NOW THE ALLIES CAN BREAK THROUGH IN THE WEST.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 191, 14 July 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)

NOW THE ALLIES CAN BREAK THROUGH IN THE WEST.

• THE IDEAL ATTACK" (By a Military Officer.) Two out of the three war predictions Attributed to Lord Kitchener have r.lready been fulfilled—the defensive of 1014 and the "draw" of 1915. What of the third—the successful advance of 1916 P A reply to this question is essayed by a military officer in the May number"of the "Fortnightly Review," in an article marked.by so much insight and such obvious technical ability .that its signature "Special Reserve," might well cover the identity of a famous soldier. His reply to the question is comprised within 20 words: "I look forward," he says, •"with absolute certainty to clearing France and Belgium of the Huns before the year is over." He puts forward cogent arguments in support of his conclusion, and these art military and not economic arguments. The economic argument, indeed, he dismisses as wholly inadequate. "It is impossible for this country or its allies to depend for victory on nothing but the economic or financial exhaustion of the Central Empires. There is no record in history of any great military Power which suffered defeat through purely economic causes as long as its fleets and armies and national spirit still remained intact and active, however much such causes may have contributed in the long run to its military downfall. . • . There will never be peace in Europe until,the German army has been utterly defeated in the field. An economic victory would mean nothing but a renewal of the conflict at a later date. "We war not with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers." What must be crushed, if Europe is ever again to know security, is not the stomachs of the German people, but their belief in the invincibility of their own arms. He goes on to discuss the impossibility of leaving everything to Russia, •' unless it is desired to extend the period of the conflict at least into 1917 or even 1918," and shows that Russia has already borne more than her fair share of the war, and contends that without resolute he'p on the 'Western front the coming autumn will not see her armies further advanced than her own original frontier. This brings the writer to his third general contention—that an advance from the. west this spring is the key of tiie whole military . situation. " \ ictory in the third year of the war," he says, "depends upon breaking through in the west," Pessimists declare that the German, line is unbreakable, and this argument, has been supported by experienced officers at the front. The writer sets forth a phalanx of reasons against this proposition: What is clear.at least is that Germany is coming'to the end of her first line troops—that is to say, men who are competent to go anywhere and do anything which efficient soldiers are expected to do. In the course of the last five months nothing but her interior lines of railways have enabled her to place her effectives now on one front and now on the other. . . . Ihe attack on Verdun has taken its full toll. There must como a period when the spearhead of the German armies is blunted or destroyed and an insufficient number of mobile soldiery exist for any given front. BETTER THAN THE FOE.

On the other hand, our own personnel has inherited in full measure the spirit of the original Expcditionary Force, while the Territorials have become war-hardened troops with which anyone might be proud to serve. the main facts seem to be that our troops are now superior as tactical and mobile units to those of the enemy, and that we should possess a great superiority of force. The German troops on the western front are usually esimatcd at two millions, but they could be, :uid no doubt would be, considerably reinforced in view of an attack being directed against them shortly. None the less, they would etill be very inferior in point of numbers. . . . At the lowest estimate, then, we should be able to put three AngloFrench soldiers against two Germans, while a concentration of two to one on the sectors selected for attack could be made with complete safety to the rest of *te line. This estimate e;rs very greatly on the side of prudence—for three to one or four to one would be a more probabc figure at the decisive point. The three conditons which must be postulated for a successful advance are: lalimied shells, greater numerical force and an army not inferior m courage, skill and administration to the German! The two first conditions have been fulfilled. What of the third? The pessimist contend* either that no army can break through modern field defences, or that at any rate our army cannot. The answer to this argument has been given at Hooge, Neuve Chapelle, Luos and elsewhere, tuough these actions have been often written down as

"partial successes or incomplete failures." The German front has been broken frequently up to the first hue. several times up to the second, and at least once up to the third. There remains the question as to the I orm of attack : The ideal attack must combine a great variety of operations In the first place the enemy must remain uncertain as to the precise point of danger, in the second place, the r."tillery preparation must so far abol-li-h the resistance of machine infant r> fire and wire entanglements, r.ot on one line of the defence, but on all the line., of the defence, as to make the advance of the infantry practicable at most pints, r'inal'y, the thrust must be made on a sufficiently wide front to prevent the victorious raiments being hopelessly enfiladed f.oni either flank al J he vei'y moment (.!' their triumph. Even then everything is not gamed unless the attackers still retain sufficient strength and cohesion to rtj>ol a counter-attack or I.i go straight on, ;is the circumstances dictate.

To posses-; Uitsc assjts implies that they not only possess a very high sense (:' discipline, but that the arrangements ior sending up reinforcement-, rations and ammunition have been carred out with precision and success. Granted all this, and the German front will he hopelessly broken, over a front of, say. ten to twenty mi'es. Such a breakage in n lin.> over three hundred n.'les long, means far more than the retirement of the defending force to n new position a Few miles in the tvar. The ablest general staff in the world could not guarantee to get its whole hue back intact Midi a short distance in the pell-mell and confusion of retreat in which the attackers and defenders would be hopelessly mixed up together, without risking whole army corps being left behind, enfi'aded, outfl inked, or even surrounded.

Can we do it? We must nt any r.nte attempt it, and if we fail the

first time we must try again, and if a third effort, "and if British soldiers we fail the second time we must make are what we think them to he. they will succeed before they have finished. . . . and victory will crown our efforts with peace before the year has run out."