What the Russian Victories Really Mean.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 203, 25 August 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)

What the Russian Victories Really Mean.

THE CENTRAL POWERS WILL BE COMPELLED TO RETREAT.

Writing in the New York "Tribune'' of June 20, Frank H. Symonds. author of "The Great War," gives a mo»t illuminating view of what the continued push of the Russians on the eastern front really means (if continued. Although written over a month ago, it seems to be coming literally true today. It is plain that the situation in tha Galician and Volliynian regions is now approaching a cns : s (he writes) which must involve the safety of the whole front of the Central Powers from the Gulf of Riga to the Roumanian frontier. It is this crisis that I mean ki discuss in the present artitle. I do not desire to be understood as forecasjtog that the things that have now beSme possible wjll happen; what i desire to do is to describe what is now possible if the Russians are not checked When the recent attack began tfSe eastern front followed the Dvina Diver from the outskirts of the city of Riga. speaking very roughly here, to the city of Dvinsk, approximately an east and west front; than it turned sharply south and ran pretty nearly straight through Pinsk, which the Germans held, through the Pripet marshes, along the Styr River, east of Lutsk and Dubno, which were Austrian, along the Sereth River just west of Tarnopol. which w*a~, Russian, to the Dniester River, and thence to the Pnith River just west of th,e Russian frontier. Now, frcm the Gulf of Riga to the Pripet marshes and to the southern border of this swamp tire line istill stands, but a little south of the marshes begins a very wide, deep curve which the Russians have driven westward This curve amounts to a semi-circle drawn about Dubno, with, a radius of perhaps thirty-five miles, which represents the extreme penetration of the Russian into the Austrian front. Going south again there is a second semicircle of perhaps twenty-five miles' radius, from the po Jit where the Dniester reaches the Russian frontier. As tho northern curve extends towards Kovei and YTadinnx-Volynski, , the southern passes south-west of Czernovitz and is approaching Kolomea. These two semi-circles, to use the military parlance, are the wedges which the Russians have driven into tha Austrian iines, .after having successfully broken the trench front which was in their immedalo front. The war in these sectors has thus become a war of movement as contrasted with the trench operation. To use a familiar figure, these two circles represent breaks in the dyke tho Central Powers had erected against the Slavonic flood; through these breaks the Russian waters are now sweeping and extending not only .westward, but tending to swirl round the ends of the dyke and expand north and south in the* fash'on of a far.. IF THE DRIVE CONTINUES. Now, if this rush eonfc : nues long it is clear that the centre of the Austrians, still standing firmly before Tarnopol and covering the railroad to Lemberg, will have to draw back to avoid being enveloped on both its flanks by the Russian hosts pouring through the breaks tin the dyke to the west of Lutsk and to the north of Kolomea. Exactly what happens when there is a break in a Mississippi levee is now taking place along the eastern front. The Germans and Austrians are trying to build a temporary dyke behind' the breaks and to circumscribe the area .it inundation. Thus we hear of very great concentrations of troops taking place bola'nd the line that was broken and in front of Kovel and.. YladinnrYolynski. Similarly, Vienna reports new stand between the Dniester anc? the Pruth west of Czernovitz. If these temporary dykes can lie raised in time we shall soon see a retirement of the Austrian centre from the front of Tarnopol behind the Zlota Lipa or the Gnila Lipa; that »is, to a position half way between the cities of Tarnopol and Lemberg. The new front will then extend from the Pripet marshes south-ward to Kovel and thence to Yladimir-Yolynski, thence southward west of the Gnila Lipa to the Dniester and thence east of Kolomea to the Carpathians. THE RUSSIAN HOPE. At tho moment the main objective? o* the Russians are the two towns of Kovel and Stanislau, north and south-east of Lemberg. In this they are exactly following their successful campaign ot August and September, 1914. If the Russians can get to Kovel, and they are not more than twenty miles from it now. they will obtain the most important railroad junction along their southern front, the point of intersection between Unes from Ij'ablin and Kiev and Rovno and Brest-Lrtovsk; their northern flank will then be protected by the Pripet marshes, thev will command the railways down which the Germnns could send troops to take them in the flank, and they will be at least a hundred miles west of the present German position at Pinsk and in a position to attack the German flank and rear from the Pripet marshes to the Dv'na. A GERMAN RETIREMENT. This would inevitably compel the Germans to draw back on all their casern front, now extending from Pinsk to the environs of Riga ; it would mean the surrender of all the Russian territory that has been occupied, save only Russian Poland, and possibly a. portion of the Cou'land. It would mean a retirement to the line of the Niemen and the Rug. Russia would by a s : ngle blow recover more than half of what she lost last summer. Turning south, the a'tuation would be this : Having taken Kevel, the Russians would be able to push westward to the Rug, which otters the next strongest defensive position. But on the east bank of the Hug they would be westward of Lemberg. If at the same time they had succeeded in pushing westward along the Dniester beyond Stanislau, they would threaten Lemberg. If at the same time they would threaten Lemberg from the south—that is, by a double envelopment —and reproduce tho situation of 1914, when the Austrian armies fighting in a wide semi-circle before the Galaeian capital were outflanked to the north and south and forced to retire, in a disorder that became a rout, upon the San and Przemysl. thus abandoning more than half of Galie'a. THE GREAT IF. It is fair to say, then, that : f the Russians are able to keep up their advance, which is still unchecked, until they reach Kovel and pass Stanislau, then the Austrian army in Galicia will have to go back out o Lomberj; and to the San, the Oermin army will have to eom'e back upon Brest-Litovsk, Bielostok. and Koyno, and tho map of Eastern Europe will have !>een brought back a long way toward its form of iust a year ago, with the further detail that

