THE STRATEGY OF THE GREAT WAR.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 169, 28 April 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE STRATEGY OF THE GREAT WAR.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE IN MODERN CAMPAIGNING, BY MAJQT GEORGE W. REDWAY.

Owing to an ■unniilitary upbringing, it is in no way surprising that the averages mind is still confused over tevms and expressions of war. Even eighteen mouth 3 of endeavour to catch up with a fighting system which was traditional with cur Continental friends and enemies, could not be expected to dispel our inherent ignorance or ail matters military. Among the many terms which are misapplied and generally misunderstood, even by people in prominent official positions, perhaps the word "Strategy" is the most frequent example. The Editor cf '<The War Illustrated," therefore, asked .Major Redway, the eminent war critic, to contribute the following article by way of explanation of the term.

L'ke the old lady who found spiritual comfort in "that blessed word Mesopotamia," many public writers and speakers cling to the term ".strategy" as an explanation of any military movement the object of which is not clear to th.-n, and iso strategy is often mistaken for tactics, policy, or administration. Lord Haldano has been a frequent offender in this respect, and on one occasion perpetrated an n-stonishing hetise. As War Minister he told us that "the strategy which won battles wan one tiling: the strategy which in cold blood and through a series of years devised the organisation of armies was a dtfferent tiling." But it is tacties, not strategy, that is concerned with the Winning of battles, and army organisation is a branch of military administration.

ease of supplies—and that is interception. i THE ENEMY'S COLOSSAL i MISTAKE. ! The third form of strategic attack is penetration, or breaking the front, and this was the manoeuvre attempted i-y the Germans in France in August, 1914. General Jofrre had echeloned his armies between Nancy and Mons. Like the steps of a ladder, the commands of Castlenau, Ruffey, Do Langle de Gary Lanrezac, anil iSir John Eiinch stood in four isolated groups on a front of one hundred and seventyfive milis, leaving a gap in the centre about Sedan. The military sin of the Germans was in failing to pierce the French centre hereabouts, and so sop- ' aratUig the French left wing from the French right wing before giving battle. It was the furious, premature attack of Von Kluck upon the British that caused the retreat from Mons in hot haste and upset the German plan, which was to detain the forces of Sir John French and Lanrezac in position until Vmi Hansen and the Duke of Wurtemborg had reached the Aisne. When the strategic front of an army has been broken the divided wings can he attacked piecemeal and driven in opposite directions —Napoleon's favourite method. But tn'« and other forms of the strategic offensive have crumbled to nieces in the present war, and that is why hostilities are prolonged. The strategic defensive ha,s proved itself to be what Clausewitz calbd it —the stronger form of war. Just as there are three forms of strategic attack, tso there are three modes of strategic defence. and the first is the defence of the frontier. To preserve nur native soil from the foot of an aggressive neighbour, to protect its inhabitants, is what an army, is maintained for, opines the taxpayer; but thin is easier said than done, even when natural obstacles like the Vosges Mountains or the River Vistula,-or fortresses lik'> Liege and Namur, seem to buttress the defence. Almost in. variably the invader will practise some. deception and concentrate lis masses upon sonio weakly guarded point. The exceptions prove the rule, as when the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula found they could bring up troops, their food and ammunition, faster by land than we could bring ours by sea, and on such a narrow tongue of land the defenders could never be in doubt where the blow would be delivered. All that our Mediterranean Expeditionary Force gained after a six months' campaign was stand ng room on a rocky beach. How different in Belgium, France and Russia! lint we turned the tables on the Turks when they ventured across the desert to invade Egypt. The deduction is obvious—namely, that an inhospitab'e terrain is the true defence of a frontier, and in highly cultivated countries or those traversed by railways or navigable waterways a defending army must resort to another mode of defence—the retreat into the interior. In this case the army is preserved at the expense of the inhabitants and the national property, for the country should be laid was'o in front of the invader, who must then halt and await convoys of food from his base. The farther he advance; the longer his delay in procuring the means to keep the held, and in theory a point should be reached at which the balance of military power in: I nes to the defending army, which then delivers the counter-stroke.

