DESPERATION! THE CAUSE OF THE VERDUN ONSLAUGHT.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 175, 19 May 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

DESPERATION! THE CAUSE OF THE VERDUN ONSLAUGHT.

' . a -- « _.i WAS Why the Method of Massed Attack is Doomed to Defeat. By ROBERT BLATCHFORD (Editor of the "Clarion') in the "Weekly Dispatch."

DKSPEKATION!— "The explanation (to my mind) of the sanguinary and so far futile, battle at Voi'dun is—Desperation. The Germans aro feeling the strain—of heavy expenditure and of heavy losses. They are held on every sea front, they are held by htance in the west and by Russia in the east. They have failed in their attempt upon Egypt. They have gained nothing by their raid on the Balkans. They know that while they grow weaker their enemies grow stronger."

DOOMED TO DEFEAT—"Even when backed by an overwhelming superiority in artillery the German infantry attack has never succeeded against the British, or against the French, except in the first weeks of the war and against halftrained troopt. In fact, tho German method of massed attack, the method of trying to walk over the enemy regardless of lx», seems to me a method doomed to defeat unless an overwhelming superiority of numbers can he brought up."

The wiseacres of three years ago, the Haldanes, Lloyd (Gorges, Mac Donalds, and Brunners, who protested before high heaven that the time was ripe for a reduction in armaments, must find the war news strange reading. What would these prescient statesmen have eaid in 1912 to any scaroemonger who had predicted that in three or four years' time we should be reckoning our war costs in thousands of millions? What would they have said had they been told that, with Russia, France, and Italy to help us, we should need an army of four million soldiers to save the Empire ? I can remember some of the things they said when we asked for an army of a million men, and for a naval grant of fifty millions. Six years ago the raising of a million soldiers and the expenditure of £100,000,000 might hays prevented war. Tha political seers ridiculed the demand. Now we are spending £35,000,000 a week. It is, I believe, some twenty years since an amiable Russian gentleman, M. Bloch, wrote a very clever book, in which he proved that, so deadly were the modern weapons of war, war would be impossible. 1 remember the book well. M. Bloch told us of the awful effects of shrapnel, and of the deadly accuracy of the rifle, and estimated thelosses at a percentage which no troops in the world could be called upon to endure. I do not think M. Bloch lived long after the publication of his book. Since his death his theories have oeen disposed of by the Russo-Japanese and the Balkan Wars.

through to Paris, or even to Calais, that would be worth far more. So they made their desperate bid for victory on the Western front. It was the battle of Ypres over again, the same effort, but intensified. It was the battles of Ypna with the newer methods learnt in Poland and in Champagne. But this time the defender: were fully equipped with guns, witii machine guns, and with shell. Had the Russians been fully and properly armed the Mackenson victories would never have been won. Had the French been as defenceless at Verdun as tho Russians were in Poland, the French mast have given way. But the French have not given way. A 6 I write the great battle is still raging. It may continue furiously on one or other of the Verdun fronts for another week or more. But I do not believe the Germans will break through, and I will give my reason. It has come to be accepted as a general axiom that no fortress can hold out successfully against modern heavy guns and high-explosive shell. Wc may accept that axiom. Tha French have accepted it. and have changed Verdun from a fortress to an entrenched and fortified position. A fort or a series of systems of forts may be battered dowa. or rendered untenable by heavy concentrated fire. But a vast system of entrenchments and hidden batteries several miles deep is a different proposition. Fort Douauroont, over the "storming" of which the Huns so loudly and so prematurely boasted, was a part of the Verdun defences as they existed in 1914. It could not have withstood the modern artillery, and had been disarmed and left undefended. Its capture served apparently as no more than a trap to the headstrong Brandcnburgcrs. The real strength of the French position is in their entrenchment;, covered by enfilade machine guns and concea'ed and distant batteries.

