ECONOMY IN MEN.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 233, 8 December 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

ECONOMY IN MEN.

FRENCH ARMY'S NEW METHODS.

CASUALTIES REDUCED BY lIALI

(By Captain Phillipe Millet ia tli-e "Observer.")

Much has been written already about the new methods of the liencli army. 1 do not think, however, that the most lcmarkable feature of the pies.nt advance lias been sufficiently i::ticed. I rek-r to the economy in men.

'liiere i- no mystery aboul it, as the figures are now more t.r I -s official. Since Julv 1 the French haw not < Jl| ly been pushing en both banks of tlio Srinme. on a front extending from the light of the Ji'itisit Army to the south of Chilly, but they have had to fight around Verdun in order to repulse the last German attacks ami to regain some ground. Their military effort has therefore never been greater since the days of the Maine. In spite of that, the monthly losses are considerably less than during the early months of the battle of Verdun. Moreover, the average casualties cf the French Army arc at present less than half what they were last ".'ar.

Such an encouraging re.-ull Ls not due to the mere fact that tho output in heavy guns and ammunition has steadily increased. It is equally due to a quite recent improvement in the way of preparing and leading an attack. As the Germans have been taught by bitter experience all the details of the now French tactics, there is no harm in explaining the essential principles of these tactics to the public. Roughly speaking, the whole secret consists in establishing a narrow and almost mathematical connection between the work done by the artillery and the movements of the attacking troo] s. Such a difficult problem as this was not easy to solve. The French command made no difficulty about confessing that it took them a long time to find out exactly how to proceed. It was not only in the early days of the var that they had mare or less to relv in the end on the dash of the infantry and wage war with men'* breasts. All of us who spent the first 20 months at the front know that, even as late as in September. 1915, although we had many more heavy guns and shells, the connection between infantry and artillery proved very imperfect and was responsible for many losses. Indeed, it may be said that it is only since July last that, owing to lessons drawn from Verdun, the problem at last found a solution. Events have, clearly shown that this solution was the right one.

PREPARATION AND ATTACK. Two things mu.-t be considered separately. First of all, the preparation; secondly, the attack itself.

The object of the preparation is to cot rid of all .the different obstacles which may delay the advance of the infantry. Now, those obstacles fall under three headings: There is first the barbed wire, then, the defensive works (trenches and strongholds), finally the curtain fire (tir de barrage) of the enemy's artillery. Experience and minute calculations have shown how to deal with every one of the.se points. The destruction of barbed wire is almost exclusively the task of the 75's: our gunners know exactly howmany shells are required per yard of wire entanglement—a fact which allows ns to determine with accuracy what extension, given the number of TVs available, may be given to the front of attack.

The task is somewhat more complicated as regards the destruction of the defensive works. Experience has proved that the best way to deal with the frontline trenches, especially when they are not easy to observe, is to use exclusively against them an enormous number of trench mortars of all sizes. It is quite pleasing to hear that these prehistoric instruments, at which we all used to laugh at first, are now firing with wonderful accuracy and make the Huns uncomfortable even when they hide ill their underground .caves. Howitzers are only used at present against the second and third lines and all the works behind the first-line trenches. As it is, their task is already a sufficiently heavy one, as it is assumed that every inch of ground must bci plastered with shells. As for the curtain fire, it can only be dealt with by firing on the enemy batteries themselves: aerial observation is requited and also long-range guns.

AEROPLANE PHOTOGIiAPHY. The minuteness of the preparation is surely one of the most comforting feature.-, of the new war. It is generally knowu that, in order to make sure that all enemy works have been properly destroyed, photographs are repeatedly taken by aeroplanes. But this is not considered enough. All these photographs are submitted not only to the divisional staff concerned, but to all the company commanders who are to lead the attack; they are required to sav whether they think that the destruction i.- complete, and. whenever there appear* to be a doubtful point, to >end out ;• patrol to confirm by direct inspection of the ground the result, shown bv the photograph. Then, and not liefore. the infantry attack is launched. Here begins the second stage. Everyone acquainted with trench warfare knows what the loot difficultv was up to the present advance. It had been quite rightly assumed that the troops mu-t only advance under a protective curtain of shells. On the oth.'i' hand, as all the wires arc nil a- -~-n :i : a battle begins, one did ml -i • how to inak.> sure that the mrvitiT curl-.ia or' shells would i ivivde lb- atl.nkiii' i :- faulty without going too fa-: rr which was a more ominous danger tr.o -!<■«•. The difficulty seemed mi in-tij .'rabl ■ lha l some of the b.--t artillery officer- suggested that the only wav out was t i time exactly beforehand the movement; of the attacking troops with the lenstiiening of the range. Anv advance und:'v Mich a *v*l.-mi would have had I.pn c 1 acci rding lo ;i suit of railwa > tini^'a'!.'. Till: IVHIIK H' Cil-OMDiNA'I lON I'ortutiitolv. eii'th t .-< !:rr n »-:: fo-ind -iioe the Allies h-.v a'hiev.d th . loa-ierv of th ■ air. The I'Mm 'cliou betv " tbe advaiii ing infant'-, a-id tb • ar'ilh rv i now en urel b- (', ■ -<.-, •■lb ' i, f..,,t!v ao-opli'tic.. \-.:'-h '<■': m.-Ii div-:-i. n i- proviib 1 v itb 'i numb r «- lb- •. Th •!!■ t.'-b i- to f.-ll.)v. .-!. -!v ti ■ ••!■ v:-n.-i.. - line, io < in . -1 ••■ i.- i:..- . u ft. < rv -ieiv. tint -inn lv I" i-i i iir! t i' :!•■■ i rr- 'in I hi them know ,•■■ ,-tlv wh .• i going f,n. \., ,i ~n ;! .{ ! ■ j;if;U!l ! V ii:l leaehed » given point, lb • 7".'- ;<■■ ■ in r, riin-il that thev fiu-t b ii"th mi !b ■: • range b"vi nd it jo a- n< I 'o bit oar nv n intMi. fnfornint bin is siuiilai lv "iv, n it' the infnntrv bapi ens In be h"hl mi bv nn unsuspected obstacle, oi if a (ierniau ci tuiter-allaek i- seen coming it)) from tb- rear.

The wav ill which thi- in-v. .-lslvti-:- In . v.-rrk- 1. n Hie Senilis i- - i•:!i• I■-- marvelb.iis. It i- niainlv l.i l:»i - i niitl" <v--tc»m Ilia' Ihc trnons i.v... the fa- I fha' thcr have l.cen able to advaec mu? ;>• •: certain of shells which nn v 1 ci m! ;imioinlv ahead <>f thorn al a di-taiu--? "i 2<iii or :'iiO vards.

Theso few technical points explain why the French losses have been reduced bv such a margin in spite of an almost continuous offensive. Of course, thing.) might and will be still more satisfactory. The main handicap the French are .-till contending with arises from the fact that they have not a sufficient .supply of long-ran go guns to completely smash the most deadly German gun, the longrange 210. The Germans are therefor.' still able to delay in some way our advance bv their curtain fire, and some time will elapse before last difficulty will l>e met as successfully a- the other ones.

But the onlv conclusion which ought; to be drawn from this fact is tint the efficiency of the French Army has not yet readied its climax. The co-operation between the workshops, which are dailv increasing their output, and the high command, who devise the best way of using the new weapons placed it their disposal, has still to yield its I,M fruit-. It is, however, very gratifying to that the results attained haw already allowed the nation to spare her own blord while increasing her rffm-iv, power.