THE SIEGE OF GERMANY FROM THE SEA.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 257, 9 March 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

THE SIEGE OF GERMANY FROM THE SEA.

Tu articles by Englishmen, addressed to neutrals, it is frequently argued that tho Kaiser's silly charge that *re> brought, on the war, is disproved by our failure to prepare an army. It won id bi better io recogn'se any lack of preparation as our statesmen's folly, and learn tho lesson to look ahead and meet tho future.

As our r.lilance consists of five first--1 lass navies against two, and wielding forces of at least three to one, the conditions afloat are more favourable than thoso for wiiit-li we have always hold err Navy prepared The Allies have a reserve, of naval strength far greater than lie, existed in the land war. They havo (oiisvqiiently had 110 difficulty ill carrying cut the chief object of war in that tliev havo maintained at sea all their military and economic activities while completely denying the surface of the sea to tine enemy, except in the Baltic and the Sea of Miraora. Ibis success we knew front history could not end a war, but it is a condition leading to a victorious peace. It is only when wii examine tho secondary objects of naval war that wo nee indications of failure, duo to the faet tha.t wo did not plan ahead, and that the different navies do not p'lssesn tho co-ordinated and united effort of ono force under a single direction. LACK OF IMAGINATION.

Our forefathers, for instance, knew how to handle a situation where neii>trals I : ko Holland and Denmark were supplying some of the trade an enemy eculd not get into his own port-« direct. Va-it neutral interests have been created in this modern form of smuggling, interests which not only work for Germany but "vvill powerfully influence these neutrals, v>liose territory might hp so useful to us in the strategy of war, against intervening at a favourable moment, ns Rumania had done. Drifting into error U usually followed by concealment of error, and this has not only been the case- in regard to the blockade in other directions. For instance, Mr. Balfour, in his controversy with Mr. Churchill, revelled that the Admiralty had failed to anticipate the need of cruisers 011 the routes to defend our trade, and had not provided a single submarino-p'oof harbour 011 the six hundred mi In stretch Of our east coast. Tlio worst case of unexplained inaction was the failure to n;ake cotton contraband. Had this been done any time during the first six months of the war, the enemy would have exhausted his available efficient propellent explosives, and the war would liavo eiubd months ago. What that means to the Empire, and almost every family in it, can easily bo imagined.

THE ZEPPS. Take tho Ztippelins ar> another example. We possessed photographs ana measurements of every detail of the Zeppelin type before tlio war. We did not build one, and yet the argument is clear. Germany was sure to use tlio submarine and mine, and made no secret of the ntention. Our naval scouting could therefore be most efficiently done by a, Zeppelin, which could manoeuvre for many hours clear of both these dangers, and seo across much givatcr areas than a surface vessel. All- - example where imagination would havo helped us was the mine-field, since wo did not provide any sea mines lunrt long after war was declared. lines of mines are tlio trenches of the sea. more potent than trenches 011 shore, for their position is unknown to the enemy, and no artillery can destroy them. So as tin enemy's ilect exists, mines can only be removed by ves els protected by a siijjori'.;" fleet, and that involves too great, a risk of attack by submarines.

FA J U K F TO I TIUSK Sl'H-

MARIXES

Olio mere instance is permissible of hew t';.i lirnin < I the Navy tailed to got to , - .vork We proiided tlio liest submarine;, but wo did not. send any to tlio Isa!tic until a few went there hCvora!*' ni.oHtlLs after war lirokc out What was tlio obvious lino of argum 'lit ?

(1) Our strength iu surface vessels would prevent German ships from sliowng in the North Sea, whereas the advantage in yiirt':i' - o voss.ds lay with the Ueniuina iu the JJaltie 2() Germany would therefore offer submarines hardly any surfa-eo targets in the North Sea, whereas her eomlnerc.i with Sweden, her operations agtim-t the Russians along the coast,

r.aeh as von do.: - (loltz forecasted, and tlio h'ockade of tlio ontiances to the I'altie would (au.-e Iter to offer plenty of targets iu the Baltic - , Then - easily fore.-oo.ihlo conditions should li.tve caused u; to send a. largo flotilla of submarine* to the Haiti: - on or about the outbreak of v.ar, ere arrangements could Ue made to prevent us.