A FALSE PROPHET

Now, after the tremendous battles of Armageddon comes the German attack upon Verdun. Since M. Bloch ventured Jus prophecy shrapnel lias become more deadly, field 'guns have increased in range and calibre, heavy guns and monster howitzers have been brought into use in the field, machine guns have multiplied greatly, and high-ex-plosive shell has intensified the horrors and the deadliness of battle. Yet in this attack on Verdun the Germans employed 750,000 men, thousands of machine guns, and 1100 howitzers, guns, and field guns, some of them of a calibre of loin; and the French Army held its own, and tha Germans did not get through. The concentrated fire of more than a thousand guns, firing explosive shell, upon a narrow front for a week, would, one might believe, destroy walls and trenches, concrete and steel, and tear to rags and tatters the whole face of the country. Yet the French Army stood the test, and at every opportunity delivered counter-attacks of H-esis-tible force and fury. Artemus >\ r ard was right; one should never prophesy until he knows. One llin. high-explos-ive shell will blow an oak tree into the air, demolish a house, and leave a crater big enough to swallow a railway engine. How many thousands of such shells fell upon a French front of five miles in a single day's bombardment in the battle of Vet dun ? And the French Army is still in existence and still unshaken. They make brave men in France.

There has lvecn nothing in this or any previous battle on the Western front to lead one to believe that the Germans can storm and capture that position. Tlie German General Staff will sacrifice their troops by tens of thousands. The German infantry will advance under awful punishment with stolid bravery. But there are limits to the endurance of any troops, and \xs must remember that at'the price the Huns would have to pay to take Verdun they arc not likely to have enough men for the work. That the German losses have been terrible there can be no doubt. We hear of one regiment being formed of the remnants of ten; wo hear estimates of 350,000 casualties, of 100,000 dead. We may discount these stories, and may yet believe that before the Germans can take real positions around Verdun their force of 750,000 men will have been so depleted as to he no match for the French reserves. And if they fail: if all they get for tho loss of a quarter of a million men is a few miles of unpeopled valley and' a few shattered forts and burning villages we may credit them with having achieved a disastrous defeat. A few more of such desperate battles and tho Western line of the Huns will (rumple up before the Allies' great offensive is besrun. Already it is conceivable that the German losses at Verdun exceed oud total losses in Gallipoli. Tin's will bring home to us the nature of the carnage.

REAL OBJECT OF THE ATTACK. What was the object of the German attack on Verdun? I have seen many theories, some of them very subtle. But to me the explanation seems more sim, pie than any I have read. To put my meaning into one word, the explanation of this sanguinary, and, so far, futile battle is—desperation. The Germans are feeling the strain. They must be feeling the strain of heavy expenditure and of heavy losses. They are hemmed in. They are hold on every sea-front, they are held by France in tho West and by Russia in the East. They have failed in their attack upon Egypt. They have gamed nothing by their raid on tho Balkans. They know that while they grow weaker their enemies grow stronger. They know that time is on the side of tho Allies. They must break the bars. They must score a victory; they must do it ere it is too late. They had tho choice between the Russian and tho French linos. They had tried the Russian line, and, although everything was in their favour, and the stars in thencourses scorn to fight with the Huns, tho Russian line held. Not only did it hold but it waxed stronger. There are many ( orman writers who profess to regard the Ru«<ians as defcited. But the Gorman General StatF know bettor. T'.ion a success in France would bo more sensational and more fruitful. To win through to Pet'og.-ul would bo a grent score; but to win

One piece of Go-man bnastfulness is worth noting. It is tho claim of the Gorman military crite. Maior Mornht, that "tho French and British will bo exposed to disaster until they ronlso that the Germans excel! thorn in infantry att'ick. Even when backed by an overwhelming superiority in artillery the Gorman infantry attack has never succeeded agnin<-t tho British, or ngninst the French, except in the first weeks of the war, and against half-trainod troops. Tn fact, the Gorman method of massed attack, tli•> method of trying to walk over the enemy, regardless of loss, seems to mo a method doomed to dofont unices an overwhelming superiority of numbers can be brought up.

"NOT A STAGE HERO"

One question I have heard mooted while tli is torrible struggle has boon going on is: Why don't the British airmen help by nttaekng the Germans at some other point of their line? The only answer I enn offer is that tho British troops in France are part of the Allied army commanded by General Joffre. If the British remain inactive we must assume that General JofFro docs not wish them to striko: and wo must content nmvolve* with tho roflecti! n that General .Ir.ffro is unite as clever as w«> are, and knows a good deal more about the situation.

they are in action. In theory at least, r however, tlie turret'system is not now. j The American Lake; Torpedo-boat Com- j pan?, from whom the Germans are Raid , to have stolen the designs from virion I the. majority of their submarines arc ' built, has tor a da-ado included among its specifications a "submarine cruiser" 1 built on precisely the lines described. j What is the significance of these new . super-submarines, more than six times j as heavy as our own E class:' Since the j beginning of August last year only one j British warship, the armed liner India, j has been sunk by a submarine in North- i cm Europe, and in the same period the j Admiralty has announced the dec-true- ; tioa of only two enemy submarines, ; sunk off the' Belgian eaost by aircraft ; bombs on August 20 and November 28 j respectively.