THE SECRET OF THE GENERALISSIMO.

The term strategy is hard to define, but if we consider policy as the affair of the Government, administration a.s the business of the War Office, and tactics as the art of the battle leaders, we see that strategy must be the concern of the Commander-in-Chief; and, in fact, his plan of campaign is only another expression for his poY-onal views on strategy. It follows thai for each campaign there must be a separate commander who frames his own strategy, though in doing so he must have regard to the policy laid down by Ins Government — represented by the War Minister—as well as to the resources placed at his disposal by the War Office, and to the standard of tactics reached by his fighting troops,and the divisional generals. All those points are we'l illustrated by the despatch of Sir lan Hamilton published on January 7th. Strategy illustrates the intellectual rather than the physcal side of war, a''id a general is said to "impose h'fl will" upon the enemy when his plan of campaign deprives his adversary of the initiative: in other words, if General A takes the offensive, General B must, willy-ni'ly, assume a defensive attitude. Now the advantage of taking the offensive m a strategic souse is that by crossing the frontier you wage war at the enemy's expense, and pre-

serve your fellow-countrymen from such honors as have been witnessed in Belgium, Fiance, and Poland. But the invader must be sure of his ability to keep the lead he has gained, for a chock V, a confession of unsuspected weakness, as when the (hand Duke Nicholas came to a halt after invading East Prussia and Gnlioia ; as when the Kaiser's advance into Franco wan arn stod at the Manic: as when Sir John Nixon's progress in Mesipntaniia was stayed by the Turks near Bagdad. Defensive strategy is usually the refuge of the weak or the unready, for it conserves strength and gains time. General Maxwell defended Egypt a year ago without ere-s ng the Suez Canal, and an Austrian commander linn resisted the Italian invasion since la.st May with such snrp'ns troops as could lie spared from the operations in Bussin and Sorbin. In only three campaigns has offensive strategy been wholly successful so far —namely, the Anglo-Japanese expedition to KiaoChau, General Botha's invasion of South-West At'r'ca. and quite recently in Serbia. Elsewhere defensive strategy has enabled the weaker side to keep the invader at bay, though whether we shall witness such a counterstroke as that which carried Wellington from Lisbon to Touloise in 1813-14 remains to 1)0 seen. The counterstroke is the pursuit of a would-be invader within h : s own i'ront'er. The first cave of a general is to decide wisely between invasion and waiting to lie invaded; but, in the case of invasion, a further choice must bo made of a form of strategic attack. .Military pundits speak of three modes of procedure, ea'lod Envelopment, Penetration, and Intercept:on; and tin so nil have reference to the selection of a starting point— called _ tho base —an objective, and the military routes from one to the other. The clearest example of envelopment is that of Marshal Maokonsen's invasion of Serbia. The Austrian* ba-ed on Bosnia crowed the Drina moving eastwards, and Mackensen's army based on Hungary came southwards over the Danube. Kvidently a Serbian army, remaining north of N'ish, would be encompassed bi fore ever a shot was tired. In other words, it would l>o strategically enveloped, and then it must light on three* fronts if it stand to light at all.

DEFENSIVE STRATEGY IX THKEI« CONTINENTS.

