STRATEGY OF TITANS.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 209, 15 September 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

STRATEGY OF TITANS.

IMMENSITY OF RUSSIA'S MOVEMENT IN THE EAST. WESTERN OUTLOOK. By DR. T. MILLER MAGUIRE in the "Daily Express'. Had Russia been properly armed and supplied with munitions in 1914 Germany would to-day be retiring behind the Vistula instead of fighting between Vilna and Dvinsk. Czernovitz would hava fallen a year ago without waiting •or Letchitsky to surround it, and the Polish Quadrilateral would have ncen a Muscovite base against all Prussia east of Posen. The Russians wore outmanoeuvred from their Polish salient east of the Vistula in 1915, just as the \ustrians are now being out-man-oeuvred on both flanks from A olhyn a to Bukovina, and threatened in their 06 was, the armies of the Cziar were absolutely shot out of the quadrilateral by\ superior artillery action in 1915, but a leading point of difference between the cases was the skilful retreat of Alexeieff from the Polish sal> cnt, with little relative loss, and the recovery of his lines of communication to Russia proper, whereas the Austrians have not had time to make a sate retreat, and have already lost more men as prisoners that the whole army ot Napoleon in 1815. or of Macmahon at Sedan in 1870. The Russians, therefore, have more than made up for tne.:r previous defects in ordnance by the a~d of Japan—a very significant fact, having regard not only to the very novel and most formidable nature of the new .explosive shell, but also to the historic phenomenon that this friendly Japan was by reason of superior initiative and readiness driving the Russians out ot Manchuria in 1905.

RUSSIAN RECUPERATION Russia soon recovers itself, and its reorganised army in 1910 rendered any chance of successful invasion of its territory quite vain. The great feature of its strategy from a defensive point of view is its immensity, and this immensity is now in mot : on. It becomes stronger ever? year, and can assume the*initiative in any quarter it pleases, alike in the ligris basin and in Asia Minor, and it can "hold" the Germans between Riga and the Pnipet Marshes, and■ ot the «amo time mask Roumania, while putting, if need he, four times as many men against Austria as that Power could put in the field even before its recent enormous losses, not to speaK of superiority in ordnance or the Lossack cavalry at Russia s disposal Thes-e are proving once more that Napoleon's estimate of the value ot cavalry before and during and especially after a victory, is a. true as ever. They can gather up the fruits of victory as well in 1916 as m 1800. In 1911 the Russians had available in man power twenty-seven European armv corps and three Caucasian corps. She has now ev,cn larger numbers and from a line of concentration reaching from the Black Sea to the Baltic she is precipitating the organised, trained manhood of all Eastern Europe (with the exception of the maelstrom of tha Balkans) and of all Central and Northern Asia for thousands ot miles back to the Pacific Ocean. There Japanese workmen arc tolling in munition lactones to supply Muscovite gunners with new shells with a new species of explosive energy, to be expended in those prodigious quantities which are so striking and novel a feature of modern artillery tactics. . . The present difficulty ol Russia is not nnv lack of men or material; but it is not difficult, in the circumstances to realise the tremendous nature ot the mental and physical task before generals, like Grant in 1864, von Moltke in 1870, Marshal Oyama in 1904-5, and General Bmsilofi to-day. in directing the whole energies of armies superior m number alone to all the troops handled bv oil the all : cd generals converging against France in 1814. I have no space for details, but one average army corps will eat up in one ,'ouy all tttie available food in a fertile countiy measuring nine miles by five, and when Moving from its base by railway requires a train d* th : i ty wagons for food supply per day.

VITAL ARTERIES It is a first principle of strategy that threats on lines of communication can only be made by superior forces, but that an effective stroke against such lines has always resulted in the isolation, retreat or sui render of the inferior force—inferior other m numbers or supplies or ability o the part of generals or of all combined. That Austria may retrieve her for tunes after the present succession ot surprises and defeats is possible. Her empire has become accustomed to reverses, from which *he seems to have the genius or good fortune to recover. But it 's most unlikely. Every avenue of effective counter-stroke seems to n.e vised No recovery is recorded in similar circumstances in the same campaign where both flanks ore turned and the centre embarrassed by an enemy whose own lines of communication are quite safe and who has a choice of retreats, as the Russians have now. It seems to me as if the llnsswna could turn, defeat and : solato the hostile centre, and press rapdly forward to the complete occupation ot Galicia, and also send in front its swarms ot ** Cossacks to revel in the rich plains ot L Hungary, which lwve been an object of intense des ; iv to all .eastern countries since the dawn of history.

PROJECTION OF POWER. The whole of Russia's present projection of the bulk of t»wo continents in overwhelming might against tho Central European States :s wha. Lord Bacon would call a reversal of th.» course of history .and one of the most mnr.el'o :s vr issjtu 'es ot time. Oiircwn relation thereto :ind the converging forces of the. Br : tish Empire is too largo a subject to lie dealt with yet. hut it is obvious that we must play our part, as in IHI2 to Mo, and just as uhly, 01 we shall lose our international status, and |) 'reliance nip 'i! the future ol our Knrpr.'. It i's in cxaggeraton to .say that our sea supremacy was never more triumphant and unchallenged than now when practically all Mie nations (,f Eiuope are transformed mti armed camps and all are niovng to (some lighting line. In Fact, tho migration of armed multitudes are vaster than anvthmg that has occurred s'iko the fall' of Dm Roman Empire or the Mongolian rushes i'n east and west in the time of Genghis Khan. Yet it must be carefully noted that, though the Austrian Empire, whether in the Tvrol or in Hungary, may he severely,' of not fatally .ruptured bv id] these sudden shocks and losses ol fighting strength. Germain is still niii.na*':-., and her arrive still number millions of effe, t.,ve<= and can assume the offensive on all p..mt> ■ n the Dvina and from VWrdim In Yp.es. knowing Ui.it niPiprjnlo-icnsive warfare courts disaster. . In the western theatre, which 's a very far cry from Vilna, Lemherg, or Czernovitz.'and yet is linke<Bherew:th

by reo'procal military interests and necessities, the Gei'mans can no longer imitate their brilliant strategy of 1870, which brought them from the Rhine to Paris in seven weess, yet they are hurling between Metz and the sea wit l desperate energy masses of troops and perpetual salvoes of artillery against the French at Verdun and the British near Ypres. TACTICS OF ATTRITION. Practically, however, the situat'on u merely tactical; there is no pretence of turning movements on either side; it has all been mere ''hard pound:ng," constant attrition. The front is narrow ; it s one series of entrenchments; there is scarcely enoug room for any more divisons to deploy. Artillery keeps at : ts work of destruction month after month, and reserves are brougnt upon both sides in multitudes. But German assaults and French heroic resistance continue as before, because all flanks are covered, and neithar sido can ''turn'' or cut th.e linos of communication of the other.

Neither side can prteend to have secured as much strategic advantage in eighteen months as the Russians have scored in this very June so far. The fronts are narrow—the projectiles unlimited and enormous in ballistic concussion and in range Soldiers fall in hecatombs before Verdun, Canadians win glory near Ypres, and Jwt the dread work of ntti it-ion goes on without interm'ssion day and night just as in last September and at the battle of Loos, and neither belligerent from Vaux to Dead Man Hill and from Ld!e to La Bassee has been ,ab!e to carry out any strategic maneuvre or to wm one days march of ground or to gain any decisive battle at any cost of life, however immense. In no war since 18G1 have mere tactics, however able, resolute, and long continued, been of much avail against brave foes in well entrenched positions with invulnerable flanks.