HOW BISMARCK FORCED PEACE.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 253, 23 February 1917, Page 2 (Supplement)

HOW BISMARCK FORCED PEACE.

In tho autumn of 1870 Bismarck found himself face to face with ia problem of tremendous difficulty. The German armies had everywhere deteated the French. The French, however, fought on. They refused to make peace; they put to hopeless confusion the ideas of many officers on the German Staff— Moltko among them—that Fiance would hoist the white flag so soon as a German army appeared before Pans. Moltke's letters show that he expected to bo shooting in Silesia by the end ot October 1870. Bismarck, then, had to find some way of forcing peace upon a high-spirited and defiant nation. And he found it quickly enough in the decision to reduce Parts, the very heart of France, by blockade. It was a slow method, but it was sure. In September the German armies began their movements to envelop tho city. The iron ring closed iu upon a population of two mil ion bouls. On September 16, 1870, the last mail out left Paris. Two days later the gates were shut and from that hour no supplies entered tne capital. &o respect for neutrals, no consideration for humanity, affected Bismarck We may remind bis countrymen ot that interesting fact to-day when they protest against the British blockade. One or two timid remonstrances from neutrals were violently brushed aside or treated with cold scorn and .savage jest. The man who professed to love the went of a burning Frenchman, who held that every uerilla should be mercilessly shot and every district where such troops showed themselves should ho devastated, was not likely to be affected b van ytenderness. There were thousands of neutrals, United' States citizens and British subjects, in the invested area, but he cared nothing tor that.

VIGOUR IX WAR. Nor have his country men since felt the least compunction. On March 4, 1592 Count Caprivi, who succeeded Bismarck as Chancellor ot the Empire made this declaration with regard to cutting off food during a naval blockade:-

War is a rough and terrible business This applies equally to warfare on land and at sea.. Soever is engaged in the war wishes to attain his object, and if he be vigor, o„ s he will employ every means to attain it. In a naval war the cutting off of the enemy's trade w one ol these means. No one can forego_ it. And really is it anything more than is done on land? If during the sege of Paris someone had equipped a train with foodstuffs for. the I avians that train would simply have \e\ stopped . . 1 must say that it States act in this way they use only the means which war gives them. In such conduct I should see absolutely no barbarity, or any difference horn the measures taken in mar on land. And I believe that, inasmuch as no naval war has been waged on a large scale since tlio days of Nelson, views alwut naval war have arisen which under-estunate its force and power.

Bismarck talked with intense glee of leaving the Parisians to "stew their own iuice." Vast stores of food had been 'accumulated in Paris before the blockado began, but it was a mathematical certainty that they would be exhausted after a definite period provided the relieving armies were not permitted to break through and convoy fresh supplies into the beleaguered city. The Uerman operations were therefore directed simply to prevent the troops in the capital, who were wretchedly commanded by the famous Trochu, from breaking out, and the various relieving armies outside from breaking

in. , .. ityj first (matters V veni < oneertully enough in Paris, though no German sentimentalists were found in the besieging army to allow immense quantities of food'and other supplies to pass into the place. On the twelfth day of the blockade the Fnited States Minister, Mr. Washburne, who remained inside, notes that meat was becoming ncaice. The want of milk and suitable tood swiftly sent up tlhe jlSeath-rate among the children of the poor. The aged and sick died off. Forage became very scarce, an dall who had horses were compelled to get rid of them because it was impossible to iced them. For the purpose of slaughtering they could be bought, at tins date, for £1 or £2 apiece. Gradually, very gradually, the misery increased. Fuel began to fail. \\hen the siege had lasted two months butter hold for 16s a pound, nnd even then was almost uneatable; turkeys went for £:\ to £4 ap'ece; chickens for 245. ; wretched rabbits for 165.; and eggs were (is a dozen. Bread stil hemained cheap, however, as the price was fixed by Government order, and wine could also be bought at. a reasonable figure. A cat fetched 6»i if lean or 7s Qd if fat; a rat Is 6d; a fat dog 2s a pound. By Christmas Da.* prices had risen still higher; a goose cost £5 nnd a chicken 295. All fresh meat except horseflesh h-td vanished from the shops; epicures thought themselves fortunate if they ooul dobtain a few ounces of fearfully salt pork at exorbitant price.

VICTORY OF HUNGER. As the blockade continued doing its work —but doing it very slowly— Bismarck's patienco began to fail . Not that ho ever for one moment thought of ivlaxin git in tho smallest degree, but hj« did wish to try other mean-, of compulsion on tho eueui yas well. He demanded of the German taSff tho bombardment of the city to intensify the effect of tho blockade. The Staff opposed him (not from any huiiHtititnrinn ideas, as lio professed and pretended), for Moltko and the men loiuid him wore ((Hit;.' insensible to such emotions, and held with the American Genera] Sheridan that the enemy's people in war rdioirhl be left with only their eye.s to weep over it. Their rea-on was that a blci l-.ade, though slow, is quite certain to succeed : while a bombardment demanded an immense supply of ammunition and guns and, as they knew irom their sjec'al knowledge of artdlery and it.-< power at that dale, would produce lit tin effect. Bismarck, however, led bis way. The bombardment wan tried, and was, as every soldier expei ted, a ridiculous banco. During nine d:iy of it '.ffl) building*! aero struck, few of them at all severely, an dabout a-, nneli damage was caused in this whole period a- i-- produced by a single Ze.pjvdin raid. What brought France down was Ihe growing hunger of the capital and the fi ar tint if the resistance of Paris -wore prolonged the two milioln people in the in. vested arear would perish by actual t-tarvation. In any ea-e .after terms were irranged. if would require a fortnight to revi<t':ai fho city, simply bo'ansd its consumption of food was so immense.

On January 28, 1871.. an armistice was signed which was in effect the surrender of Paris to famine, and the stir, render of France with Paris. Bismarck and Moltko imposed their own terms. Any attempt l>y the French to obtain more favourable conditions was answered implacably by the statement that Paris was short of food and at the mercy of the German Army. Bismarck played adroitly on the weakness- of the French representative, Jules Favre, and compele'd him to associate France with the surrender of the French capital.

Bismarck obtained what he wanted by starving Paris. To that measure, following upon tho complete defeat of the French armies, the miserable peace of Frankfort was due.