The Germans in the Cameroon are exploiting this form of defence, and thov aim at foiling General Dobell. who hope,; to bring them to a decisive aet'on before his little army wastes away bv disoa.se and losses in guerilla warfare. Tie Turks in the Tigris Valley are also finding their account in this strategic retreat in spite of our successful light at Ctesiphon. The Russians inw Miind the l)w na would be thrice as effective for action to-day if they had voluntarily abandoned Warsaw Inst year. General -lofl're's premature battles on the front or, before tho arrival of S:r John French, weakened h's army for the Battle of the Maine. But policy rare'y permits a genoraMo treat h : s frontier regions as the enemy will treat them, and one can imagine what a domestic upheaval would have followed tho burning of towns and v.l!ag<s, tho evacuation of the population, and the di struct on oi railways and bridge-, in Northern France as a means e.f impeding the German advance. The result of a tender policy in 1!»14 is that the enemy is in IS) 16 s+'ll subsisting neon the inhabitants who are hold in lwndage to the con((tivror. And. in speaking of what might have been. «c arc brought tn the th'rd mode of .-trategio defence, which may lie illustrated from tho recent situation in Serbia. Marshal Putn It, with nn army at no time 'argor than the Bulgarian Army, could never hope to cent aid also with the Ausirians and Germans, and therefore he was bound t'i re I real — but in what diroefou? Many would s;iy be .-hoii'd have hastened south to unite with the Finn: ;-B'itf-h exped lion, but strategy lied a very different course. WHAT MARSHAL PI'TNIK MIGHT HAVE DON*!. By moving westwards into the hill country he could have fought to advantage on a familiar terrain, if tho enemy pressed; but if on the other band the enemy declined to follow him into tho mountain, he could, as it

Inter:option may 1).- cal'ed an nnijjlt-(k-ntion uf envelopment, anil of this process we haVe seen no esample ho fin- duriiiii; the war: lint last summer wo were on tenterhooks hst tlio (Jraiul Duke Ni'-lu.la-t, liv luinjrinj; on to Warsaw, 1 I'l euahle the enemy to ef;'c t interception: for at the end of .1 u!v tin- Aiu;tro-G.M-inans were cro«sw<"' tiie N'iir-w on hi- and fio V stida on liis left, and another week would have seen the junction of these free s to the i*a>t i f Warsaw Ike an ;,.,,„ |, ,„,! , ncirelint; the main Uu-<daii iirinv. I'he (jirand Duke would then have h id mi fii;-e to the rear and cur ',,:,, W av ma if he could! Such was the situation of Ha.'.nino at Metz and .Macjlahon ai Sedan ill I*7o, and m ii:ilh <:; is"-; the whole arnn had to <-urr nder to avoid oxt-rmination in l>attj... |i General .lofl'ro cou'd contrive t:i sti-.ko northwards from Verdun to l,iee;e. the fate of all the German armies west of the Mciise would he sealed, for they would ho cut off from their

were, lie in wait until Marshal Mackenscu proceeded southwards to meet the Salonika expedition. Then would have coine the golden opportunity for Marshal Putmk to issue forth and harass the enemy's convoys and their escorts coming from the Danube.

In such circumstances General Sarrail could have acted in a similar fashion against the Bulgarian Army moving westwards. Both forces would have taken up "a flang position" an it if) t-ullcd, than which few defensive manoeuvres are more effective. Forty years ago Orsman Pasha brought the whole Russian Army to a standstill for five months by thus emerging from Widin after the invader had crossed the Danube. Whether, in fact, the Serbian commander conceived such a plan in October we do not know; but it is supposed that, before retiring to his present positon, he wa.s tempted into fighting with superior forces, though that could serve no useful purpose—indeed, it may have rendered him unlit to operate with effect when the Framo-British expedition moves forward. Strategy is "a power that' differs from the mere ability to fight.'" In conclusion we must observe that, in the present war. the principal campaigns have not l>eeiY conducted with the vigour which was looked for after the experiences rr.f the Austrians in 1866 and the French in 1870, to say nothing of the campaign in Manchuria and the Balkans in the present century. A remnrkab'e equalisation of forces has coincided with a dis'nclinat'on to run risks on the part of the generals. Offensive strategy has been yoked with defensive tactics, every gain of ground has been consolidated by chtienchmcnts of n semi-permanent character, and the result is a deadlock that will last until one side or the other reaiis.fi that keeping nvllions of men under arms, employed in self-preserva-tion rather than the defeat of the enemy, is a negation of the art of war.