ON THE BRITISH FRONT.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 223, 3 November 1916, Page 5 (Supplement)

ON THE BRITISH FRONT.

111. 5 ALONG THE LIN3. By GEORGE HUTCHISON. (Specially Commissioned by the Ota*.) Daily Times.) "Eep" with the so f t "r" scarcely sounded from the parting of the lips after eep—still aptanng in despatches, to be, no doubt, perpetuated in Guide Books to the confusion of the plain tourist, as Ypres—will probably not causa the same difficulty as some othsr places with regard to treatment aftev the war. Reims—(or Rlieims, as the English persist In spelling it) —will hi- suitably restored, —a white arch.iepi.st opal pal aca in reinforced concrete arising un der the shadow of the ancient Cathedral, and the former structures in the neighbourhood repaired, to the satisfaction of the modern architect, so that the capital of Chi.mpagne will become as substantial and important a city as before the war. "Eep" is different. At tha most it was three years ago a rather decadeat place, numbering less tiian a twentieth part of tho population it boasted whea the Clct'i Hall typified :ts glory. Bosides cloth, in its woollen elements, tin city had been famous for its linen. Hence the name, id some measure .-. key to the pronunciation, of D'ypres ot diaper. Tho Cloth Hall in the main features of 1914 was less than a hundred years old —a mere affair of yesterday compared with tho memorials of any of the other old Flemish cities. While Bruges remains in its ecclesiasti. cal serenity, as it is likely to do; wh : le Ghent survives, with its seunth century buildings and its inland harbour, like a mediaeval Manchester, connecting by a deep and wide canal with the North tSea, and rich in its trade associations with England, and it-; miles of nursery and flower gardens—there neej be no great regret that the comparxtivoly modern frescoes and the wooden gables of the Cloth Hall at 'Eep" wil. rave disappeared, wh:le the rums rema'n to testify to the ruthlessness of the invader.

In the first battle for Calais (fougnt at "Eep") tho town and Cathedec! were destroyed without hesitation, but the Cloth Hall was let significantly intact —the only budding thus avoided — which spoke well for the accuracy of tho German gunners, and so gave rise to the surmise—probably true that the stately Hall was preserved as th.3 intended scene of some groat pageant in which the Kaiser would proclaim the end of England. The second batt!.i for Calais having resulted no better than the first, German hideous-ness w ■■■> now exemplified with a precision whieh left little to be desired in the way -y spitefulness in the systematic destruction of the Cloth Hall, until only y few traces of the frescoes remained. But in this condition "Eep"' may belter testify the work of Germany.

In the forthcoming new Cook's Guide to tho War Zone, "Ecp" should certainly rank ns one of the firit-elass aV tractions, and its crumUling walls may for some considerable time bo expected to re-echo to descriptive embellishments addressed to the " personally conducted." Convenient pathways may fittingly perambulate the nuns, and a service of electric cars will communicate with the suburb of marble hotels and stucco boarding-houses that will arise somewhere in tho neighbourhood. Only the more serious-minclel pilgrims will seek out the quiet eemettries that hold so much that was once the hop; and pride of England and ot tho Land of the Maple which faced fearful od Is in the first and second attempts to hack a way through to the chain-:! porta. When history attains to something like a decision on the amis of Germany it will probably be seen that ihe Higher Command d'd not contemplate a struggle in the south-western part of Belgium. Tho undoubted plan to atta.ii Franco through Belgium on the east was expected to result in tho fall of Paris and the occupation of the Channel ports, as well as ihe iron and coil districts to the north-east, n! 1 of whim would be held in pledge unt 1 payment of a war indemnity so heavy as not to bo discharged before furth >r developments had made the Channel ports stepping-: tones to England. It is harlly now in doubt that Englanl was ecu hdently expected to refrain from interference en land. When England too.i the bolder and more righteous cours), the plans of the Higher Comn and were enlarged to include a strike to the westward against the "contemptible force that Britain had thrown into thv struggle, and it nay be surmised that tho struggle which was so hardly sustained on tho road to Calais would ha v. resulted to the advantage ot Germany had she Jiot in o: e of those mistakes which have ma nod and ri ined her plans preferred to parade the streets of Antwerp instead of pressing southward.

