ON THE FRENCH FRONT.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 221, 27 October 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

ON THE FRENCH FRONT.

AT VERDUN. By George Hutchison. Specially Commissioned By the Otago Da:ly Times.

It was a quiet day at Verdun, when one could converse with his neighbour close at hand, without shout-ng, in the intervals of the deeper bursts of gun fire. These more resounding peals came chiefiy from the south, beyond tho outskirts of the town, in the direction where the Heavier French artillery, hidden behind natural obstructions and discreetly veiled by ingenion.; devices from tlio prying eyes of the circling aircraft, swooping occasionally high up 01 er the terrain, were throwing their shells over the town on to the German entrenchments to the north and e\ist. There was, of eou'se, the re turn fire, but that was four miles beyond the town, and contributed to the prevailing din by the minor sounds if rushing projectiles overhead which Unknowing ones could describe by dimensions bewildering to tne inscientitic mind. But such a comparative quietness as indicated was well understood to bo but a prelude to the outburst whicii would presently combine in such a cataclysm of sound as no words have yet been formed to describe accurately. Verdun, lying in a wide depression, in the Valley of the Mouse, with its swift-flowing waters brought into qu:et subjection by the canal that conforms to its course' but is now a stagnant ana unpeopled waterway, was important before the war as "a place of arms," watching the defiles through the mountains to the eastward separating it from the rival fortress of xvletz. As a town Verdun had no military importance, but was considered an impregnable centre with its douole or treble ring of forts, which was described as "the last word" in modern engineering—a belief that is to-day but one of the many illusions of tho war.

On a restricted from oi some 40 miles stretching from tho mountain range that rises abruptly from tho Woevre Plains, about 15 miles to the east, and stretching across to the broKen and heavily-timbered counf% of tin Argonne, the Germans had concentrated by February last between twentyfive and thirty divisions of piekrl troops, supported by a strength of i. tillery never before brought together with'Yi such a space. The number of guns, comprising a very large propiition of heavier calibre than any then m tho possession of the French is said to have reached the enormous figures of 3000, with unlimited supplies of munitions of all sorts. The encircling fortifications vere deemed u" the Germans to interpose no obstacles of importance, but rather the reverse, as the position of each was accurately known and its destruction in turn, .;- it would come within range of the heavier guns, predicted with an unfailing certitude that included not only the destruction of the .works themselves but the demolition of the guns known To be mounted in each fortification. Thus the German Staff anticipated to strike early thu year a mortal blow at the heart o f France —to go far towards ending the war on both fronts—and, incidentally, to re-establish the fading f rtunes ol the Crown Prince, who was nominal? in command of this great demonstration of the invincible power of Germany. How it failed is one of those unaccountable events which from time to time during the extraordinary development of this war occurred to frustrate the apparently inevitable triumph of German arms. The greatest emergencies have again and again appeared to bring out a power and spirit of defence that has turned eatastrophies into triumph*. The nistorv of the struggle in the Valley of the Meuse ha.s been one <» f rapiclevolution. in the first overwhel .i----ing onrush of the German armies, one of the furthest encroachments on French soil was at St. Mihiel, on'*Sh-> Mouse, some 25 miles south of Verdun. So favourable was the configuration of the country at this point that although a somewhat narrow salient. Mount St. Michiel defied every effort of the French to dislodge the enemy. This salient has been a veritable thorn in the side of France, and its great natural strength and unique position probably determined the choice by the Germans to make their supreme effort at Verdun. The first phase—during the winter of last year—November to January,—saw the Gorman and j rench armies in Brabant entrenched to the north of Verdun, such as they had been after the retirement of the Germans from their first great onrush. The whole countryside—here of gently rolling bills, wit:i many woods and scattered villages and not a few stately chateaTix—became it maze of trenches, conforming in tho main to natural offensive or defensive positions. No douTit at this time tin svstem of dug-outs (which obtains still throughout the greater part of tho long front of several hundred miies, iron the North Sea to Switzerland, broken only by the passage of the larger rivers flowing northward), prevailed in Brabant in somewhat identical form, and only occasional conflicts took place, during* the winter months'in the scattered woods, or where the artillery on v w side or the other was able to make occasionally a deeper impression than ordinary. Behind these trenches the preparations tor tiio spring campaign vent on in the strengthening en both sides of second and third-line defences, and on the one side in the secret massing of Gorman hosts. There can lie no doubt now that the German preparations for the spring campaign in tho valley of the Meu.-e were more systematic and complete than the Frencn. When," on February 21, the great German push began, the French were unprepared for such -x. avalanche as descended on their trenches to the north and east of Verdun. A volume of long-range tire, from guns of a calibre not before disclosed, speedily demolished tlic Frenofl trenches, and was followed by an onrush of infantry that overwhelmed all opposition in tho first and second line-, then only t'eenly held by the French. It was a great surprise, and so far a triumph for the German stall'. The strategy of the French ut this tune was not to persist in t determined defence e.t outlying points, i.ut to retire 'f severely pressed within the ii irthorn def. nee at kylvf.ld-2 wrf ihe northern sector of the fortification*. lint, before this retirement had been ii.ore than comonccd it was realised t'mt the '■« rman objective meant something more than a demonstration. It v. i. an attack on \ i-rduu and all its works. The movement was recognised to be a master-stroke, and dispositions were hurt- idly made to contest every yard, own beyond the range of tin fortifications of ground. Already the first line he.d been Inst, and the parapets of the second almost levelled, and i! o communication trench' s of both second and tliird lines cumbered with debris Reinforcements were hurried hi. ;:,, | Hie word passed to hold on to Urn d nth. Then, ;:- the German "heavies ' were move d up to i nil form t the advance of their assaults, the revelation nf the I,'scirssiioss or worse- of the vanned ln:t;fi atVns was made clear to the From b. The fortress guns wer i hurriedly removed as well as could be dene in th > whirlwind of destruction that now i nelo-ed the more outlying feet- and new emplacements wort* hasti'v coiistrui ted of simpler materials out-