If the published accounts of the new , U-boats are coriect, it cannot be denied that they will modify the existing stats . of affair-* very considerably. Working ; only upon the meagre information that : is allowed to come to our knowledge, it i is known that the most successful meth- I ods of lighting the submarine have been I provided by destroyers and drifters, to ' which vessels Admiral Sir Reginald , Bacon attributed the immunity of his '• fleet from loss by submarine attack ' during his operations off the Belgian ; coast. A submarine of 5000 tons, how- i ever, would easily hold her own m rom- ! bat with a destroyer, while the drift- ; ers whose mod' of operation cannot be | described, would find themselves severe- ! ly handicapped when tackling a vessel ; of the power which a 5000-ton submarine would necessarily possess. The fast I motr-boat, too, would be useless. ■

Tt may well ho, therefore, that the [ advent of Ilu- super-submarine, asstini- i ing it to the characteristics with which it lias been eroditod, will nocc-si. tsit-o n complete revision of the methods : by which smallc craft wore circum- ; vented, and because of this their ap- : poarane-e at rea i.iay at first bo attended hv iin appreciable moasuro of success. This would especially l>e the ease> if the Admiralty's acquaintance with j what lias been goitv.c on in German ship- j yards is "necessarily speculative''— the phrase and the confession are the First Lord's. On ilte other hand there are lonMdc'-iitioiv; which render the bi<; f-iibniarino nioro vulnerable than the .smaller, lis motive-power when suhm.'r.L'.od mu'-t be enormously greater and the noise of tiie motors correspondin yly easier to detect, while the in- , or'•;:-od bulk and speed when cruising j beneath tiie surfaeo would further help . Id betray its v-herealmuts more dis- j tinetivelv than in the case of a. nnaller | ves : ol. Tn any event, the navy which J so quickly came to grips with the sub-

HIS WEIGHT. A certain retired tradesman admits that he is "a very poor judge of a good horse," while the local blacksmith claims to be "'a good judge, of a bad one." And in this connection an amusing story is being told at the expense, of the fomrcr. He had bought a very old horse very cheap, and took the animal down to the blacksmith's to be shod. ''How many shoes am I to put on?" asked the blacksmith, critically surveying the antiquated steed. "Oh. four," said the owner; adding, doubtfully, "if he's worth 'em." The blacksmith put two shoes on and then stopped. "Mind you." ho explained to the proud owner of the equine wreck, "I'm not faying as your 'oss isn't worth another couple, o' shoes, but I'm quite sartain as he's got as many as he can carry away." TOMMY'S QUESTION. Mr. and Mrs. Bailey were entertaining a few friends. "Yes, I think I really must get a motor-car in the spring," said the ho.-t, casually, during a lull in tlie conversation. "I haven't quite decided what make yet; but it's no use gettiag a cheap one, they're sometimes so unreliable. I suppose I can get a really f-erviccable little affair for nine hundred pounds or so." While the company wore still gasping at tlii-s careless mention of wealth, one lady turned o Bailey jjunior and remarked:— "I say. Tommy, your father's going to buy a motor-car for you to ride in. Eight-year-old Tommy tinned glcefuilv to bis nareuL

"I say, dad," he asked/' will that funny-hiking man call every week for the money, like he did last year when ynu bought the bicycle?'' THE HUNS EAT D.l). MEAT. THEY CANNOI AFFORD MEAT IX GERMANY.

Fool i> so dear in Germany that the. p-vu-er ehi• se« arc quite unable to afford meat, wlivh now costs hall'-a-eiown to t!ir. * shillings a noutnl. The liun professors, however, have iiiveiited it aew kind of food, called D.O. meat. Like K.K. bread it is partly the genuine thing and party not. It iv in fact, a mixture nf dried corf, vesvtah'e fats and meat or bacon.

A Berlin paper in a recent article stated that the n<'\v meat was not on ! ,v nniiri.diinc, but had the advnnta.ee of being only tenpenco a pound, a price within range of the pockets f the poorer classes.