THE ZEEBRUGGE BATTLE.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 249, 9 February 1917, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE ZEEBRUGGE BATTLE.

When, subsequent to the Jutland Battle, Sir John Jellicoe was appointed to the position of First Sea Lord, and Roar-Admiral Sir David Beatty to the command of the Grand Fleet, the control and policy of the British Navy passed from the hands of amateurs and theorists into those of professionals. The blockade was immediately tightened, and Germany at once began to feel the strain. The control of the Navy had passed into the hands of two typical British seamen who were highly trained and% efficient. They were both confident and competent—confident 'a their own ability and that of the men under them, and competent to adopt an aggressive policy and to carry 4 t through. After the Jutland fight, Sir David Boattie was undeservedly criticised by a few parliamentarians for taking allegedly unwarranted risks. His explanation was that the British commanders fought the enemy when and where they found him, or could find him; that they practised a virile aggressive fighting policy, and that if they awaited the enemy's attack in his own time and pince the advantage was against them. This policy symbolises the spirit and action of the Br'tkh Navy all through the war, and from the latest information to hand regarding the fight off Zeebrugge on Tuesday las 1 , the British were the aggressors. The accounts which have so far reached us are meagre an] disjointed, and it 'a very apparent that even the Admiralty —whatever they may know about the British ships which participated—ate very much in the dark as to the damage inflicted upon the enemy. The information from the "Daily Mail's" Ymuiden correspondent is, however, so circumstantial that there is no doubt a great deal of truth surrounded by ita atmosphere of hearsay. Until detailed information is available from official sources, the extent and importance of the action, and the relative sains and losses, will be difficult to approximate. From the information available, howover, it appears that a German flotilla of about twelve vessels, in fear of being frozen in in Zeebrugge harbour, made a dash for another German port. The British fleet suddently attacked with irresistible force, and scattered them, the coastal population being awakened by the heavy firing. One British torpedoer was sunk, one German vessel sunk, and the U69 badly, but not irreparably damaged. The "Daily Telegraph's" Rotterdam correspondent states that it is certain that seven German ships were sunk, and later news states that wounded Germans (whom the cable previously states were dazed and excited), admit that ten German ships were destroyed. The real magnitude of the engagement, and the British and enemy losses, .will in all probability be cabled shortly. Meanwhile, through the haze .of rumours and reports, sufficient evideaoe can be gleaned to suggest that the German navy has received another smashup, and that the "aggressive'' policy >f Admiral Beatty has again been vindicated. It is no use to put a manager in to farm your farm and then tell him what to do. It is futile to relegate the control of your dairy herd to a man who has never seen a cow. And it is likewise futile to keep two bulldogs such ns Jellicoe . and Beatty on the leash of Admiralty control and expect them to achieve victories. It is very improbable that they will have many more opportunities to demonstrate the strength of the men and mechanism under -their command during the present war, for the reason that the German , fleets are unlikely to take any more risks. When the detailed facts of the Zeebrugge aotion ci me out, however, it may be found that the Jellicoe-Beatty policy of agtessiveness has been amply justified.