side tlio ramparts, nvhich remained henceforth only useful for covering unchino gun and rifle tire. The forts, with their casements and galleries, became death traps rather tnan dofensivtworks. The French had to resort io digging trenches among the outer works of the forts, but more often tiact to resort to the open country around them or to the nuns of"The neighbouring villages. A now system ol defence liad to be improvised. Jt was no longer n system of trenches, with dug-outs ani rallying places, readied by well protected communication trenches, but cover sought among ruined masonry of what had been the more substantial buildings of villages that had disappeared in all but names. Hardamont, Vaux, Daniloup, on the cast; Bothincourt, Le Mort Homme, on the west, are names that will live for ever in the annals of tho French. The sites of most of them have been lost and gained, and lost again, but ever with glory to the defenders ; and others, more to the south, may stii.l har.o to lie contested—Tavnnna and Souvillo —they arc (or will he) only so many incidents In the gigantic struggle that became th- turning point in the great war on the West. The sacrifice of life in tern i,.conflicts lias necessar/iy been very great, but the French nad humanely and wisely from their standpoint determined on an economy of life based on a rough estimate of sacrifice against positions—often mere heaps of bloodstained nibble or charred tree stumps which had become of minor niilita/v value compared with the fuller knowledge of experience As tor the enemy, the astonishing thing has been the pers'stencv of sacrifice keeping pare with an increasing iecling of despair at the inadequaiv of results for the terrible losses sustained. But with them it was a case of parryins on even to the oitter end of total defeat. They had become committed to Verdun. A3 a critic of their own Has expressed it, they had got their tee h so deep into Verdun that they could not let go.

The methods of attack on tho siclo of the Allies throughout their far-Aim:]; battle Imo on the west had i ndergono many changes, hut the Germans seemed unable to trust themselves io make any change m tb<>ir f,.rm of attack. With the Allies, expeiience wasallowed to alter formulas and traditions. Test-books and histories wo:e discarded and new movements evolved. No longer were company formations, or close formations of any sort, retain"! once the route march was ever. Latterly the assault with the a has de pended on the attackers getting as quickly as possible over thj parapets o£ the first line by openings made in tho wire for the purpose, and thei scattering in units. Jt was as if a handful of dried peas -were being sr r-ji broadcast, so that, as the seconds and minutes went by, the space to be traversed appeared covered with a multitude of round dots, cacli a soldier with nlk> and bayonet in one hand an I with the other plying the bombs with which he started out plentifully begrt. This method has been demonstrated as tn<? saTest formation—if formation it mav be termed -against the machine gun lire that has been so elaborated by the enemy as to have hecome effective ne ;t to the high explosive shell-fire that levels trenches and destroys all scmblan.-e of coherence in any ascertainable target or tangible opposition. Casualties of necessity there were in abundance, but on a smaller percentage. This form of attack necessarily depends to a large extent on th? persona - ity of the rank and file, and that has seemingly remained the pre-eminent achievement of the British and French soldiery. It also seems impossible foi the Germans to achieve such a pitch •of intelligence as necessary for independent action. They must still attack ''en masse." This has been seen in an intense decree in the terrible destruction attending theT assaults on both banks of the Meuse— especially .against the positions held by the French - n tho sites of former villages and between the mounds which once were elaborate fortifications, where all has l>een rec'u'O.l t> open ground. A whole German division has often been employed on a single attack, so that—with a' front of what might represent .a company 100 imen two djoep, .but formed of double companies following closely the one upon the other, and separated from the next similar formation by only an interspaced line of officers urging on their men; and again followed closely by repeated formations in the same way, to the depth of a. reyjment, and that repeated again and again,—a Gorman attack has often presented such a target that the converging fir.! of hundreds of machine guns and thousands of rifles and scores of the " 75's" — which arc the special prid. of the French artillerymen—have nvade for r time little apparent impression on the moving mass, which, nevertheless, ha . been losing hundreds every second. The work of destruction soon begins to tell, so that the most perfect discipline in time breaks down.