the offensive will still belong to the Slav and not to the Teuton. The best way to explain the present movement in its widest possibilities is \a turn to the great German offensive of last summer. That liegan by .a. far smaller immediate and local victory than the Russ : ans have already achieved. Mackensen at the Dunajec broke the Russian Kne on a front of less than twenty miles, originally. Through this gap he poured huge forces, just as the Russian's are pouring huge forces through the two great gaps that they have cut in the Austrian lines. The Russians then bpgan to draw back thentroops on both sides at the break and endeavoured to make a stand at the Sin River. LAST YEAR. This stand was made for some days, long enough to permit of a reconcentrat:on of Russian arnres and prevent the envelopment of the forces in the Carpathians, but not long enough to cons.oiidfite a position that could be held indefinitely. This phase exactly corresponds to the piesent attempt of the Germans and Austrians to consolidate a new position from Kovel to the Gnila Lipa and save Lemberg and the northern front. WHEN LEMBERG FELL. Forced to leave the San, the Russians went back to the Grodek Lake line before Lemberg; but agam they were unable to make a long stay here and were cbl-'ged to 'retrteatw again until they stood beh'nd the Sereth, and, haying iost Dubno and Lutsk, reached the lines that they subsequently held until the present operation. But this retirement uncovereci the centre in Poland, and it was compelled to retreat first from Warsaw and then from Brest-Litovsk If the Russians are able to turn the Austro-German forces out of Kovel and Lemberg, the parallel will be patent and the results will be felt along the whole German front. Here you have a plain evidence of the consequences of a successful breaking of trench lines on a wide front and at two separated po : nts. The situation in the west would have been similar if last September the French and British had got through in Champagne and in Artois. Then the German armies between the two points would have been compelled to draw back to avoid envelopment, and the western front might have been earned back at least to the French frontier from the Meuse to tho Scheldt. WHAT MAY COME. In the next few days the important thing to watch is the situation of the two flanks of he Ausrian armies from Pripet to the Carpathians. If the Russians get Kovel, then it is clclar that the whole eastern front will be compromised and the Germans will have to draw in to the Bug. if the Russians get round to the south of Lemberg, then the Austrian line wiU have to retire to the San, surrendering all of Eastern Gallon and most of Bukovma once more. Meantime the Germans have sent new masses of troops down the railroad from Brest-Litovsk to Kovel to attack the northern flank of the advancing Russians; they have sent troops past along the Lublin-Kovel railroad lor the same purpose, and they are making a concentration at Yladimir-Yolynski. south of Kovol and considerably east of the Bug. Away to the south the Austrians are making a new concentrat'on cast of Stanislau, between the Dniester and the Carpathians. Finally, they are holding back the Russian centre west of the Sereth, although there are clear evidences that they will very soon have to go back behind the Zlota Lipa and probably ultimately behind the Gnila Lipa. WILL THE NEW DYKE HOLD? The huge number of Austrians who have been captured, the great loss ot artillery and munitions, and the relatively rapid rate of Russian advance all suggest that there is a demoralisation in the Austrian armies far greater than that in the Russian after the Danajcc hist year, and comparable to the Aus tri.in debacle in 1914, which could not ue checked until the Austrians were driven across the Carpathians and in upon the outer forts of Cracow. The really important thfng that everyone can see is that the Russians have now pushed a very great victory to the point where it may prove one o fthe decisive incidents in the war. We see what they are driving at and we see what they might accomplish. We see w'th equally clear vision what the Germans must do and what they are trying to do w'th characteristic vigour and skill. What we do not see is whether the new line that is being built wiP hold or not. and whether the Austrian armies are still in bh(ape to make a further resistance. LOOKING WESTWARD. Since it is essential to view the war as a whole, let us now look westward lor a moment. We know that the British are ready to stuike, or will be readv by next month. (Thev have alreadv struck.) We know that they have had until quite recently to face a concentration oi German troops wlncn was so great as to hold out little promise of success for a drive. Some of these troops have now been drawn down to Verdun. If Germany is presently compelled to draw upon her troops in the west to meet the peril in the east, then we shall scon see a further reduction of troops before the Brit'sh or a complete (-essation of the Verdun operation, or both, because the Verdun operation has never called for great numbers at any considerable moment, its cost having conn- from the necessity to renew very frequently the relatively small army making the great attack. It is a perfectly safe conjecture that at any reduction of the German effectives before the British below the .safety point will be followed by the same sort of attack that struck the Austrians in , Galeja and Yolhyma, when they had sent their reserves to Italy and the Germans had drawn out their "stiffening" < orps for use in the west. If Germany has to withdraw troops from the western :o the eastern front, then we may be on the etc of decisive events on the west. ITALY'S POSITION. Meantime the Austrians have moved troops away from the Trentino front I and the Italians are again on the offen- | sive and have regained a little of the r ■ lost territory. Further redu-tions of Austrian armi s on this front will ceri tair ly lead to e: it aggressive action on I the part of the It-nans 'along the Ison- ; zo. for if the \vt- i- entering into a de--1 cisive stage Itily has st'll to demonstrate ber claim t" what she expects to get if the Allies win. Nothing is less likely than th.it Russia, France, or