AND THE KK.SU/I'. The le-uk of our fai'uro to laee iho future .mil many other ea-is could lie cited—i-i that altiir over two years of war, ;.gi!n-.l :i X;ivv which dar\* not (ngagti in hat-Lie, we haw yet Ix'eii denied liy minis .-ill entrance into the Ha!tic, the Dardanelles, and into e v :t 'i:=i\u ;vea-; of water iff tin" (Jennnn coa-i--. We ii\i vacilhit-d in a. way ki:->'.vi> i ■. all in <.nr h!o-krd', and v.e I: 11': 1 to tcrminmv (> >riuany's t-rndn with Sud. n Xe.iriy .ill our movement-, in the North Sea arc r-~-\i .1 ' r .l to i!ii> (nTimuis hy Z'ppeLins, and to judge hy the numlu r of trofips wo kce,i in (ireat Mrittin tha n:ival anllioritiis have given no piaranUv against invasion. .V rov. ;he j:i> ti.ra of "11 ■ ini'_ht have U'l'ii." ii: ii-l '»e n r:tt-'it "Too hit.'." We r.re had sfiner.-, good . tayi -s. {• iul Mire winners; ami our X;ivv h is >■ ;i'end:dly ::tone 1 I.t adinin>■l r.'itimistake-'. It was brought late iu th.' r'N : - to . : t-. niij-ri pared has,-, hul si a,man-hip r>:ho si.to all diHieulie >. lut hi Hai I !■■ of •! ui..in. 1 not only did on l ' men slam t-heniselv. ; far superior in moral, hut the Oermans wore loth s: rnt'-yi'-aliy and tactical'v defeatI. i -ea; nig <,n'v throunh the informal '< i' ei\ t i» l.y a Z'ppeliu. NKW IM.OOD. Th" failure of Whitehall ha, led n:anv to Air. I•I all I • fo;<i idea thai n•« hlood and reform slu u! I lie hronirhi in. and he ha i so-aavd a great following some ll: ; i .\da'i"a'ty riiouii>nt;u i'v fai'-'d. on the fir-f r | oris of the I!att!e of Jutland. to support the ga'hmt 'eiir.en who had win a mil 'e vc'orv. Some filiio a"o Mr. I!. lfour refused .a iv () ui*t in Par'ianient fer reform I'Viiee le> di<lihed eh in war! He his now in-

liy CO.UMAMUvK CAUL VON BELLA IKS, K.X., M.l\

troducod one officer with seagoing experience during tho war. That is not enough. The First Sea Lord should 'kj a gr at with tho most nwin sea experience. All tho Sea Lords of the Board should bo relieved of their administrative routine work, and hold tho post among them of Directors of the War Staff, Operations, and Air Services. Tlio present Directors are not on tho Board, which is kept too busy with mere routino duties which tax < norgy and cramp imagination. Tho Navy has do no so well afloat that rno longs to see its own high standards i'.ppiicd to those in control ashore. And tlio knowledgo that there is room for improvement is really a most encouraging thought, l)o'ause with every advance wo increase the stringency ol our 1 iego of (iernianv. The fuss made over tho Moewe and tho Deutsehland, by a nation which in peace-time possessed tlio second navy and the second mercantile marine in the world, sj>eaks volume* as to t!u> siege of Germany in one direction, and contrasts .with the regularity with which the supplies of tho Allies pass over tho .seas. The fall of the last of the German colonies and the consequent release of British shipping employed, shows vividly the operations of our sea-power in another direction. RUB IT IX.

The Germans know of it. dream of it, foci it in every fibre of their bodies —this tyranny of sea-power. Tt leads Hindenhurg to exclaim that England is tho enemy. It is what .brought Xapo!oon down and made him crv out to his generals after a victory:—"We want greater things than this, wo want ships, colonic?, and commerce.'' Slowly tho dim consciousness that British seapower will make an end of Prussian miltarsm is turning to stark reality. Our bruins must get to work on the problem of how to usa our sea-power with tlio best effect. If the Germans think p thcy can circumvent it, that thought will prolong the war. For (•very man and women then the problem i- to make tho Government bring liomc to Germany the hopelessness of such an idea. One method is publicity. If we aro really building to the full limits of our resources, tho more Germany knows of it tho better. If we sink submarines, tho sooner Germany hears of it the better. If wo get munitions from America let the far t l>e rubbed in. To constrain neutrals whose frontiers march with those of Germany is tho way to reach the mind of tho Hun, for lie will very soon hear and feel our action. When he feels that lie is vo ringed in that there is no relief from any point of tho compass, ho will bo in tho mood to surrender. His allies must feel our sea-power not merely passively but actively. Let us remember that both Ncl-on and Dimdonald were Keen advocates of coastal operations. Syria, which offers a promising field for si sell raids, was tho scene of Sydney Smith's successful exploit at Aero against Xapcloon, causing the latter to say that a British captain made him miss his destinv!

The tist oi' these operations is that they should inflict great damage in proportion to the force employed, and tauso a large force of the enemy to bo absorbed with the defensive iiisteiul of iho offensive, otherwise they come under Napoleon's ban that "the English li ve to wa;'o war in small packets. •

DESTROYERS AND SUBMARINES

To know what to avoid is as important as to know what to do. J am constantly told that we ought to employ all our destroyers in hunting submarines, and ill our f!;et in knocking Heligoland to pieces. That certainly is not tliu .(ellic.o toucli. It was by having liis de-trovers with him that Sir John .lellicoo was able to accomplish so much at tho Battle of Jutland. It was a terrible mistake to give up Helligoland, but ivp uo not wipe out our mistake by piling another on top of it. If whilo wo bear in mind our great objectivo of tho High Seas Fleet, we can do more with tho Allied navi\=, then tliu second great object is to make their prossuro and offensive felt simultanei uslv with the offensives on ,all fronts by the armies on shore. Tho submarine hunt is foremost among these scci ndary objectives because the submarines interfere with the transport of troops and munitions, and sensibly redine day by day tin 3GOO ocean-going steamers with which wo started this war .So much are our steamer* wanted in this war that we have t;iken over half, or 52 per criit., for the war pur- ] o-e-i of tho Allies.