Ono feature has been noticed as peculiar to these massed attacks at Verdun. It would seem to be a physiological development, so natural that t might have been expected to have been remarked upon before. Po.-sibly the conditions at Verdun, where the attacks have been in the ope; —for nc woods or trees remain to shelter or dislocate the solidity of advance,—have permitted of its illustration in greater degree than elsewhere. It is that, while losses, constant, but unstnying ti lh L > onward rush, are being made and nimediately replaced from the rear. there form on the flanks eddies of mea instinctively turning away in the direc tion of freer movement from the torrent of destruction that is fining them. So swirls of men begin to form on the flanks, and this outward movement in time extends towards the centre, so that soon the oncoming appear* lo disperse in opposite dire tion*, and presently there are tew, or none, oi all the host that were being urged an.l drivon on to funtniuo the dance ol death. The field is heaped with dead and dying, and the living, forced by the bending oi the flanks, hnd tliemselvjs making instinctively for retreat, oa;h ono forced by the man next lmn, stumbling or falling in the same d rection of apparent safety. It lias been said thar any charge may succeed il ihe attackers are prepared to pay the price, and ihe (•'arinans have been prodigal at this gaaie. The price they have paid must be fatal to any campaign that cannot be ended in a short time. I'll© French have, no doubt, lost very heavily how heavily iv.'ll probably never fm known, -but not in anything lik" the same proportion a* the Germans. All figures are necessarily approximate in ■; war o millions but it is probable thai the German casualties uermg th-i first live months of thofr attack en Verdun have exceeded ill in tuber ha.) tht population of New Zealand and that their money hiss in expenditure of ammunition and material has amounted to a* mueh as the whole of the national .debt of the Dominion before the war. The initi.itrvo has at Verdun neon, hitherto (June, 1916,) with the Germans, and they have no doubt profit >d in that respect. The French have had to play a losing game but they have done it magnificently, and with a regard for the encouragement of their soldiers that has <Umv much to preserve their wonderful efficiency. r'ivp davs has been the period that as ■., rule has lmnted the serve'.' of the French in

the more exposed positions. Of course, there have been detachments whi:h could not be relieved, sucTl as the garrison of Fort de Vaux, who were surrounded, and surrendered only when no effectives remained to contest further the possession of the riifns. The mu.l and grime-covered survivors arc moved to villages, where the relief is mainly from actual fighting, for p.uades at"J held with a frequency 111 these rest camps that would be considered irksome to our forces further nrrth. But

"glory," or what bespeaks it is stimulous to tho French, and theiir "drapen," or flag, is constantly being displyaed and honoured. Comprehensively, it denotes the courage and devotion of every unit. Where a thousanu men go int'i action and a third only return, it would be impracticable, where all were heroes and the majority have made the last sacrifice on the field of TTonour, to reward even a representative number, -> the custom has become more frequent of late tod ecorate tho flag or the regiment with the symbols th.it ordinan'v were reserved for the more conspicuous instances of individual va'iour. Parades and reviews are frequent behind till lines. These rejuvenate the war-stained heroes, and tho constant itivani ot reinforcements moves on in turn to defend "the flag" at any and cxery sacrifice. The buildings of Verchin ho've hen Tinder long-range lire from monster German guns from within a couple .if months of tl» beginning of tho gre it attack. With questionable advantage, as compared with the possible destruction that the same attenticn would have gamed elsewhere, the Germans have destroyed nearly the wl ole of the town on the lvght, or eastern bank of the Mouse. More recently they lia ,- j extended their fire to the western sale of the river wher the cathedral, the so-called citadel, which has become < f mediaval value, and the. principle public buildings are —or were —situate, but. such attentions are onlv evidences of

" while the injury to il«o cathedra] lias been taken as denoting the growing conviction on the part of headquarters' staff, that tb>* vanity of the Crown Prints must suffer another obscuration.