The prolongation of that seaward lino, by iv.ovo and counter-move, will yet bo one of the roosf intensely mts:esting studies of the groat uar. Tiic highway to the straits lav throuj.i " Eop," and its sleepy lnsignifioan .0 was awakened to 0, hee.s that will linger as long as any,of the other vital struggles on the west. The battles of Xeuve Chapclle nn! of Loos, to the south, were efforts by the Brit'sh to assert an initiative tint could l.ot be sustained for lack of men and munitions, rs against the ine<haustible supplies of both on the side of of the enemy. So, throughout the summer (in Europe) of 1915, we had to hang on grimly to the entrenchments behind winch our new armies were heme; slowly bill It up and tardy supplies accumulated, while (iermanv took advantage of the comparative lull to turn eastward and sweep Russia out of I'oland and Com land, and assist Austria to retake the territory to tinsouth. The succeeding winter was a time opreparation, with the tragedy of Sorliia tlirown in, ae.d the way fiom Hanburg on th» cold north to Hagdad in the fabled Ka-t, w;v. opened to the cominercial travellers of Germanv, who saw new and n-h markets opened up to tievery gates of India. The beginning '•' 15)1(5 ur.doeiited'y saw Germany a conqueror on everv I'rmt except the west, and there she contemplated a successful and final effort in the early month* of this year. VV '], --e'eimite wisdom, s)ic le- , -,|, 1 i,-, u the campaign on the ; v. : r-t the Russian front ivm and mow. By snia^lrnj; - r'-> i- ' rst th" Germans sought !■> .-* -., v . '■■■ -variations only of det.rl

the original plan of campaign which counted on the linal overthrow of Russia by victorious forces from the western front. Thus, early in February the fateful attack on Verdun was be&un. the imensity of tliat effort ha» already been discussed. Itt nas been described and probab'y with justice as the turning point of the war. The only reflection on the French in connection with this tragic phase was the extent of the surprise, which called forth an effort almost more than human. Germany was well served in the secrecy that enveloped her plans rather than in any espionage of her agents in the camps . f the Allies —a service which has been much exaggerated. On the side of the Allies there appeared to be almost complete quiescence, with no more th 1:1 ordinary preparation for an initiative later in the spring. The extent of Germany's preparation was rot credited until developed The surprise is to bo explained without insisting on treachery or spying to any considerable extent. Germany has had, and still has, the immense advantage of interior lines by which her forces can be movj-1 over hundreds of miles within a i'e.v hours by means of her systems of railways, which may be said to have been strategically perfect and to work with the precision of a machine attuned to respond to the slightest touch. On the other side, the armies of tha Allies were widely dispersed and insufficiently supplied with aircraft until the later ftages of the spring campaign. The laborious efforts of the Allies to supply their shortcomings could not have escaped the vigilance of a le.vS proficient staff than has already served Germany so well, and may be said to become more proficient as experience accumulates. As for the '"push" »n the Somme, it was recognised that a forward effort was due, and overd'i», uy the British before the attack on Verdun had fully developed. The German High Command does not need the gossip of clubs cr coterhs to guide it in its deliberations. If there had been reliance on stub source of information before the war, the experience of the misleading character >f such information had been alreaiy proved to Germany. Preparations to support a forward movement of tho magnitude intended to restore the initiative to the side of the Allies, espo 1ally where, as it was in this instance : in the direction of joint action by the French and British were necessary on such a scalo as not l > admit of mora than secrecy as to detail.

Among many other wor'cs railway lines had to be extended, and in pa-ts duplicated, light lines had to be throw.i forward, communication trenches had to be laid off, and galleries constructed underground capable of sheltering whole battalions, new emplacemezi -s for heavier guns had to be prepared and a whole system of water supply laid down, even to the outermost trenches soon—(it was expected) to w left far in tho rear. All this was not possible w :thout indications i eing observable and the conclusions to be drawn by the enemy wero not unshaken even long betoro the intense irnllery work of smashing his entrenchments had begun and continued tor ('ays and nights without cessation. The rest was mainly a question of human endurance Where, as in the sectors opposite Thiepval and Ovi'levs the barrage of slip's sufficiently destroyed the wire entanglements of the enemy and knocked Ins parapets into dust heaps, the sustained rushes carried tho warfare into the first and second, and even in

into the third lines of the German entrenchments with only such loss as v. asinevitable. Further north, the entanglements, 20 or 40 feet deep, had not been destroyed to the same cxtc.it, and our i on were held up in the-.-o thickets of wires and played upon by every description of death-dealing engines, so that no heroism com ! possl'-.'.v survive even in remnants to ct.rry what was left so securely fortified. More than one highly placed commander was retired, and many others sent to swell the Lost Legion of the Damned as failures for whom there can be no furth ;r use.

The successes of the south we - . 1 Homeric in their individual triumph--, and tho success in that direction will soon have its effect on the sectors further to the north.