WHAT THE BRITISH EMPIRE HAS DONE IN THE WAR

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 181, 9 June 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

WHAT THE BRITISH EMPIRE HAS DONE IN THE WAR

BY PROFESSOR H. A. L. FiSHER, \ ice-Chancellor of Sheffield University.

The time lias arrived when it seems useful to attempt an answer to a question so .elementary that a smile may rise to the lips at the mere mention of it, but, nevertheless, like many elementary things, vital to the right understanding ot contemporary events and tendencies. The question which we propose to answer is 1-liis: What has the British Empire done in the war ?

It will be convenient to consider in the first place the work of the British navy.

The British navy has swept the German flag off the high seas. But for its assisatnee the German navy, more powerful than the French, would have bombarded French coast towns, sunk several French warships, intercepted French commerce, and endangered the transport of African levies to the theatre of war in France. The intervention of the British navy has not only .saved our ally from these certain and formidable dangers It has been the means oi sinking 40 German warships, five Austrian warships, and six Turkish warships, of capturing at sea or sinking 116 German traders, exclusive of 18 enemy vessels captured near the Suez Canal Zone, and exclusive of 69 German vessels which were detained in ports in the United Ivingd > n. of ihe 34 which were detained in British ports abroad, and of the 26 which were seized on entering British ports after the outbreak ef war.

It has ensured the safe transport of large forces from India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to Europe, of a large army ironi England t.j Franc?, and of considerable forces from England to Egypt hiul the Mediterranean. It has enabled munitions vf war and provisions of a'l kinds to reach Great Britain and France from the United States of America and from other parts of the globe, and at the same time has intercepted the supply of sueh munitions to the enemy countries. How valuable its services have been to our brilliant ally France is generously acknrrvledged by a Fren h writer in the following nassagr

"111 view c/f th.e fact that the greater part of our coal area is invaded by the enemy, the loss of the command of the sea by England would involve more than her own capitulation. She indeed, would lie forced to capitulate through starvation. But France a'so and her new ally, Italy, being deprived

of coal and therefore of the means of supplying their factories and military transport, would soon also >o at the morcy of their rdversaries." It lias enabled the general commerco of the British Empire and of our French ally to be carried on in time of war almost as freely as in tune of peace, and this despite the nitial ravages of some scattered German cruisers and the subsequent operatic '.l, of the German • t'bmannes.

It has I),'in sufficiently si ong not only to guard the coasts of Great Britain and Fran e, to protect tlit transport of troops to the Continent, and to intercept all oceanic commerce with the enemy, but also to conduct operations with the enemy, but also to conduct operations in Samoa. German New Guinea and Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall and Caroline Islands (in conjiii'-tioii with Japan), the Cameroons (in conjunction with the Franih), Walfisch Bay, German East Africa, Tsingi.au (in conjunction with Japan), the Persian Guli. ihe Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aiexaudn tta, the harbour of Su yrna. the Falkland Islands. it has already caused the 'loss of all the Gorman colonic*.

It has proved its superiority in open fight against detachments of the German navy on three occasions, m the action of August 2* in lie iiight .it' Heligoland, at the battle of liie Falkland Islands on December and again in Admiral Sir David Beatty s action of the Dogger Bank on January 2-1, when the Blucher was stink and the Sevdiitz and Derlfliugcr wee set uii fire.

This astounding, but not uuexpteted, achievement lias been the result of incessant and vigilant a< tivities oi which tin' land-faring population of Kuropo lia- on' y the fa in to t ritioii.

Great Britain was not, when the war broke out, a military cu niiy as that term i- understood upon the Continent. 11 Had no ; .m.-eript ,:>my like 11 if fnii' li. no .-•h.'iuo of i oirpul.-ory military truining like the S\> i-s. For its war servi.-.e, both on sea and land, it depended entuely on voluntary oiforl. Ii pos>-. ,v-c.i a ! igi: -trained regulai - army consisting ol some 2:);).l'00 en the active and men on the reserve li>t, an Indian army of about loll,(II) 1 ! moil. and a Urritorial fore? of vol'inteei's for home defence numbering some men. \ol dy. however, could predi'l how inanx logalar troop-, ct.uhl be safe!/ niliah'awn

from India, aor how many n iritoriaN would volunteer for foreign .-"nice, nor what wou'd be ihe military value of a territorial legiment in a modern Continental campaign. These [ rob'ems were not matter of public speculation, be. a ii-e th. ll country at large did not

belfeve either in the imminence or :n the likelihood of a European war. On the contrary, it was never more hotlyengaged in domestic controversy than when the war cloud suddenly burst over Belgium in tne opening week of Augiu , 1014. The Briti.-h Expeditionary Force which crossed the Channel n the second week of August - ithout a single casualty and with a detailed perfection of equipment and i .obilisation which was to on one fore astonishing than to ourselves, consisted in the first instance of two divisions only. For its size it was probably the best fighting force in Europe, for it was composed ot highly-trained long-service soldiers, many of whom had been through the Boer war, and :i'l of whom were in the pink of physical condition. Though it proved to be comparatively weak in machine-guns and heavy artillery, its cavalry was splendidly mounted, and its aircraft superior to that of the enemy in reconnaissance and attack. But hardly had this small force taken up its position on the French frontier when it was compelled to execute the most difficult operation in war- a strategic retreat.

