THROUGH ENEMY STAFF'S EYES.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 158, 24 March 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

THROUGH ENEMY STAFF'S EYES.

By HILAIRK BELOC m "Land and Water.''

THEIK LIMITATIONS AND Ol'il POSSIBILITIES. SUCCESSES EXCUSE EXCESSES.

Of ni.s plan as a whole, the enemy now knows, like a piece of ancient Inslory, that lie has failed in that rap-.l action which was his one clearly thought-out scheme. He failed to surround, p'erce, or put nut (if action in any fashion, the French Armies: therefore, his war, which was to nave hecn the end of •. trilogy, the .short, sure, triumphant, and conclusive chapter parallel to, but greater than, the chapters of lfco6 and i:-"(.), has yet become an immensely expensive, not yet disastrous, but already very doubtful thing. Take it for all in all, the general attitude of the enemy's Higher Cora mand at tin's moment admits the po;sibiity of winning through, but if he believed it possible, through the political weakne-.s of Irs enemies, through their division l , and lack of common direction, through their suppc.f.eu weariness, through the'r diversity, through the advent of new forces (as yet neutral) upon his side, tnrough the violent financial pressure which the cosmopolitan usurers ha\> a'ready begun to exercise in Irs favour: yet he knows that even one of those elements in his calculations, valuable as they are, aiy separate from the purely military elements of th.e situation. PURELY MILITARY ELEMENTS. Now what are tiic-< purely military elements in the situation? One: The great main forces of too enemy and the Allies stand, and must necessarily stand, in Poland and in France. If the end of the war finds them itill standing, or if tin 1 enemy gets a real decision, well and good : or so much the better lor him. On the other hand, the two great lines, the Eastern and Western, equally offer an opportunity for his foes. Let iiim suffer a decisive defeat upon either, and he is imed.iately lost. For how long and in what fashion can we stand, or even later perhaps attempt an offensive upon these two lines? We know within a very close margin how the German Contingent stands with regard to this problem; That, with the end of 1910, they exhausted their efficient reserves, '.'hey are beginning to draw upon their first categories of inefficient!,, and they keep in reserve wiiat remains of their young or class HUG, while preparing to call up at any moment the still younger class I£' 17! INDEFINITE PROLONGATION ? XO. Sum it up, and it is clearly apparent that the effort as a whole is one which permit.., of no indefinite prolongation. Jt is a situation not relieved at all by a risky extension of front in the Balkans, but it is a situation which the addition of Greece, and much more the addition of Rumania, would temporarily relieve. No one in writing a nrlitary history would call siicii a situation a "victory, "or even see m it a tendency towards victory, it is a condition of siege; but of a siege that can be well maintained for some longer, and which the enemy hopes to raise. Staff surveying he situation knows, Numerically, the German General just as we know, that the situation of the Allies is one permitting an almost indefinite prolongation of hostilities. On the other hand, this numerical calculation alone is not everything. )t is upon other factors tnat the German Higher Command is speculating for its chances of maintaining its position until (as it hopes) the great Alliance shall either dissolve or grow weary. But while moral elements can be stated they cannot be measured with the : .me measuit as the numerical ones; no one can give an exact calculation of taeni. A sober judgment will lean against any exaggeration of them, and it ■- probable that the enemy's Higher Command, in its private calculations, gives them very much less weight than is given to them in public pronouncements. HIS MAXIMI'M : OUR EXTENSION. A legend confined to tins country, or rather to some sections of this country, suggests that this growing inferiority of the enemy's position in man-power is made up by his superior power of production. But he has reached his maximum of production. Further, the neutral market in complete munitions (for what it is still worth) is open to the Allies and closed to t'n.e enemy. There is little doubt, if we take tinevidence of reliable observers, that not only German eivi'ian opinion, but the general opinion of the country, ncluding the rank and file of the army in Germany, is that the Central Powe' ■■ have already won the war. For instance, in econon its a few experts have heart.! of index n nubers. and can discuss the inflation of the currency an! gold reserve, out for the mass of the people a live pound note is a piece ol absolute value. It is just the same in military affairs. Tins general or popular opinion regards an advance as tic one proof of military success, a retirement as the one proof of military failure.