THE CHANNEL TUNNEL.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 245, 26 January 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL.

" The advocates of the revised scheme for the Channel tunnel seem to rely a great deal oa our present relations with France, and even suggest that any opposition to the making of the tunnel implies some reflection upon our Allies, and on the permamncy of our relations with them. I should like to say that no one is more an admirer and a lover of the French than I am, and I earnestly desire that the Alliance may bo everlasting—a far closer alliance than any diplomatic arrangement between friendly Governments—a real union or hearts between two peoples. But in a question like this we must renieuiuer that we are the trustees for a fcrdistaut future. It would bo to i?no-e all the adages of history to assume that tho exisf'ng sentiment Lct.v:en the two great neighbouring aoo'-:a could never undergo any change, ar.d to act on any other assumption \,t i Id not be statesmanship, hut amotion ;1ism."

At the same time, I think ir.e ca_o ■csts on far stronger ground th m o\en he possibility which we must leep'd "Lew of tl;e disagreement at soni<; fuure date between peoples who are now lose Allies and friends. We liave io emember that one end of the proposed tunnel would be near C; Uis Sow, Calais is not merely a 1 letch eaport; it is the gate to the Continnt ot Europe. It is by no means a riolent, suggestion that in some future European war Calais may be wrested rom the Frencli by someone else, i ct people recall what we were all thinking Df at the time of the first Battle of fpres. There were the gravest possible apprehensions as that time that the Germans might force their way through to Calais; in fact, it ,r as knowu to be one of tlio main objects of tneir strategy, and for a time looked like being successful. Now, supposing tlio Channel tunnel had been n existence at the time, one of two tLings would have happened—either the Gciman army would have cut its way through to Calais, seized the French end of tlio tunnel, and l:nve made a dash for the English end before the tunnel could be destroyed; or, cn the nther hand, it might, of course, have been effectively destroyed by the I /rethought and determination of our own Government. If the latter had I pen ione, great destruction of property and great less would have resulted, without —as the subsequent events showed — there being any real necessity for it. If the tunnel had been in existenoe, tlio question of blowing it up immediately the Yprcs menace was threatened, would have occasioned violent controversy in this country. Prudent people would nave called for its immediate destruction, and, on the other hand, the largo financial interests involved would have boon urging the necessity for delay. Which of would have prevailed, no one can tell. That there would have been a Jjrenfc danger is obvious, and the existence of the tunnel at that moment would probably have caused a panic n the country, and trie apprehension wlieh we all felt in the circumstances as to tlio possibility of the 10-« C:i ;is. would have been augmented a iiand-.il-fold; and our some of security, rt s'in,; on our Xavv, against actual invuun, would have b"en destroyed. Then there remains the question at to whether or not the elective le*truetion of the tunnel could or could not be carried out in such circumstances as then existed. Advocates of the scheme say It could be done in a moment, and that no military danger could consequently arise. Personally, 1 am not competent to give an opinion on the point; but it is equally true that those who advance this argument are not military experts. hen th.e subject was discussed some years ago, military expert opinion in this country reported definitely against the tunnel, and that opinion has never yet been over-ruled by eqcally competent authorities. Nothing in tne general conditions of warfare (so far as I know them) affecting this question, has altered in the meantime, and all the circumstances in favour of the tunnel which aro urged to-day were present iu the minds of the late Lord Wolseley Mid other strategists, who were unconvinced by them twenty years ago. The present war has proved that we can still depend upon our ancient bulwark— the Royal Navy. The command of the sea has enabled us to transport to the Continent an army infinitely larger than ever in our history has fought und< r the British Flag. It has been supplied with quantities of munitions of war, commissariat, stores of all kinds ,such as never before entered into the minds of any military commanders to require. We have done tins in spite of the existence of German submarines and mines, without tne slightest interruption, and by general consent, with the single exception of munitions (the lack of wliich was due to other causes), no army was ever so adequan ly supplied before. We should have gained nothing whatever by the tunnel, except perhaps the saving of a c/u'tain amount of labour at the ports on both s'des of the Channel. The saving of money would nave trifling. It ought to be noted, however, that the chief promoter of the scheme happens to li a gentleman of German parentage, and, though naturalised, ictains, without any right to it. the German tide of "Baron."' I do not suppose for a moment that " Baron" D'Erlanger is actuated by any motives of hostility to his adopted country ; but it is not unfa'r to assume that his anxiety 011 Khalf of British interests and British security is less keen than that of those who have no ancestral connection with the lain! of the Hun. Tt appears to ni", therefore, that the revival of the scheme is altogether mistimed. to say tiie least of it. and 1 bavo very little doubt that ulie.n itconies to lie once more d'scussed in all its hearings, as it must before it is "■auctioned bv the Government, it will bo found that Englishmen are not more disposed to-day than they were twenty years a'jro to destroy the insular posiiion whi f -h fur centuries ins been our safeguard."