THE GERMAN AIR RAIDS.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 173, 12 May 1916, Page 4 (Supplement)

THE GERMAN AIR RAIDS.

According to the reviewers—the volume itse'f has not yet reached us—the latest number of the "Times History of the War," dealing with the German air raids on England, has a good deal to say ; n criticism of tho Government towards these. First of all, the authorities made too light of them; they denied that they could achieve any useful military purpose, and the results of the earlier ones to some extent bora out their contention. They forgot hat theso were merely experimental, and that as time wore on the German aviators would inevitably become more adept in their work of destruction. Thus to begin with the anti-aircraft guns wero too few and of too small a calibre; there was an inadequato cupply of aeroplanes to drive off the raiders; the public were insufficiently mstrurted about the best things to be dona when a raid was in progress; and, paradoxically, a censorship which insisted upon rigid secrecy in more oi less unessential matters allowed an extraordinary and disastrous degree of latitude in this one. There were practically no restrictions whatever imposed upon the press in its descriptions of the earlier raids. The locality visited could be mentioned, even the street and number of houses on which bombs fell. All tho papers, as a matter of course, published diagrams of the routes followed by the Zeppelins. The Germans must have chuckled in those days, for England magnanimously told them the precise details which they wanted most to know, and showed them how far the conjectures and calculations of their Zeppelin commanders tallied with fact. When it was recognised that air raids had to bo taken into account as something moro thai, the comparatively harmless obsession of a scientific crank, tho Government's policy was completely reversed. Tho anti-aircraft establishment was strengthened, though to what exent and upon what lines is naturally not stated, and tho censorship, repenting of its previous indulgence, went to the other extreme and erred by insisting on an injudicious degree of reticence in all references to tho subjejet. It was certainly prudent to disallow anything which might localise the places attacked for tho benefit of future raiders. No sensible person objected to that. But by permitting no elescriptions of the raid to bo published beyond the bare statement by the Admiralty, officialdom made a bad mistake. Tho authorities intended by this moans to prevent exaggerated and highly coloured accounts, which might needlessly alarm the public; in po.nt of fact, their policy produced tho precise result which they had hoped to avoid. They could not keep p iople from talking and writing to each other about these things, and they forgot that the surpriso and horror of thoso who saw the effects of an attack would inevitably give them a distorted idea of its actual importance. "The civilian who .wit- '

nessed a Zeppelin raid for the first tine nearly always imrgined casualties and tho loss of property to be much greater than they were. In every district whero an attack took place the residents wrote long letters to their friends describing the scenes. Many such letters, written inder tho stress of great emotion, wero greatly, if unconsciously, exaggerated. These personal narratives were eagerly sought for in the absence of newspaper reports, were circulated all over the Kingdom, and were handed from friend to friend. Thus, in place of descriptions written by men whoso life's work it was to get at the truth and record the real facts, the nation had the series of uneonsored, over-coloured, privatelywritten narratives.'' The effect of all this was particularly unfortunate ; n neutral countries. Since their accredited correspondents were not allowed to send details, the newspapers had to fall back upon tho stories f returned travellers, who naturally mado the most of their chance, and repeated the worst of tho rumours which lost nothing in the telling. "Thus," concludes the author, "the net result of this policy of silence was to produce a wholly falso impression of what had taken place. . . The fact is that those responsible for the* publication of war news showed at this stage a total misapprehension of the psychology of the British nation.' It is only fay- to add that tho mistake was recognised last February, when the press was allowed (subject to certain obvious restrictions in which it gladly acquiesces) to resume its legitimate function as far as air raids were concerned. Tho author descril>es in some detn.il tho various att. KS on England. Wo havo heard most of the story before, but it is one thing to read of the raids as reported at intervals in the press and another to read of the whole shameful series together. It is a cumulative record of utter barbarism. The sinking of a Lus.tania or an Ancona shocks the conscienco of the world, but in some ways the history of the Zeppelin raids is worse. In these there is no possibility of pleading impulse or misapprehension. Their authors can be inspired by nothing but cold blooded, calculated malevolence. They attack from a height which makes discrimination quite impossible; at the very best their indifference to the fate of noncombatants is criminal: at the worst the batants is criminal; at the worst the gleo exhibited by themselves and the German press at their performances is revolting. It is nothing to them that in the list of their victims, soldiers and sailors represent an infinitesimal proportion. They glory in their exploits of "military significance"—that is to say, in tho maimed and shattered bodies of children, women, and oTd men; in homes destroyed, and in quiet villages riven as by an earthquake. When per. 1 comes Germany will begin her new career with much that will bo very hard ever to live down. Nothing will takj longer than a certain incident that occurred in a country field far trom any habitation. A school treat was in progress, a Zeppelin flew overhead, and its commander decided that for want of bigger game this would suffice.