upon tho West. France was to lie forced to give up her colonies, and probably some of the rich industrial districts which Germany occupies to-day. But the main object was always mastery in the East, with tho great possibilities of empire which it offered, and tiie vast field for development and for commercial profit which it assured." In spite of rebuffs and disappointments, Germany, according to Mr Mallet, has steadily pursued the-e aims. Her plan for crushing France broke down, thanks largely to the support the French received from the British I" ■ t and ;.!ie British Expeditionary Force, I ut it left valuable French territory in her hands. Her plan for crushing Russia also tailed, but it left Poland in her grasp. All the while her hclieu: 's in the Balkans went on an I prospered. "Germany do<s not mean, if she can help it," declares Mr Mallet, " to give up both Belgium and Poland at the peace settlement. Last summer the was working hard for a separate peace uith Russia. Had she gained that, l'oiuud might have been relinquished, bu: in that case she would have clung tenaciously to lur gains upon the West. To-day, foiled by Russian loyalty, she might surrender Belgium and tne occupied territory in Franco if the Allies would leave her Poland and persuade Russia to accept Armenia instead. But even if things gc badly, and both Poland and Belgium have to be restored in the end, Germany still counts on retaining her hold upon the East. Whether the war go.es for or against her, she expects to lind her compensation there. Let the Allies foreo her, if they can, to ma ; i3 reparation in the north of Europe, and to acquiesce ia minor losses over sea. Even then, with a group of great independent States about her, containing some ol ; tne fairest undeveloped districts in the world, she hopes to dominate Central Europe and all the waters of the nearer East, to carry her system into the heart of Asia, and tu achieve, in spite of local and temporary failures, her most important object in precipitating war." I.'nless the Allied victory checkmates this Eastern policy, as well as her designs upon Belgium, France and Western Russia, there is no hope of destaging the German system and proving to the Gorman people the uselessness, as well as the iniquity, of the idea! set up by their rulers—"an autocracy bui[t upon ruthless fore % a centralised and practically despotic State, depending on its guns its discipline, its highly organised machinery, 't< skilfully calculated app.-aj to economic interests and material ends, while fool, 'ng the people and holding th< m ;.t bay." Tho peace of Kurope will i»' if the present rulers of formally can withdraw Irom the war with

any gain of power or inllin nee in tho East. Hence the illlportar.ee ol the advance recently made ni .Mcsopotanr.i, and the desirability of action 111 M-c Balkans ns en/Tgetv a> is <-o;iM"-l, :>t with tho due proMV-ution of the w:.r on the Western. Hu-.si.in, and Italian fronts.