WAR PLANS FOR THE SUMMER.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 197, 4 August 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

WAR PLANS FOR THE SUMMER.

[HE MASSING OF FORCES IX 1 HI. WEM: A FEW MORE MONTHSTHEN A DECISION.

MYSTEHY OF WHERE THE ALUFS ARE TO STRIKE.

' l " m ..'} I r A,l,ltar y Correspondent of the Illustrated Sunday Herald.'' (The following article, written at the end of May, ivfore the present gfeat offensive had commenced will be interesting at the present juncture.)

Looking at the situation from t'ienemy point of view, it must appear something like this: Th« Germans have 17(j division;. J hey have about 100 holding t'iie tienclkM of the Western battle front which has a length of over 450 miles'; ii,il.t that number of divisions on th" Eastern battle front from the Baltic tc i,jnsk, which also lias a length of about •m 0 miles; and a general reserve of somo 20 divisions available for use on cither front, but now fully employed before Verdun.

Austria ha» 70 divisions, of whicn cbcut half are on tho Eastern front, between Pinsk and the Roumanian frontier, and half employed again-t the Italian*.

A\e know that the Entente Powers can dispose of 83 British and half a dozen Belgian divisions.

We also know that if Germany, wit'i a population of 07 millions, has been aMe to put 170 division* into the field, I' ranc-e, who has suffered proportionately rather Jess losses, and has a population of nearly 40 millions, should abole to put at least 100 divisions m the field.

This assumption is a,ll the morn reasonable, since the French official review of the war issued more than a ' ear ago claimed that France had million men in first line, with 1J million men in reserve.

ITALY'S THREE MILLIONS. Now a force of H¥) divisions, with staffs, independent cavalry formations and subsidiary services, -would number somewhere about 2} million men, and tho fact that France has not yet used her 1910 and 1917 classes suggests that her field armies are not smaller now than they were in March, 1915.

We know that Italy commenced th war with 24 active and 12 reserve divisions, and a number of Alpine units equal to another six divisions. As M. Piclion tells us that she has called un three million men and has actual!., enrolled 2,400,000, Italy must now be able to dispose of a field army scarcely if at all inferior in numbers to that of Austria-Hungary. Russia started the war with 70 firstlino divisions, and tho fact was d'vulged more than a year ago that a reserve division had been added to each of the first-line divisions, besides which Russia had the who'e of her militia at command, and must have now pret v nearly 200 divisions in the field.

Germany will argue thus The clash for Bagdad, which resulted in the siege nf Rut and the necessity for attempting to relieve tho place, absorbed larger forces than were at first contemplated. But the fall of Kut and 1 the pressure now exercised upon the Turki by the Russians will leave the British free to confine future operations >.i Mesopotamia almost entirely to Indian ti'OODS.

Sbe will also argue that the Brit' li sent large forces to Egypt both to safeguard the Canal which, at that time was threatened by the Turkish Syrian Army, and to act as a general reserve for her forces in the Balkans and Mesl opotamia. The Turkish divisions, however, are now so depleted and so fully occupied elsewhere that there is probably no longer any need for keeping a large British force in Egypt. The French and British went to Salonika to keep Greece from being forced into the arms of the Central Powers. Germany and Austria have now withdrawn nearly all their troops from the Balkans, and can no longer subject Greece to the same pressure with which they threatened her at one t« me. and the* position can now be held by the Serbian Army reinforced by half a dozen French and British divisions.

FORC'ES AVAILABLE IN FRANCE

It is, thetrcfore, obvious_ that of the 190 British, Belgian, and French divisions, not more than a dozen need oe allocated to minor fields,, wlilo the remainder, which represent a foive equal to ti," whole German Army, with practica'ly unlimited reserves behmc. them, are available tor the Eastern front. ~ At the same time, the Russians are under no necessity to u'o more than maintain their present position against the Turks, whose army, winch nominal. |y consists of ")2 divisions, cannot inns, for more than .10(1.,000 effectives, and >s obliged to provide for the defence of Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Syria and Thrace. t , It is obvious, therefore, that, it th. Allies so wish, they can cease to press the campaign in minor fields and can concentrate 170 French, British and Belgian divisions in t 4 ho Western theatre "which ensures them of a 70 per cent numerical superiority. They can equally concentrate at least 100 Russian divisions ill tbe Eastern theatre, wlych the Russians an equal superiority. " Similarly, the Italians should enjoy a<Ti}iivt the Austrians superiority ot nearly 2 to 1, and it on'y remains to consider from Germany's own actions bow she expects her endures to emp.oy their forces. Germany attacked the Allies because -he saw it was necessary to forestall, the r impending offensives. She attacked in the Western, in preference to the Eastern, field, because Russia had been driven so far Hack and had such poor coininimicatjons ihat -lie did not. constitute either such •' such an immediate dang t the AH os n the West.

THE AI LIES' PPOC'EDI'RE. for the method of procedure of tho Allies in the. West, we know that .lofl're d'recls tie- g.-nt-ral stratesrv in tbal f'e-'d. and that he and the whole French Staff are stooped in Napoleonic theory. Napoleon's method was to enwo the enemy throughout the whole of his line.' to phi him to his ground, and to force him to use up his

reserves. Then he would hurl his own general reserves upon the point he had | selected for decisive attack i i the hill assurance that their overwhelming I numbers would carry them through. ' and that the enemy would have no 10with which to counter-attack him.

No peace that we may conclude with Germany will bo a lasting peace unti' she has been decisively defeated in the held. It we endure a few months Ion" er we may be certain that Germany can and will be, decisively defeated. Jut the end is not yet. Napoleon could attain results in tbe course of one summer's dav because he i 1 with comparatively small numbers because the weapons of his dav had little range, and because his genius towered high above that of his oppon-

To-day tho numbers engaged, and the volume, range and precision of our fire weapons has increased so enormously while the mobility of armies, handicapped with heavy artillerv, has decieased so greatly that it is now vcrv oi theu't to bring up reserve* and niunit'ons in time acUeve decisive results. \\ here Napoleon took a ,e»hours to wear down his enemy, it ma now take months.

Anything short of complete success will mean an inconclusive peace which Germany will break w hen she has Mifncently recovered and is able to cs.tch this country, either unsupported, -.u* not so powerfully supported as it is at thi-i present time.