THE FINAL RESERVES. A FORECAST FOR 1917.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 253, 23 February 1917, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE FINAL RESERVES. A FORECAST FOR 1917.

By COLONEL FEYLER

The Eminent Swiss Military Strategist. Whatever may bo the result of the fall of Bucharest and the invasion of Rumania, it can in no sense be described as a movement which will exert any great decisive influence on the war itself. Tho intervention of Rumania might have had this effect had it been prepared with a greater care and fitted «ith greater exactitude and neatness into tho general plan of the European struggle. For in that event, it could not have failed to benefit, •.o'.sidcrably, the Entente situation. It ha« not done so dir? •;!;,-, however. So that the Allied Powers wui'd be wiso t.) admit the facts a.s they stand and to recognise that the whole s.t.'ation today ia practically identical with that of three months back, with two differences —namely, that the Cc.-.tral Empires have gained extensive material resources by their invasion <T Rumania, and that their reserves of men have been diminished by the. "costs" of that invasion. The Allies on their s : de have missed a splendid opportunity for (rushing their Balkan adversaries, and have, of course, also lost a number of Rumanian soldiers and guns. Finally, for both tho opposing combinations, there has been—and will reman —a new and extended front, tho demands of which will press more heavily on the Central Empires, since their armies have luen weakened in creating it, and have born unable to secure any augmentation of force wherewith to hold it; whereas the Allies have gained the definite assistance of the Rumanian forces.

Therefore, although the invasion of Rumania may he hailed by the Central Empires as a distinctly sucessful manoeuvre, they can in no some regard :t as a definite triumph, nor as one which has brought them a singlo step nearer towards the dictation of a Victorious Peace to the members of tho QuadrupleEntente. They havo captured another slice of enemy territory; the sovereignty of the Balkans, for which they are battling, is still more or less within their grasp; hut all this is useless to them, unless they can hold all that they havo seized, and they are still confronted with the necessity of striking other heavy blows on other fronts, such as will definitely crush one or more of their ennnucs before they can hope to realise any portion of any of their gain*

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1917 CAMPAIGN.

Next year's campaign will tell u* whether they can succeed in doing this. We shall know, sometime in 1917, whether tho Central Empires can still discover tho necessary resources in men and material for the destruction, or rather the crushing, of any one of their adversaries; and whether, as seems more probable, the Allied advantages in this respect will not result in the crushing of the Central Empires. It is true that neither of these objects will bo achieved in 1917. But even if tho war continues into 191?, we shall at least know whether German energy and resources can lie developed sufficiently to enable them to retain (with the possible assistance of divided counsels and lassitude on the part of their adversaries) the uncertain plunder they havo been able to .seize. Both tho two great comhinatioift will assuredly devote most of the present winter to the gathering and arming of new armies in preparation for the campaign of 1917: since it is now plain that the ultimate victory must lielong to the belligerent side which will still ho in possession of reserves when the ot..ers will have placed their last availably men in the fighting lino.

The issue is consequently fairly plain, particularly if hc institute a comparison between the two champions -who had to support the first shock of hostilities, since these two (France and Germany) were the two who .alone can be said to have been in a state* of military preparedness at the outbreak of hostilities.

POWER. THE BALANCE-SHEETS IN MAN

In theso two and a half years of war Franc has called up for armies one out of every six of her population. How does the German Empire compare with France in this respect? 1 cannot claim acquaintance with the exact figures; but I do not think that we shall ho far wrong in estimating the drain on German manhood as having been at least as heavy as that on the French. Tt is tr-uo that the French losves in 1914 were far heavier thau the German; but the adverse balance was surely redressed during 1915 and 11*16. More than redressed, in all probability, and for two reasons. In the first place. Germany has h:id no colonial resources on which to draw, while Franco has raised several hundreds of thousands of-coloured troops in her African possessions. Secondly, Germany has been compelled to extend her various fronts in far greater proportion to her supply of effectives than has been the case with France. Hence it should bo safe to siy, at worst, that Franco and Germany exert to-day much the sanio proportionate strength, aa ojv posed to each other, aj> they did at the commencement of hostilities. The same c.innot, however, lie said c f the allies of the two chief antagonists. Groat Britain has called up only cue out of every ten, Italy uhc out ot ewry eleven, Russia one out ol every twenty. Each of these Powers, consequently, iin-i still a largo margin of ttfective reserves left on which -he can still draw, if need arises: while the alius of France can still count on the active co-operation of their smaller alii'--- Belgium, Servia. Rumania, Portugal, and .Montenegro.

