HINDENBURG'S BIG TASK.
LORD SYDENHAM ON THE FALL
OF FALKENHAYN
Lod Sydenham, one of the greatest students of military history and strategy, discussing the recent hcanges in the German High Command, said: "It mast always be remembered that a new Commander-in-Chief may feel himself bound to do something, and when he is forced to do something in a difficult portion i,t is apt to (be the wrong thing.'' Exactly why the Kaiser dismissed Falkenhayn, Lord Sydenham did not profess to know, " but, - ' he said, "it is certain that things have gene wrong certain that things have gone generally wrong for German arms and it may lie that the Emperor declared that a change was necessary and took the linj which he thought would be ir»os.t popular with the German people. There Is no doubt but that in some way, I don't know how, Hindenburg has achieved immense popularity with his countrymen. He has shown, so far t,.s one caM judge, little strategic genius of any kind, but ho has proved himself a hard fighter of the type of Steinmetz >n 18.70. The popular estimate of a general's capacity is not always accurate. "Personally, I think a man of his age is too old for such a post as Chief of the General Staff in such an exceedingly difficult position for Germany it the present. The qualities required are very exacting compared with those needed lor the command of an army. It is difficult to believe that at G7 a man can keep in Ins head all the countless deta'is and the positions over such a vast front as the Chief of the General Staff must have ready to hand. The task which awaits the new Chief is incomparably move difficult than that with which Moltke was charged in IS7O after many years of preparation.'' FAILURE BEFORE VERDUN. Another theory for the dismissal Falkenhayn advanced by Lord Syden- ; ham, who candidly admitted that with a man such as the German Emperor to deal with it was 'difficult to form | any accurate view, was that possibly the deposed Chief of Staff was responsible for the Verdun policy, which has proved such a, disastrous failure. "Whether that dangerous commitment," he said, "was due t) Falkenhayn or not, it must be remembered to his credit that the great drive through Galieia which forced the retreat of the Russian armies was a fine strategic conception ,and certainly the biggest thing in the war." Commenting on the reported antagonism of the two generals, Lord Sydenham said: "It seems highly probable that Hindenburg's view was that a decision must be sought in the east, and that Faikenhayn's view, backed by the Kaiser, was that the west was the vital front. If this is the correct appreciation'of the views of the two men, and if, as is believed, Hindenbrrg, alter the general retirement of th ■ Russia i armies and their known shortage of munitions, petitioned to be permitted to advance on Petrograd, the refusal of the strong reinforcements necessary for this enterprise is explained and may have resulted in the strong antagonism of the two men.
" While the growing dangers of the situation doubtless influenced the Kaiser to swap horses, the action of Rumania may have been the final deciding factor.
Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/PWT19161110.2.20.35
Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka
Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 225, 10 November 1916, Page 4 (Supplement)
Word count
Tapeke kupu
543HINDENBURG'S BIG TASK. Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 225, 10 November 1916, Page 4 (Supplement)
Using this item
Te whakamahi i tēnei tūemi
See our copyright guide for information on how you may use this title.
Acknowledgements
Ngā mihi
This newspaper was digitised in partnership with Auckland Libraries.