Europe needs no reminder of how the British irmy fought th-il retrea' from lions to the Marne under th» scorching eye of an August sun maintaining its disciplined coherence in the face of overwhelming forces, and so covering its rapid movement L> a series of desperate actions that it helped to save Paris and so determine the whole course of the western ;ampaign The course of the campa;°n had brought the British army into ihe centre of the French line of the Aisne, w position inconvenient for its communications with the Channel Do r t« and consequently opposing obstacles to its easy and regular expansion i?y draft.-' from home. The British comrander accordingly 'eiresented to General .Toffre the desirability of transferring the British contingent to the extreme left of the French armies, where they might he in closer geographical connection with England and protect the Channel ports ii'om seizure by the enemy. The pian was accepted and executed with brilliance. By the second week of October the British armywas holding the hue in Southern Flanders, and there it has remained to this day, barring the northern gateway into Franco.

Once transfer: ed to the north, the British army was called upon to discharge an oihee the gravity oi which cannot be overestimated. An effective offensive was out of the question, for though the losse= incurred in the first two months of the campaign had been repaired and the army augmented by a third corps and two divisions from

Ind:a, it was vastly out-numbered by the forces which tne Germans were 'n a position to bung against it. But as a sample of defensive \ arfare against overwhelming c.dcls it would be difficult to match the defence of the Ypres salient i>y the British troops during the great battle which oegan on October L'O. and ended on November 11.

In the first battle of Ypres the British army, 15U.( ! 0U strong, repulsed a series or attacks extending over three weeks and delivered by a force of half a million men supported by a superior weight of artillery. But the i-econd baitle ol Ypres, though superficial!y 'ess sensational than the first, for the disparity in numbers between the forces engagei' was greatly reduced, furnishes an striking proof of the quality of our troops, it was a 1 attic lasting from April 'll to May Jo and beginning with the tomplet3 and .sudden rout of a French division on our left, which caused a rent i:i the line so wkb that an ercmy led with invoming vigour should have had no ciiiiiculty :n bursting thrcugh to Calais, flu v that rent was cut and how closed i> the story of th's desperate struggle .it Ypres.

Three distinct objects were jichicvetl by the combined action of the British lt-et >and arnry (luring the autumn and winter of the lirst year o!' the war. Ih; 1 iirst 01 those was the protcction of tiio »hattc I**l and enfeebled remnants of the Belgian :• !'iny against ar. overwhelming German attack until such time a-s the flooded Vser provided a strong defensive position beh'nd which the army eou'd he strengthened and reconstituted.

Hew rapidly and efl'eetu.-.'iy those new armies Tiave been raised is one '>f the linest episodes in our national history. When a country is invaded, its homesteads fired its women folk assaulted. it-, wealth plundered, its inno- • cut civilian population ter:onscd by a hrutal soldiery, no artifice > required to bring the teirors of war Im 1 ore the minds of its population. The mannocd

I.i an invaded country lights under a •.t"ni ami unremitting stre-s of bitter determination to free the sacred

s..i 1 from the ir.-olent prcson o of the barbarian. Kvery man knows his duty instinctively. It is plain and palpable

b"loie him. 'iut in the case ol Great Britain and her colonu.s there was no mi'li char ar.d unmistakable message 1" ih.e mind and conscience of the com - oa.n man. The whole territ.i / of the I'ritish Kmpir<\ with the impoi fanf excptaiii o| the South Africa:) l inen, was by reason of the supremacy of the ]!r;ti-li fleet immune from invasion. Nobody in Great Britain had tTie slightest fear that the Germans had t in their power to devastae Kent or Suffolk, to burr. down CnrteiSurv

Cathedral, or to shoot batches of shopmen and country parsons, and r. nation of narrow-mindc l egotists might have been content >d with this r.'tasure of security. But the crucial fact to Oe retained by all who would understand the strength and purpose of the British Empire is that, without the prospect of invasion, the United Kingdom and its dominions have bollard almost as if invasion were actual!} taking place. It has sometimes been said that the voluntary system has fauod. But wiiat country has ever raised over 60 per cent, of its total u<ruitable strength for service beyond rhe seas in a few months? In this murderous collision of nations the main object of the weaker party by land and sea is to wear down the forces of the enemy until weakness has lieon converted into preponderan-e. Now the position of the Allied forces with respect to the Germanic Powers is that they embarked on the war fwitli a marked numerical inferiority. Neither

Russia nor Gre.r Britain was able immediately to pt a sufficient weight into the balance to repair the numerical inferiority of France. Their potential resources Here great. Iheir resources capable of immediate mobilisation were, in view of the difficult task before them, comparatively slender.

Great Britain had to find everything but primarily men. Russia, with abundant supplies of men, had to find munitions, i'he problem for the Allied Powers was to contain the armies of the enemy until the huge resources or Great Britain and Russia could bo made available for effective use. It did not matter where an action was fought, so long as the enemy forces suffered at least as heavily as the Allies, for the principle obje.t of the Allies has been and is to gain time for the full development of their strength against an enemy who lias already expended his maximum power and will steadily grow weaker, both absolutely and relatively to lis opponents.

These general considerations will bring out the special value of the British contribution to tne Allied cause. Our intervention in the war has furnished cur Allies with the mean? both of gaining and profiting by time. If our land army has not been of itself sufficiently strong to reconquer Belgium, it has materially helped in the defence or France, behind which new armies are being prepared and vast stores rf munitions actively accumulated. Though it has continually been engaged with superior forces, it has inflicted enormous losses on the enemy, whose lighting qualities it continues to regard as good, but inferior to its own. And meanwhile, under the shelter of the British fleet, munitions and stores of every kind flow into the armed camps of the Western Allies.