These reserve forces would, of course, ,-ili have to he trained, equipped, supplied v, ;«}i officers, not to mention artillery and munition", before they con!.l be utili-,il a.s effective armie-v But since ill: s,' last-mentioned needs can al| in. supplied in due time, it is obvious that in man power the Quadruple Kiiti nte I'ikvsm'. a great advantage.

For uliat resources can Germany hope for from her allies con-parable t'» these? Neither A ustriri-Hunjrarv, BulL r an.i. nor even the Ottoman Empire poss'-wes anything like the reserves of in u still uncalled to tho colours in KiK-i-i. Italy, and Great Britain. Aus-tria-Hungary has suffered heavier losso< tli.-m any of the Great Powers. She tailed up to the colour-' men from ">1 to ■").■) many months ago, whereas Hu<si.i hiw not yet palled up her men of In. rnnont rai-e sufTnaVtit men. even by ■*. levee on masc\ to hold even li»r own local '■nuts n : thout German .I'si-tan-e. In fact, Turkey ah.ne of all Germany's al'i -■, would apjxar to ho st || able to spare troops for ex-Turkish I rout ■>. though it is by no means ocrtain that she will be nb'e to spare many more in the near future. The patloi;.; straits to which t'-e Ger-

man General Stuff has now l.een reduced seoiu fairly plain. They must necessarily strain every nerve, even at the risk of complete collapse in their solitary hope of victory —which must be ai. early victory, if defeat is to bo avoided. That is why they are seeking to compel the enlistment of Polish troops, in order to till the gaps in tho Imperial armies ;that is why they have swept the Belgians into slavery, in ord« r to liberate German workmen for military service; that is why they have established a National Conscription. Ci on of old men and women, for war work, in order that the munition factories may lx> finally "conilied" clean of every last man fitted for field service. They have been forced to adopt all these expedients because they realise- that jf the war is prolonged indefinitely the Allies must inevitably win through their much larger reserves of mar power.

A FORECAST FOR 1917. It is neeccSKiry to realise fully all that these German expedients signify. The} are, it is true, an expression of the German will t 1 ) victory. But they afford, also, abundant proof that the German High Command daro not contemplate tho prospect of a long-drawn-out struggle, and of its resolution to strive for an early peace, at any cost. In other words, that 1917 will see what may be her last attempt to " hack" her way through to victory regardless of cost. Personally, I fully anticipate an early saries of giant offensives, possibly on soveral fronts. There will be a big push against Rumania with all the additional troops which can be scraped together. Italy is already awaiting the renewal of last summer's Austrian attempts to "bre:ik througn." Possibly, nay, probably, further efforts on a most gigantic fcale may be made to bnau tho Russian front, to capture Riga and tc smash the defem-es of Dvinsk. Even a big western offensive on the scale of tho Verdun offensive may le in preparation. But in any case it seems certain to me that Germany will for-e the pa.c for all she is worth in 1917. and that she will throw every available gun and her last re-erves of men into the field in the hope of smashing down at least one or more of her adver-aries to the ground.

I am led to the-c conclusions less by a study of German strategy during the was" and by her repeated desperate attempts to catch up with h:r now t?rlibly be'ated time-table (of which the Verdun hecatombs were the most signal manifestation), than by an inability to perceive either any other reason for her latest activities- cr any other hopeful prospect which she can still entertain.

She must snatch speedy victory or Siicctim').

Hindenburg's declaration that tho Allies might continue to attack for thirty years, I ut that if they did they would only find him repelling their attacks for thirty years, was merely a tour de phrase for the benefit of the German journalists. A prolonged war Ls a war which Germany must lose. Hindenburg and the whole Imperial Staff realise that fact.

The German failure hitherto to any of her adversiries into subnii-si >n has already aroused an uneasy foreboding of defeat in many German heart?. For the German must smash through to victory. He cannot conceive of any other path. He is at last aware that in tho balance of final reserves the scales- are heavily weighted against him. So that his sole remaining hopo is for an early victory regardless of cost, even if tho failure to secure it promptly will entail crushing and only slightly postponed disaster.— London "Sunday Times"