PUBLISHED ON TUESDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOONS. FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1916 TRADE AFTER THE WAR.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 195, 28 July 1916, Page 2

PUBLISHED ON TUESDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOONS.

FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1916 TRADE AFTER THE WAR.

" We nothing extenuate, nor set down auuht in malice."

The manifold problems involved in the evolution of a satVactory and effective policy for the conduct of trade after the war are receiving the earnest consideration of statesmen and publicists throughout the Empire. Broadly speaking, ic may, we think, be safely assumed that the weight of opinion is in favour of a policy, the purpose and effect of which shall be To establish a reciprocal pre fereritial tariff system within the British Empire. To establi-h commercial relations on a reciprocity system between Great Britain and the other Entente Powers, To grant favourable treatment to neutral nations. To restrict trade and commerce with enemy aliens by moans of a tariff and other measures with a view to preventing dumping or securing of commercial advantages on the restoration of peace. The above planks carry the endorsement of the important Impeiial Conference, which was composed of the representatives of the British Chambers of Commerce in the United Kingdom, tlio British posses>ijns, and foreign countries, who met in London last month for the purpose of discussing economic problems arising out of the war. It is a matter of common knowledge chat the British Board of Trade is in receipt of'similar suggestions from different commercial institutions concerning the advisability ol' giving proper protection to industries in Great Britain, uniting the whole Empire financially and commercially, and penalising, if u't actually annihilating, enemy trade. But whil? it may bo comparatively easy to persuade all political parties that i in the interests of Great Britain and i her Allies some such pnlirr i= do- 1 si ruble, there remain- to be fared j

the extraordinary difficulties which must bo ovorcomo beforo such a policy can be made effective. Wo can insist that all goods uf enemy manufacture shall be J marked with the name uf the j country of oiigin. We can impose a special tariff on such goods. We can give special treatment to our own people, to our Allies and to neutrals. But when we have done these things we may lind ourselves i still afar from the attainment of the i object we have in view. If Germany finds herself unable to do j business with us directly, we may be sure that she wiil strive her utmost j to profit indirectly at our expense, and one of the means by which it may be possible for her to do this unless we are able to devise an effective check is by way of " replace trade." What is meant by the term " replace trade" may be thus explained: Germany is an enemy country whose goods we do not wish to buy. The United States, for example, is a neutral country doing business both with Germany and with us. We buy American goods which America replaces in her own markets, for home consumption, with German goods. The more we buy from America the more America buys from Germany, an arrangement which cannot but work for the mutual advantage of America and Germany, and which, in effect, not only nullifies the handicap we seek to place on German trade, but probably penalises us by making us pay more for the American goods than America pays to Germany for similar or perhaps even higher grade, goods. Imagine this principle operating in all neutral countries, and it must be obvious that unless Great Britaia and her Allies can devise some way of effectively checkmating the operations Germany will be but little troubled by any policy which may be adopted for the restriction of her trade