POSSIBLE FUTURE OFFENSIVES

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 268, 20 April 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

POSSIBLE FUTURE OFFENSIVES

Ever since the enemy commenced his withdrawal on the Western front, niil even before this event, frequent gues c e; have been .made as to the locality In which he would follow up such a move by- an offensive. The "New York World" ccrrespondent, as well as tli3 newspapers and publ.'j in Rome, aro sure that this blow will lie delivered against Italy, while t". i Russian Minister of War apparently has stronger reasons for anticipating a German drive against the northern section of the great Russian front in the East. Mr Hilaire Bcllcc, answering numerous questions by correspondents on this subject in "Land and Water," in February last, admitted that he could not possibly tell, and added: —"All newspaper speculation and prophecy are either a repetition of deliberately propagated enemy rumours or futile nonThe writer considered, however, that the larje lines of the problem were perfectly clear. "If the enemy cannot achieve success by sea," he adds, "whether negatively by graduallystrangling maritime communications by submarines, or positively by winning a great naval action, his only other alternative is to gamble en aa early offensive in tho West. He cannot possibly get a superiority of numbers there. He must take the edds. By taking the edds, of course, he shortens the war against himself badly if he loses. In other words, the enemy is bound to one or two things, and quite possibly may attempt both of these things (for they are compatible as simultaneous actions), a stroke by sea and a stroke in the west by land." His negative stroke by sea has been delivered, and, although we are still feeling its effects, it docs not promise *o achieve the enemy's main object. The withdrawal from the front between Arras and Soissons may provide him with a few additional troops over and above his actual requirements for holding the line. The slight shortening of the line already effected, however, will not oi' itself provide him with a reserve sufficient to give him superiority on a chosen sector of the Western front. Whether ho will attempt to assume superiority on any of the various fronts open to him is known only to those whose first duty is to hide such valuable military information from others.