HUN BOASTS AND COLD FACTS.
WHY THE GERMAN CHANCES OF WINNING DIMINISH. By ROBERT BLATCHFORD. The Germans have an abiding faith in advertisement, but with characteristic German "thoroughness" they overdo it. It is all very well for a Thrasonical Chancellor to split the ears of his Reichstag groundlings with boasts of universal victories, for it helps to keep the German public in good heart. But boasts, like curses, come home to roost; and when Germany learns the truth there may come a dangerous recoil. It is quite true that Germany, Austria. Turkey, and Bulgaria hav<> utterly defeated Montenegro and have signally beaten Servia. And perhaps these valiant deeds and mighty conquests may have impressed the .smaller neutrals. But upon the Allies they have had no effect unless it De to tighten their hands upon their swords. The German war god, Clausewitz, gave considerably importance to the influencing of public opinion in war. But lie d;d not propose to influence public opinion in the enemy's country by blatant boasts of unimportant victories over small forces in distant and minor theatres of war. His ice a was thus expressed : "Public opinion is ultimately gained by great victories and by possession of the enemy's capital." That was how Clausewitz proposed to turn the public opinion of the enemy in the direction of surrender or appeals for peace. POINTS THEY FAIL TO SCORE. The authority of Clausewitz in Germany is so thoroughly established that we may quote him against the modcu Huns with every confidence. Writing of the principles of strategy, C'ausewitz says:—"'The first and most important maxim which we can set before outselves is to employ all the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy. The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible at the point where the decisive blow is to l>e struck. The success at that point will compensate for all defeats at secondaiy points." Again, Clause wit/, fa id : —" But whatsoever may b 0 tho central po.nt of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our ultimate operations, still the conquest ami destruction of his army is the Giirest commencement, and, in all cases, thi. most essential." These principles of the greatest of German authorities on strategy ate supported by the authority of a sti'! greater soldier, Napoleon, who said: "There are many good generals ti Europe, but they sec too many things at one time. As for mo, I see only one thing, the enemy's chief army, and I concentrate ali my efforts to destroy it." Clausewitz learned a great deal from Nnpo'eon; Germany has learned nearly all she knows from Clausewitz " AMAZED" —BUT WHY? Yet we have the German war lords claiming victory and professing amazement because the Allies do not acknowledge themselves beaten. How can the pupils of Clausewitz expect to gain the public opinion of their enemies without fulfilling the conditions laic.' clown by him for success? To gain public opinion the Germans are told that they must win great victories and occupy the enemy's capital. They have g.a.ned no groat victories and they have nut entered Paris or Petrograd or Loti don. Clausewitz and Napoleon have toid them that to be victorious they must defeat and overthrow the enemy's main army of France, of Russia, or ol Britain. They have never eet foot on British soil. They are held in France, and more than hold. I hey are held by Russia and more than held. They have suffered heavy losses in men and material, their resources are fast ia; 1' they have an enormous front to dei n:d, and* tae armies and munitions of t :r enemies are giowing steadily. The "'decisive points" in this war aie on tho Anglo-French and Russian fronts, and —on the sea. Any cool observer wil perceive that in spite of the German advances east and west, the German chance of winning has diminished since the autumn of 1914 and is still hopelessly diminishing. On the sea they are hopelessly and completely beaten, and they have lost their colonies and tliea 1 trade. If they expect the Allies to despair under these cond.tions they are marvellously sanguine, 'lho Allies mean to fight to a finish and are confident of victory. No one can gainsay the reality of the Russian recovery on the eastern front. No one can deny that the Germans are more than hold on the western front. The French success in Champagne was a great victory. The French official account of this battle shows tha the Germans were driven from positions they thought impregnable, with a loss of 1 ~)U guns and 25.001) prisoners, and with total casualties of 140,000 men. To give an ice; of the magnitude ot this nuccess, the French General Staff quoted, for comparison, the results of famous battles of the past. At Jena the French too* 15.000 prisoners and 200 guns; at Austerlitz 12.WK) prisoners and lrG guns. At St. Privet the French casualties 10,000 men. As for our own country, we have only to cease playing the fool and put our Brit is!', back into it and the end is sure. And, just to tickle the [ essimists, I will remind tl'.cm that we came through a more critical and dangerous trial above a century ago. In 1797 we had France, Spain, ana Holland united against us. We had only a small Army, and our Navy was in n state of mut'ny. In that year Admirak Jems, Nelson, and Duncan won the two almost miraculous naval victories, over the French and Spanish at St. Vincent and over the Dutch at Camperdown. Ireland was in revolt, and the Dutcn fleet under Admiral Winter was bound to Ireland to cover a French invasion.
Tlio British camo through all ilmt, and a!-o thronu.li other crises,, as :n the <a-e of Napoleon's invas on of Esiypt. find the cn'c of the coal'tion of several Powers nprnst us in IMU when Nelson captured tlio Danish 'loot fit Copenhagen, and in tho cae of Napoleon's threatened invasion e.f England. which wa- prevented hv Nelson's last victory at Trafalgar. Wo are .1 1 igger, richer, stronger Tower now than wo were a century ago, and our men have prove:' l in Galhpoli and Flanders. in the North Sea and the Atlantic, that their courage and stamina are tip to the highest British standard. I spoke i 11st now of Napoleoninvasion of Eizypt. How history repeats itself. In 1797, a year of great British naval victories, Napoleon wrote: "The time is not far distant when we shall fecf. that truly to destroy England we
must take possession of Egypt.'' in 1916, the Kaiser and ins g< and allies are ob&ossed with tli< :ciea. Where the great Napoleon the little Kaiser hopes to succee Hope has always been notorious i "flatterng tales." —"Week!; patch."
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Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 161, 31 March 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)
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1,141HUN BOASTS AND COLD FACTS. Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 161, 31 March 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)
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