Britain will refuse to make a peace otherwise satisfactory if Italy has still failed to get Trieste or Dalmatia. Finally, there is patent stir in the Balkans." If the Germans and Austrians are compelled to draw their troops out of Bulgaria it is certain that there will be a thrust from Salonika in overwhelming numbers which may put bulgaria out of the war in a brief campaign and cut the life line that binds Turkey to the Central Powers. The value ot Salonika is now becoming patent, and the real extent of the menace of the Allied army here is unnrstakable ROUMANIA. As to RoumarTia, she wants Bukovina, and Russia is again getting it. She also wants Transylvania, and Russia can again offer it to her as 1h ? price of coming in and conquering it. If tha war is enter'ng a decisive stage, Roumania is likely to come in, because all her profit lies -in making an alliance with the Allies before the war is over, and thus establishing a claim to her "lost provinces." Nowhere will tho events'of the next few days be watched more closely than in Bucharest, save, perhaps, in Athens. The entrance of Roumania would not be as important from the military side as from the moral, although it would have real military value. This is because the world has decided that Roumania does not mean to como in until the outcome of the war is assured and then to " rush to the succour of the victor." Were Roumania to come in, Europe would say : "It must be about over, because the Roumanians have decked to enlist." It is very easy to sit down with a map and the early reports of a success in the field and build up a whole edifice of success consequent upon these first successes. But it is equally dangerous. T do not mean to be understood as forecasting that any of the things 1 have discussed will happen. But 1 am anxious to make clear that any one, or several of them may happen, that the Germans may be able to put the Austrians on their feet and build up a new dyke against Russian inundation or that the inundation may sweep on f or a few weeks more and compel a general retirement of the Central Powers from the Gulf of Riga to the Carpathians. Not since last summer has there opened any such wide horizon of possibility ; not since the Lemberg days have the Allied prospects been so materially brightened; not since tho Battle of the Carpathians has the general Allied situation bo,en so favourable. To say more is idle. THE MEANING OF VERDUN. We beg'n to see the meaning of Verdun more clearly now. France once more " took on" the " operative corner" of the fight She accepted and fulfilled the mission of holdmg the final drive of the Germans to win a moral victory on the battlefield. By holding Verdun for nearly four months under terriffic attack the French have succeeded 'n preventing the moral victory for Germany. Their work is now about done. It must be for the British and the Russians to bear the cost in lives and do the main work of the summer campaign. France has fought and won another Marne. even if the ruins of the old city of Verdun should ultimately fall to the Germans. Verdun may easily prove to be another Genota. and Petain may have rendered to the Allies exactly the service that Massena rendered to Napoleon when he held the Italian town until the victory of Marengo had been prepared. Genoa finally fell, but Marengo settled the war.