AI!M Alii STKAMERS. Tha important tiling is to turn the hunted into the hunter by arming all the steamers. A 12-knot Italian steamer is r.aid to have recently sunk one •iihtnarino and beaten < ff two on her way to Xrw York, and it is significant that in spite of the op. rations of the I' •").'! an armed Italian strainer saihil. while unarmed British steamers postponed their sailings. The war statis-tir-i aro com-lu-ive as to tli » advantage of arming not on'v the steamer, but ail patrol boats hunting frr submarines ft' the guns are equally available for sinking floating mines and firing at Zeppelins, all the better. Economy of guns .and jineii em !>• jj»y changing th.'ni over from ve-sels passing out oi the submarine zone to these ] a-sing in. That i-- a deta.'l. The important. tilings to renieniber are that it takes time to replace a 10-i merchant ship it is e\p:'teivn t > build, and it inter!', '.re-, with naval work.

IV. in evi !'y punt ot \ if.v it is l«itor j t.» arm exi-tiim -hips. Soiiiotinns we I m.«vl them hully tor a ccMa n purpose other than actual work. Supposing we j lie'il hiitnlred vessels in th:> Mi-diter-I rane n, mi 11 i it trnop-i there coii'd I'O j rapidly Ira imported from (.lie point to ; : Mother. That t"a< t .-done would piano j il'.e who';■ human plan in jeopardy, for I they h';v«> no men to sp-ire to m \ t a ! new --it nation, and ihe t r in-poit of | t roo; . hv s"a is rnueh more rapd than | |>y the p or railw iy -y-t to h.. found lie:!,* the cols': ~ft lie Ki-tcrtl h;i - ill of ! (I', M-' lit- rraii- an. Should the mij- | tai'v plart in ( onjui'i I ion with liu--ia j -ml Hi.mania open n> a read from t-Sn«r» I ( i.nut 11. s to the Mt ditei raui an. wheat j ?i'pp'ie<: would come to us hy a (|!i«-k- ---; i• r'route, tl an the Argentine. So !. t u = j I,e"p our r,:er-liant -hips hv rrmircr | tl. . m . \",11 a submarine would da v e we-k en tlio ■ urfaco in act ion if all nierj eli tut ship ' were armed, and their speed i he'e.-v Iho surfac> is not more than I*2 j knots, or possibly 1-1 knots in tile latent ; (vi>>. I.et iiv fnrfliennor" ronomo-e that if wo huihi n few Zeppelins they

would bo, in association with our fleet and hydroplanes more th;;n a match for a number of German Zeppelins, and so complicate tho German Navy's scout iug tactics. If our naval movements worn co-ordinated with theso of the Russians in tho Baltic, it is quite possible to break the Baltic b'.crkado of the Sound against .submarines and <*>mmerco. Finally, let us think out ahead how to u<jo Zeebrugge and Ostend, and tlio canal systems, and Antwerp, when they aro ono<> more in our hands. A MORE STRINGENT BLOCKADE. My last, point i, tho blockade. It has t l»eo mado more stringent. If it involves in the c-.iH' of Holland and Denmark, with frontiers marching witli thoso of Germany, certain delicate points of national rights, we should ask ourselves ths question. Wo believe the war involves our European civilisation, whilst all Europe, including Holland and Denmark, will come under the l'ru»ian heM of miltiarism if it Is lost. Iho greater right to defend civilisaton swallows up the lesser right of internatienaJ laws framed before railways gave new moans of supplying an enemy and a new meaning to a principle more tilian on|-e enfinciy.itod in <mr ptrizecourts that a neutral ought not to acquire a new trade with our enemy by reason of the fact taht the enemy's shipping has been driven off tho ska. All theso considerations pont to the fact that we have still mc.'tns at our disposal of bringing an increasing pressure to bear on our enemy, and if under the present mild conditions of our piego of Germany the Hun has begun to "squeal." wo have every reason to hope for satisfactory results as our sea power strengthens to 3 st-ang!e-hold. In the e?.f*i or Greece tc have prescriptive rights under our guarantee of the Constitution and under her treaties, and it is permissible to point out that with her const, tho Corinth Canal, and tho majority of tho people on our side, sea power onn very effectively ho brought into action so as to clear up the situation in a very short time. 'j'o brine Greco to our side would save tis 111 uMi transport work, b A s des giving us victory in the East asrainst the Gorman railway .sysntem to Constantinople. (Readers will note that since this article was written Admiral Jellicoe has been appointed First Sfa. Ix>rd, and that. Sir David Beatty has succeeded him in command of the Grand Fleet.)